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VOLUME 32 NUMBER 3 SUMMER 1988

War and Peace in the Middle East
The Baghdad Alternative — Laurie Mylroie — 339
Israel's Security Dilemma — Michael Mandelbaum — 355

The Soviet Historical Debate — Jiri Hochman — 369

South Africa's Bomb: A Military Option? — Michèle A. Flournoy and Kurt M. Campbell — 385

Policy Brief:
Getting to Mars — John W. Garver — 403

Review Essays
The Use (and Mainly Misuse) of History — Richard N. Haass — 411
Is Gorbachev a Revolutionary? — Vladimir Tismaneanu — 420

Documentation
Torture — Armando Valladares — 427
Confessions of a Soviet Muslim Rebel — Abd al-Qadir — 432

Correspondence — 437

Brief Reviews — 447
World Politics — 449
International Economics — 457
War Studies — 461
The Middle East — 464
Asia and the Pacific — 473
The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe — 476
Latin America — 481
Africa — 486

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THE BAGHDAD ALTERNATIVE

by Laurie Mylroie

The U.S. government has a problem in the Persian Gulf. The two powers of the region, Iran and Iraq, are engaged in all-out war. Yet Moscow has better relations with both of them than Washington has. The Soviets remain Iraq's largest arms supplier, but at the same time Soviet officials routinely visit Iran — without chocolate cakes or military spare parts. These two relationships are connected: Moscow's support for Baghdad serves as leverage with Tehran. This has been especially evident at the United Nations where the Soviets have thwarted U.S.-led efforts to implement a cease-fire that would benefit Iraq. Being dependent on Moscow for arms, Baghdad can do little to stop its maneuvering.

By contrast, the United States lacks meaningful ties with either belligerent. Tehran rejects normal relations: that is why Washington got no benefits from the arms sales caper — neither dialogue nor freed hostages. Nor is there much chance for an improving relation with Iran. The Khomeinists need to portray the United States as "the Great Satan." This legitimizes the regime as the defender of Islam against a "Zionist-imperialist conspiracy." Absent such a conspiracy — if Iran admits that the United States and Israel are friendly, even to the point of selling Tehran arms — where is the danger to Islam, and by what right do the mullahs, *hojjatulislams*, and ayatollahs hold sway? This abiding problem of the regime's domestic legitimacy blocks any resumption of Iranian-American relations.

In the case of Iraq, however, it is American reticence that prevents the relationship from developing. In their quiet way, Iraqi leaders seem interested in establishing closer ties. The U.S. reluctance results from a perception that the great prize in the Persian Gulf, Iran, though lost in 1979, will one day be regained. Washington therefore clings to neutrality in the Gulf war — despite repeated attacks by Tehran on American lives and property — and remains aloof from Iraq. Nothing is done that might forfeit a relationship after the ayatollah, or (worse still) that might drive Iran into the arms of Moscow.[1]

[1] Many analysts stress the importance of avoiding action which would alienate Iran for the sake of the post-Khomeini regime: Shireen Hunter, "After the Ayatollah," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1987; Nicholas Schahgaldian, *The Iranian Military Under the Islamic Republic*, (Santa Monica: Rand, 1987); and George Nader, "Iran's Sense of Religious Mission," *Wall Street Journal*, January 13, 1988.

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This is a mistake. I shall argue that Iraq's foreign policy and internal situation have, since 1982, led to a rough and unrecognized congruence in American and Iraqi interests. To be sure, it is not easy to think of Iraq in this light, for Baghdad was hostile to the United States for almost as long as Iran was friendly. But the war has altered Iraq's position in fundamental and enduring ways, with the result that American-Iraqi cooperation offers a potential source of mutual benefit. Not to take up this offer means losing an important opportunity.

Iraq Before the War

To understand Iraq today, we must first review some history. Two "revolutions" — the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 and the seizure of power by the Arab Ba'th (renascence) Socialist party in 1968 — produced highly ideological regimes in Baghdad. Even in an area characterized by radical governments, Iraq's Ba'thist rulers stood out, espousing a wildly anti-Western, anti-Zionist policy intended to assure legitimacy at home.

This extremism in part reflected the isolation of Iraq. In the Ottoman era and until 1914, Iraq was a backwater far removed from Istanbul and even further removed from Europe. Even since 1914, Iraq's relative isolation has continued; consequently the population has had relatively little experience with the outside world, and regimes have been free to pursue whatever odd, often brutal, policies seemed to meet immediate needs. As the country's ethnic and sectarian fragmentation has always made Iraq difficult to rule, even the Iraqi monarchy (installed by the British in 1920) pursued heavy-handed practices by the benign standards of the day, with an active internal security force. The far more repressive regimes that have ruled since 1958 reinforced Iraq's traditional isolation, and thus its extremism.

For all its faults, the Ba'th regime at least provided stability. Under the monarchy cabinets lasted eighteen months on average. From 1958 to 1968, three military coups followed in quick succession. But the Ba'th party has governed for twenty years. Combined with a ninefold increase in oil revenues between 1973 and 1980, this stability led to unprecedented economic growth, which in turn allowed the population to overlook some of the harsher aspects of Ba'thist rule.[2]

Indeed, the regime places great stress on its role in bringing modernity to Iraq; that is central to legitimizing Ba'thist rule. Ba'thist

[2] Diplomats resident in Baghdad explain that, despite their initial doubts, they witnessed a genuine popularity that Saddam Husayn seems to enjoy in Iraq. They were surprised, for instance, when at a spring 1987 festival in Mosul the president left his guards and stepped into an eager crowd.

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ideology is fervently secular and rationalistic. It derives from Western political traditions, and contrasts directly with the fundamentalist Islamic ideology espoused by Khomeini. The Ba'th promises well-being on earth, not a place in heaven.

Thus, women in Iraq probably have more options than in any other Arab country, and these have increased thanks to war-induced labor shortages. Baghdad women often wear Western dress, currently the 1960s styles, with skirts shorter in Baghdad than Boston, as Iraq's isolation make its fashions laggard. Further, Iraqis do not seem to be very good Muslims, at least by the ayatollah's fanatical standards. Johnny Walker Black Label is something of a national drink. (The rest of the Gulf drinks too, but in secret.) Even in the countryside, with easy-going habits that long preceded the Ba'th,[3] there seem to be some laxities in the practice of Islam.

As for the relation between mosque and state, the government holds that every citizen is equally Iraqi, that faith is irrelevant to politics. This is not exactly the case, but the ideal does have some relevance. Under Saddam, a conscious effort has been made to integrate Iraq's Shi'a into the traditional Sunni-dominated elite.[4] Similarly, that the foreign minister is a Christian is a singular occurrence in the Muslim Middle East.

This is not to say fundamentalist Islam lacks support. Ad-Da'wa, the fundamentalist Shi'i party, emerged in the late 1950s, clashed with the government in the mid-1970s, and was then radicalized and strengthened by the Iranian Revolution. Moreover, an "Islamic tendency" has some popularity at the universities. But the government sternly opposes sectarianism, a policy that seems to enjoy popular support.

Iraq's unprecedented political stability under the Ba'th was for some years accompanied by a relative calm in foreign relations. Although Britain's 1971 withdrawal from the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms precipitated a scramble for regional dominance, the shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, quickly won. His dominant position was ratified in a 1975 accord with Iraq, which established a *modus vivendi* between the two countries. In return for a territorial concession in the Shatt al-'Arab River, Tehran stopped aiding the Kurdish rebels

[3] Hanna Batatu "Iraq's Shi'a, their Political Role, and the Process of their Integration into Society," in Barbara Freyer Stowasser, ed., *The Islamic Impulse* (Washington: Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1987).

[4] See Saddam Husayn *Fi'd-Din wa at-Turath* (Baghdad, 1977) on the need to separate religion and politics. See also Amazia Baram, "The Ruling Elite in Ba'thi Iraq, 1968-1986: The Changing Features of a Collective Profile," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (forthcoming, 1989) for the Shi'i integration. The one exception to the Ba'th's non-sectarianism is its attitude toward the Jews. On the one hand, Iraq's small Jewish community is reported to enjoy the government's full protection, even offering a Sabbath blessing of Saddam Husayn. On the other hand, in contradiction to their principles, Iraqi officials sometimes adopt a racist, anti-Semitic posture as part of their war propaganda, linking current ties between Israel and Iran to the imagined support of the Jews in Babylonian exile for Cyrus the Great.

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in Iraq, allowing Baghdad to subdue a revolt that had been simmering since Ottoman times. For four years, 1975-79, it appeared that Iran-Iraq relations had stabilized.

The Iranian revolution ended this calm. Baghdad did not want Khomeini to succeed and remained a firm supporter of the shah even, by one account, offering to "arrange an accident" for the ayatollah late in 1978.[5] Iraqi apprehensions proved fully justified, for the revolutionary regime in Iran quickly called on the Iraqi Shi'a to overthrow their "atheistic" government.[6] But the revolution weakened Iran's military capability and thus seemingly presented Iraq with an opportunity to replace Iran as the dominant power in the Gulf. Against a background of escalating tensions, and for a mix of defensive and offensive reasons, Iraqi forces invaded Iran in September 1980.

During these years Baghdad had little to offer the United States. Its foreign policy was a milder variant of Iran's today. As in the case of Iran, that policy served to justify the regime's ambitions to regional hegemony while providing domestic legitimacy.

Tacit Agreement with the United States

American and Iraqi interests have begun to converge as a result of the Iranian Revolution and Tehran's dominance through the long war (and especially since 1982, when Iranian forces assumed the offensive). Because these shared interests are not much appreciated, it is worth examining them in some detail.

To begin with, the United States and Iraq now have many of the same friends in the Middle East. The Iranian Revolution made Iraq the de facto protector of the status quo in the region, even as the United States is the status quo great power. America's friends — Israel, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia — are status quo states. None promotes an ideology of radical change or a basic revision of the regional balance of power. Each is threatened by the revisionist states which do seek such changes. Conversely, Iran's friends — Syria, Libya, South Yemen — are revisionist states and allies of the revisionist great power, the Soviet Union.

Moreover, because Iraq is weaker than Iran, Baghdad has increasingly needed help from abroad. In return, it has to offer its allies support. This was evident at the 1987 Arab summit in Amman, where Iraq played a key role in sanctioning the resumption of full diplomatic relations with Egypt. (Ironically, eight years earlier, Iraqis had led the effort to ostracize Egypt in response to the Camp David accords.) This served U.S. interests, for full diplomatic relations removes the

[5] Amir Taheri, *The Spirit of Allah*, (Bethesda, Md.: Adler & Adler, 1986), p. 225.
[6] Efraim Karsh, *The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis*, Adelphi Papers 220 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987).

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last major stigma on the American-sponsored peace treaty, giving it acceptance if not legitimacy in Arab politics.

Iraq's role as defender of the status quo has led it to take other positions congruent with American interests and opposed to those of Moscow. Washington has made the defense of Chad against Libya a fairly high priority, including Chad among the few countries to which the United States has supplied Stinger missiles. Iraq has also provided equipment to Chad and helped train Chadian forces to use the large arsenal of Soviet weaponry they captured in 1987.[7] Similarly, early in 1988, when Ethiopian-backed forces challenged the Sudanese government, Baghdad expedited arms and supplies to Khartoum, to bolster it against the pro-Soviet government in Addis Ababa.[8]

Baghdad now quietly endorses an American military presence in the Persian Gulf. In earlier years Iraqi leaders hoped to dominate the region, but the war has shown that they cannot do this — and that Iran can. Accordingly, Baghdad has conspicuously not criticized the U.S. reflagging of Kuwaiti ships. When asked to express an opinion on this operation, Iraqi officials avoid the matter, saying that it is a sovereign decision of Kuwait's. When Moscow criticized the American presence in the Gulf, Iraqi officials pointedly reminded them that the war had brought the U.S. Navy into the region, and ending the war would allow American forces to leave.[9]

On the matter of oil pricing, Iraqi policy has again fallen in line with American interests. Revolutionary Iran consistently presses for higher prices, even when it is obvious that the market will not support them (suggesting that politics overrides economics in determining its policy on pricing). But less-and-less revolutionary Baghdad has its eyes firmly on the market. It virtually ignores OPEC production restraints that are supposed to increase prices. As one report puts it, "Iraq is pumping all the oil it can."[10] The director of Iraq's Oil Marketing Company is very quick to offer statistics on Iraqi oil production, but when I asked in mid-1987 about Iraq's OPEC quota (as opposed to actual Iraqi production), he claimed not to know the figure.

In part, high production serves to maximize revenues needed to wage war; at the same time, the more Iraq sells, the less Iran earns. Also, Iraq's oil reserves are larger than Iran's (probably twice the size), so it benefits over the long term by prices low enough to preserve its market share.[11] In part, too, this oil production policy

[7] *Washington Times*, April 9, 1987. Chad approached Egypt first for assistance, but Cairo hesitated to antagonize its neighbor, Libya. Instead, Iraq stepped in.

[8] Kuwait News Agency, January 2, 1988, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Near East and South Asia* (Washington, D.C.), January 4, 1988.

[9] Latif Jasim, information minister, press conference, September 7, 1987.

[10] Youssef Ibrahim, *New York Times*, March 9, 1988.

[11] *Oil and Gas Journal*, December 28, 1987.

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has a political goal. With Iran the leading advocate of high prices, Baghdad tends to adopt the opposite stance.

Thus, American and Iraqi interests converge on a host of issues without coordination. Indeed, Iraqi officials maintain that the convergence of interests is accidental. They reject any description of their policy as "moderate," preferring "responsible" instead. Similarly, American officials scarcely view Baghdad as a supporter of U.S. policies. Yet if Baghdad's policies and interests are in so many instances the same as Washington's, something has happened that those officials do not recognize. Not seeing the radical shift in Iraq's position created by the war, Washington and Baghdad have yet to see each other as potential allies.

If Baghdad's policies and interests are in so many instances the same as Washington's, something has happened that those governments do not recognize. Not seeing the radical shift in Iraq's position created by the war, Washington and Baghdad have yet to see each other as potential allies.

In part, this convergence arises because the Iranian Revolution turned Baghdad into a status quo power. But that alone does not explain everything, for Iraqi rulers could still aspire to establish their own regional hegemony. Iran's military superiority precludes this course. The mortal threat to his regime since 1982 has obliged President Saddam Husayn to seek support from the moderate Arab states that are also threatened by Iran's aggressiveness, and these moderate states are America's friends. Baghdad is obliged to reciprocate their support, while its rivalry with Tehran drives Iraq to check Iran's regional allies, the revisionist states tied to Moscow.

Disillusion with Ideology

Inside Iraq too, the war has brought about changes in line with American interests. Baghdad's inability to win, or even end, the war has brought tremendous hardship. According to State Department estimates, Iraq has suffered more than 400,000 casualties — over 120,000 dead and 300,000 wounded. Iranian casualties are thought to be about 300,000 dead and 450,000 wounded. Thus, Iraq's per capita casualty rate is some 75 percent higher than Iran's. For all the Iranians' professed love of martyrdom, Iraqis have been the martyrs.

Although Iraq's population is only one-third the size of Iran's (16 million versus 50 million), Iraq maintains a larger army. In the spring of 1988, Iran fielded a force only two-thirds Iraq's; this helps

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explain Tehran's sudden loss of the Faw peninsula.[12] Nearly half of Iraq's male population between the ages of eighteen and forty-five is in the military. Those of draft age at the war's start have been serving continuously, while older men are rotated in and out.

The war is a particular burden for the younger generation. The intense mobilization effort means long military service. Even for those whom the fighting leaves with life and limb intact, the normal concerns of career and family remain suspended. A twenty-two-year-old who graduated from college in June 1980, might well have done nothing since that time but sit in a muddy, mosquito-infested trench. And, because he was still alive and whole, he would be ranked among the lucky ones.

For young women, too, the war is onerous. They are postponing marriage because their parents do not want them to become war widows. In an Arab society (where the main business of women is to become wives), the growing ranks of the unwed is an increasing social problem. It has particular salience for a Ba'th regime which promises a better material life, not martyrdom.

This apparent normality of life results partly from the Ba'th party's sensitivity to its promises of material welfare; partly from an effort to maintain morale by keeping the feeling of war remote from daily life; partly from the tough face of a tough regime.

Yet despite all these sacrifices, Baghdad does not look a city at war. There are no tanks or sandbags, no uniformed soldiers. There are no air raids nor public shelters, no bombed and burnt-out buildings. Nor are the hardships of war readily apparent. Crippled young men do not fill the streets, and there is no rationing. Baghdad to all appearances is a city at peace.

But appearances deceive. As there are no crippled young men, so there are few young Iraqi men at all. The young men one sees are mostly Sudanese and Egyptian. One soon realizes, too, that the proliferation of oversized cement flower pots, and the decorative chains at the entrance of every major hotel, are meant to prevent car bombings.

This apparent normality of life results partly from the Ba'th party's sensitivity to its promises of material welfare; partly from an effort to maintain morale by keeping the feeling of war remote from

[12] Anthony Cordesman, Voice of America Symposium, May 6, 1988, Washington, D.C.

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daily life; and partly from the tough face of a tough regime. But the pretense that a devastating war has been without much effect also has a very political aspect. The official line holds that the war has changed nothing about Iraqi policy, and the more junior the official, the more he clings to that line.

Of course, the war has had a major effect, above all on implementation of Ba'thist ideology. Formulated by Syrian intellectuals in the 1940s, the Ba'th platform sought to set the agenda for independent Arab states. In most of the Middle East it had been centuries since Arabic-speaking peoples had had power; not unexpectedly, then, ideas about statehood led to some highly unrealistic programs. Ba'thism, with its special stress on the unity of the Arab world, was one of these. It attracted idealistic young men to the goal of a united Arab world, newborn after its liberation from centuries of foreign rule, restoring the glory of a millennium past.

But this goal, as well as the two other elements of the Ba'th triad — freedom and socialism — was unrealizable. The Arabs, independent, reverted to their traditional factionalism. Arab socialism worked no better than anyone else's socialism. Freedom disappeared under the weight of *raison d'état*. Indeed, the twelve years of prewar Ba'thist rule in Iraq, 1968-1980, saw a clear reduction in ambitions.[13] In some respects, the changes induced by the war are a continuation of the longer-term mellowing of the regime. But the ideological posture and ambitions remained strong. By the war's start, Iraq had essentially shifted from the forceful export of Ba'thism to a largely political effort to unify the Arabs under Iraqi leadership in an anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist posture.

Meaningful change, from an American perspective, came only after 1982, when Iraq was forced on the defensive, in effect obliged to acknowledge Iran's continued military superiority and its unrelenting hostility. Thus the war has starkly raised the futility, even the dangers, of unrealistic ideology. For example, while party hacks could once easily progress up the ranks, the war put a premium on competence. As elsewhere, an emphasis on results led to an erosion of ideology. One Arab diplomat long resident in Baghdad reflected in 1987 on the three pillars of Ba'th ideology: "What has happened to Ba'thism? Arab unity? It's a joke! The Iraqis curse the [Gulf] Arabs for their timid support against a common enemy and damn the Syrians as worse than the Iranians. Freedom was lost to Iraq even before the Ba'th took power. As for socialism, the government is selling off the country."

[13] Amazia Baram, "Qawmiya and Wataniya in Ba'thi Iraq: The Search for a New Balance," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 19:2, April 1983.

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An Emerging Iraqi Identity

All Iraqi governments have depended on the ideology of Pan-Arab unity to overcome the country's fragmentation and the weak sense of national identity. In every case, this led to a militant stance against Israel. The Ba'th version of Pan-Arabism provided the ideological basis for Iraq's strong ambitions in the Arab world, in the process challenging American influence in the region. A decade of strident Pan-Arabism made it look as though this troublesome ideology had a permanent hold on Baghdad.

But it did not. The war with Iran has gone far to create an alternate identity, the Iraqi one. A lingering aura of Pan-Arabism remains, to be sure, but the stress is now on *al-'Iraqiya*, "Iraqism." This has two elements: sponsorship by the government and spontaneous feeling from below. Propaganda aimed at the home front focuses exclusively on the defense of Iraq and loyalty to Saddam Husayn. Everything else — the Arab nation, anti-Zionism, anti-imperialism, and all the other standard features of earlier rhetoric — is distinctly secondary. Instead, the government draws on pre-Arab, pre-Islamic roots to cultivate a sense of Babylonian identity.

A strengthening of Iraqi identity is also developing from below. A middle-aged man, a long-time Ba'thist with some Western education, had lunch with me in 1987. He had just returned from five years at the Basra front, where the most intense fighting has occurred. He explained to me that military service made him feel more Iraqi. He had lived and fought in the trenches with soldiers from all parts of the country and all social classes, individuals he would not otherwise have encountered. A camaraderie had developed. As an educated, thoughtful man, he explained that he had felt the need for a reason to justify what he was doing — and that there was only one: he was defending Iraq. He admitted that the growing feeling of Iraqi nationality diminished the sense of being Arab. And as the Arab identity lost ground, so too did concern for the Palestinians. Millions of Iraqis are presumably experiencing the same war-induced changes of heart.

The emergence of a distinct Iraqi identity sits uneasily with the original Ba'th commitment to Pan-Arabism, and so tensions between the two concepts of nationality persist. For the time being, however, the movement is in one direction only, and it appears that Pan-Arabism will play a steadily diminished role in the political life of Iraq. The Pan-Arabist era may have been just an interlude. If so, a chastened, inward-looking Iraq, where the impulse to regional dominance has abated in favor of a preference for stability, is likely to share more interests with the United States.

The Egyptian case offers a hopeful analogy. Chastened by the failure of Gamal Abdal Nasser's Pan-Arabism and the defeat of 1967,

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Anwar as-Sadat increasingly focused his government's attention on Egypt. The Egyptian government self-consciously sought to promote a sense of Pharaonic identity as a way to recover from the disastrous Pan-Arabism. The result was a government prepared to work over the long term with the United States. Similar changes seem to be taking place in Iraq.

Perestroika in Iraq

Oil wealth long permitted the Iraqi government to afford the inefficiencies of a state-run economy. But no more. The war not only caused a labor shortage, but it turned Iraq's $30 billion-plus financial reserves into a $60 billion debt.[14] These pressures have led to a decisive shift away from socialist practices.

To promote productivity and conserve foreign exchange, the government in early 1987 initiated a series of steps aimed at promoting private investment and at reducing the bureaucracy that regulates economic activity. The General Federation of Trade Unions was abolished — it was just another level of political control that did little for workers. The ministries of agriculture and irrigation were merged, as were those of heavy and light industry. Major public companies are being shifted to the "mixed sector"; for example, 49 percent of the national airline has already been put up for sale. The government sold off dozens of small state enterprises, including poultry and cattle farms, supermarkets, and gasoline stations. By now, most state-owned farms have already been sold, and the plan is to privatize them all by mid-1988.

Such changes will have clear economic benefits — and for the United States as well as for Iraq. Iraq is now the fourth largest market for U.S. exports in the Middle East; it follows Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt, all far more conventional friends. A less rigid economic system facilitates business in Iraq, and this should become important when the war ends and reconstruction begins.

Economic reforms are popular, in part because they have produced some quick results. Before gas stations were privatized, for example, a station might theoretically be open until ten o'clock at night. But a car that pulled up for gasoline at nine would likely be met by a grimy attendant who would explain that the station was already closed for inventory, repairs, or whatever pretext laziness suggested. Selling off the stations means that gasoline can now be found in Baghdad around the clock.

Beyond these economic changes, the whole political economy appears to be in flux. Profit has to be legitimized and inequality of

[14] *Middle East Economic Digest*, April 19, 1986; and Anne-Marie Johnson, "Iraq: Economic Responses to the Gulf War," *Fletcher Forum*, Winter 1987.

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income tolerated if private investors are to be encouraged. That means some basic modifications. As Saddam Husayn recently explained: "Our socialism does not advocate dispossessing people of their property. It is geared to the creation and fair distribution of wealth. Accordingly our socialism seeks, among other things, to boost wealth rather than share out what wealth there is."[15]

Of course, if economic liberalization is to work, it requires some political liberalization as well — thus the Chinese and Soviet dilemmas over their own economic reform. Interestingly, the Soviets, despite *perestroika*, were quick to see — and complain about — the political implications of the Iraqi moves. Saddam Husayn responded with an unusual public criticism, affirming that the economic changes amounted to *glasnost* in Iraq, and implying that the Soviets could learn from Iraq's experience![16]

Centralization of Power

That the war has centralized power in Iraq is evident from the ubiquitous posters of Saddam Husayn, which reflect the president's unchallenged primacy. Yet posters do not tell much about the inner workings of government. Some observers believe that there is no other meaningful voice in the government beside Saddam, that the party has been reduced to a vehicle for his rule. They point, for example, to the 1987 order to diet. Saddam decreed that government officials above a certain rank had to lose weight if they exceeded the standards of the height/weight charts. Though not entirely uncalled for (Iraqi bureaucrats tend to an unhealthy girth), the order represented an assertion of Saddam's authority. Diet the officials did.

Other observers see the Ba'th party as a still powerful institution. They believe the president must take its sentiments — including those of hardline ideologues — into account. Iraqi policy still retains much ambiguity. Why did Baghdad long delay the re-establishment of relations with Egypt, which began already in 1981 to provide arms to Iraq? There are two explanations. One is ideological — that Iraq was reluctant to lend even tacit sanction to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The other is practical — that Iraq hesitated to move ahead of Saudi Arabia and alienate a major financier. Probably both were relevant, but it is difficult to know how much each weighed in the balance.

The issue is not susceptible to resolution, for information is lacking. But from an American perspective, the more Saddam Husayn exercises control over the Ba'th party, including the ideologues, the

[15] *Al-Qabas* (Kuwait), February 24, 1988, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Near East and South Asia* (Washington, D.C.), February 26, 1988.

[16] Saddam Hussayn, "Why we have turned the status of workers into civil servants," March 31, 1987.

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better. Centralization of power permits the regime to deviate from unworkable principles and pursue its interests. Indeed, whatever else one thinks of the Iraqi president, he has shown a capacity to make strategic decisions and abide by them. Saddam Husayn oversaw the surprise 1975 accord with Iran. Contrary to Ba'th ideology, he ceded Arab territory to Iran — half the waters of the Shatt al-'Arab. Though the agreement prompted grumbling within the party,[17] it was adhered to until Saddam Husayn saw fit to take the next decisive step — war against the bellicose and ominous Islamic Republic of Iran.

Then, as now, there exists a formula for undertaking pragmatic action. Iraqi pragmatism first distinguishes between the tactical and the strategic; revolutionary goals may legitimately be pursued with tactical flexibility, lest a rigid adherence to ideology endanger the revolution.[18] Then, acknowledging the need for compromise, the deviation from revolutionary principles should be public (in contrast to, say, the Iranian government, which could only buy arms from the United States and Israel secretly). Of course, tactical flexibility can be stretched to justify almost any policies, and this seems to be what is happening in Iraq today.

Is the change in Iraq's position in fact merely tactical, and only for the duration of the war? That is doubtful, for the end of the fighting is unlikely to change much. Tensions between Iran and Iraq would remain high and the possibility of another war will continue. A revanchist Iran, bent on achieving the victory denied it in this round, is likely to try again. Existing regional alliances — Iraq and the moderates against Iran and the radicals — will remain in place. The situation may come to resemble that of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the Ottomans in Iraq and the Safavids in Iran fought each other off and on for over 200 years.

The greatest consequence of the war's end will likely be to ease Iraqi dependence on Moscow, facilitating relations with Washington. Also, it is probably not just idle chatter when Iraqi officials express a hope that the end of the war will bring more democracy, affirming that Saddam Husayn is "much concerned about democracy.... He thinks that it is healthy."[19] At a minimum, "more democracy" will be a useful tactic to alleviate blame for the war and generate a sense of shared responsibility in one of the most authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.

[17] Personal communication, Iraqi official.

[18] Saddam Husayn, *Flexibility in Revolutionary Work* (Baghdad: Manshurat al-Thawra, 1977).

[19] Finance Minister Mukhalif al-Hadithi, *The Christian Science Monitor*, October 28, 1987.

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Implications for the United States

Iraq and the United States need each other. Obviously, the United States could assist Iraq in many ways. Baghdad depends on American political support, for U.N. Security Council Resolution 598 may look neutral, but it is not. It calls for a return to the prewar boundaries, with an Iranian withdrawal from Iraqi territory, and a formal end to the war; Tehran seeks an informal cease-fire in place. The United States could give far more economic aid on easier terms (it provides $700 million in commodity credits annually and $200 million in short-term commercial loans) and it could provide military assistance.

Iraq wants to buy American military equipment — first, for the political impact that the implicit end of U.S. neutrality would have; second, for the weapons themselves. Iraq has tried in a variety of ways to start such a relationship. It has requested non-lethal equipment such as Lockheed's C-130 transport plane. (Lockheed has permission to sell it the civilian, but not the marginally different military version.) Iraq has asked for defensive equipment, such as infrared countermeasures against Iran's surface-to-air missiles (the effectiveness of which was much improved by the American sale of spare parts to Tehran). The Jordanians have asked to transfer some U.S.-made artillery-locating radar to Iraq.[20] But all these requests have been refused, for Washington does not want to violate its neutrality, making it the world's only major arms supplier which does not sell to Iraq.[21]

The United States also has much to gain from closer relations. Since the fall of the shah in 1979, it has held a weak position in the Persian Gulf area. Saudi Arabia lacks the strength to stand up in support of U.S. policy, and its government conciliates hostile states too readily. Only Iraq can bolster the American position. Ties between the two states would strengthen the U.S. position in the Persian Gulf, limit the Soviet Union's room for maneuver, and enhance prospects for an Arab-Israeli settlement. The Iranians, left to the cold embrace of the Russian bear, might — like the Chinese after the Usuri River clashes of the late 1960s or Egypt after the 1967 war — begin to consider it a very uncomfortable position and wonder if their hysterical, unremitting challenge to Washington had not become a little dangerous. Who knows, the United States might even find that there are some genuine "moderates" in Tehran.

Further, since the Lebanon war of 1982, Baghdad has given quiet support for every initiative toward an Arab-Israeli settlement.

[20] *New York Times*, April 2, 1987.

[21] U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1986* (Washington: GPO), p. 145.

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In 1982 Baghdad assured King al-Husayn of Jordan that it would back any negotiations he might undertake on the basis of the Reagan Plan. Baghdad had many reservations about the 1983 Lebanese-Israeli agreement, but took the stance that, for the sake of the "Arab nation" (i.e., rescuing Lebanon from Syria), it should not be opposed. In 1985, it supported the Husayn-PLO accord, which also would have provided a reasonable basis for negotiations, had the PLO not reneged on it.

This position reflected not so much a change in attitude toward Israel or the United States as the effect of the war with Iran. Baghdad backed its ally Jordan and opposed Tehran's ally Syria. But no matter what the reason, Iraq's position supported the United States, offering yet another example of American and Iraqi interests in convergence.

The next steps, however, are Washington's. In part, this is because the authorities in Baghdad traditionally have paid little attention to international diplomacy, and the habit lingers. Also, Iraqi officials believe, not without reason, that the merest hint from Tehran would cause Washington to drop the Iraqi connection. In answer to this, Americans have to demonstrate that relations with Iraq will be conducted independently of Iran (as, for example, American-Israeli relations are insulated from American-Arab relations).

The U.S. government should seek two changes from Baghdad: its private blessing for Arab-Israeli negotiations and the moderation of its public stance.

Once a modicum of trust has been established, the U.S. government can then make further assistance contingent on Baghdad's continued helpfulness in the Arab-Israeli conflict. That means taking additional steps toward softening its ideological posture. This would undoubtedly raise difficulties within the Ba'th party, but it would have the several advantages of opposing Syria and Iran, supporting Egypt and Jordan, and winning American backing. Unfortunately, Baghdad's public posture at present seems designed to obscure its underlying support for an Arab-Israeli settlement. Since the November 1986 revelations of American and Israeli arms deals with Iran, it has adopted a strident tone that equates Zionism with Khomeinism and portrays Iraq's war with Iran as the eastern reflection of the Palestinian struggle in the west.

The U.S. government should seek two changes from Baghdad: its private blessing for Arab-Israeli negotiations and the moderation of its public stance. These would be tantamount to support for the

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peace process and would constitute the reciprocity necessary to sustain American backing for Iraq. Therein lies the basis for developing a Baghdad-Washington relationship, one that would serve both American and Iraqi interests. Iraq need never have anything to do with Israel itself.

Of course, Tehran and Damascus would try to undermine and embarrass Baghdad for its shift. But the Iranians are proven hypocrites, as they have long bought arms from the very state they denounce as the "Zionist enemy." Similarly, Syria pretends to the role of vanguard of the liberation of Palestine, although it has scrupulously maintained a firm cease-fire with Israel for nearly fifteen years, since the 1974 Golan accord.[22]

The case against improved relations with Baghdad usually rests on the regime's brutality, and there is considerable validity to the charges, if not the argument. The use of chemical warfare in general and the specific case of Halabja (the town where hundreds of Iraq's own citizens died from gases) are by all standards horrific. Likewise, the missile attacks on Tehran and the barbarism in the civil war against the Kurds are rightly condemned.

But these are not reason enough to prevent an improvement in U.S.-Iraqi relations. The Middle East has few democracies, and unless Americans are willing to restrict good relations to Turkey and Israel, deals have to be made with dictators. However unpleasant it is, the regime in Iraq hardly differs from those in the neighborhood. Iran for instance has also used gas warfare — in fact, also at Halabja, according to the estimate of both the U.S. Defense Department and the United Nations.[23] Moreover, it was Iran that began the war of the cities. From 1985 until early 1988 Tehran launched over fifty Scud missiles on Baghdad, before Iraq began to retaliate in kind.

Thus, the many analysts who urge the conciliation of other despotic regimes in the Middle East cannot logically oppose closer relations with Baghdad on the basis of the regime's atrocities. Syria to the west and Iran to the east have no lack of apologists in this country ready to argue for appeasement. Each is seen as an important state without which some major goal — peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict or containment of the Soviet Union — cannot be achieved. All this, and more, is true of Iraq.

Too, association with the United States tends to soften regimes, as the image of America changes in the government's propaganda and in the popular mind. Students, businessmen, and bureaucrats,

[22] On Syria's undeclared accommodation with Israel, see Aaron Miller, "A New Arab Pragmatism," ORBIS, Winter 1988.

[23] *Washington Post,* April 5, 1988. The U.N. report failed to identify which side used gas, leaving the impression that both sides had. "Report of the Mission Dispatched by the Secretary-General to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq," April 25, 1988.

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all those involved in the increased dealings with the United States, come to appreciate and absorb American values. Egypt in Sadat's first years, emerging from a long state of war and Nasser's despotism, was no Mecca of civil liberties. But as the alignment with the United States developed, the regime's grasp relaxed, and Egypt has become one of the most open of Arab countries.

There is great danger over the long term for the United States in the Persian Gulf. If the Soviets continue their long-term improvement in relations with Iran, using their ties to Baghdad as leverage over Tehran, then Moscow would be positioned to dominate the region through its relations with the two most important states. Yet there is also opportunity for the United States in the Gulf. The most stunning successes for U.S. policy have come when a pro-Soviet regime unexpectedly switches sides, as happened in China and Egypt. While Iraq remains dependent for Soviet arms in a fight for its life, such a radical shift is impossible. But the bases exist for that kind of change over the longer term.

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ISRAEL'S SECURITY DILEMMA

by Michael Mandelbaum

Of all the states of the postwar era, Israel was the most threatened. Tiny, awkwardly shaped, with vulnerable borders, it was surrounded by larger and far more populous Arab states that objected to its very existence. In the course of twenty-five years from 1948 to 1973, Israel fought four wars for its survival against these neighbors. In each case, Israel won. Yet its victories did not make Israel secure, nor did they compel Arabs to accept Israel as a legitimate Middle East nation. Consequently, after its third and fourth wars, Israel confronted a particularly acute version of a universal political problem called "the security dilemma."

The Security Dilemma

Each state's security depends partly on its own actions, and partly on the actions of other states. The security dilemma arises because these two aspects are related in unpredictable ways. Consider this imaginary situation. Fredonia wishes to maximize its security vis-à-vis its neighbor, Sylvania. It has, in very broad terms, two means available. Fredonia may increase military capability, or lessen it.

If Fredonia increases its military capability, Sylvania will react in one of two ways. It may be deterred from attacking Fredonia, and in that sense become less hostile, making Fredonia more secure. Or, in the face of a Fredonian build-up, Sylvania may see Fredonia as a threat, undertake a build-up of its own, and in that sense become more hostile, leaving Fredonia less secure.

Suppose on the other hand Fredonia chooses to lessen its military capability. Again, Sylvania will react in one of two ways. It may perceive Fredonia as less of a threat and become less hostile, thus making Fredonia more secure. Or Sylvania may be tempted to exploit Fredonia's new weakness and become more hostile, making Fredonia less secure.

This is the security dilemma. Within limits, a state can control its military capabilities, and all states set their capabilities for the

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purpose of making themselves more secure. But policies undertaken to make a state more secure can make it less so, because a state cannot control how its power, or lack of it, will affect other states. And this is true no matter which course a state chooses. A military build-up may deter or provoke; a build-down may bring conciliation or temptation.

All states confront the security dilemma, and the four alternatives that comprise it are present between any pair of states. Yet the dilemma is not central to relations between every two states. It pertains principally to states that are roughly equal in strength, in regular contact with each other, and with some prospect of military rivalry. Still, these limits do not explain why the dilemma has not played a more prominent part in security policy. The reason lies in the fact that, instead of confronting the dilemma, most states have simply believed that greater strength brings greater security. Rarely has a state been decisively influenced by the prospect that preparations for war — deterrence — will have the consequence of making war more likely, through provocation.

Yet such provocation does occur, or so students of international politics believe. For instance, the German decision to build a fleet of warships in the years leading up to World War I, it has been argued, pushed Britain into alliance with France and Russia. Some observers have contended the Chinese dispatch of troops to Korea in the fall of 1950 provoked twenty years of American animosity. And the competition in nuclear arms between the United States and the Soviet Union has also been seen as involving unintended provocation with each side acquiring weapons for fear that the other was about to do so.

But provocation cannot be proven. We cannot know if Britain would have stayed out of the war in 1914 had Germany not mounted its naval challenge. China might have been more secure had it not entered the Korean War, but perhaps the United States would have been even more inclined to try to remove the communist regime. If the United States or the Soviet Union had stopped adding to its nuclear arms perhaps the other would have, too. But we cannot know.

This uncertainty is one reason states seldom pursue policies designed to avoid provocation. There is another: if a policy of increasing strength is mistaken, at least it provides the means to overcome the mistake. If Fredonia's policy of strength makes war with Sylvania more likely, it also increases Fredonia's chances of winning. It is possible that World War I occurred because Germany was too strong. It is certain the Germans lost the war because they were not strong enough. Between the two approaches, there is thus a powerful bias in favor of increasing strength.

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Similarly, even if states realize that maximizing strength may lead to undesired outcomes, they shrink from giving up strength to conciliate adversaries. If the policy fails, it can mean disaster. The most famous example of such a mistake is the appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s. The Western powers gave concessions to Germany hoping to satsify its demands and render it peaceful. But their acquiescence in the remilitarization of the Rhineland and their surrender of Czechoslovakia left the allies weaker when Hitler's appetite for conquest had not been satisfied and war came.

Israel and the Security Dilemma Until 1973

From 1948 to 1967, Israel faced the security dilemma only abstractly. In fact, its policy was, as a popular Hebrew phrase put it, one of *ein breira* — no choice. Israel had to be strong, and strength held no danger of provocation, for the Arab world was already as hostile as it could conceivably be.

The depth of this hostility had several causes, among which was the pull of Pan-Arab feeling. Pan-Arabism gave each Arab state and people license to judge the others, and this had the effect of preventing Arab rulers from considering conciliation with Israel. Each ruler went to war against Israel in 1948 partly from fear that he would be discredited in the eyes of all Arabs if he held back while others conquered Palestine. After 1948, none was willing to accept Israel lest he be charged with insufficient devotion to the Arab cause.

With no danger of provocation before 1967, and no hope of conciliation, Israelis practiced deterrence. The economy was organized to promote independence. Settlement patterns were designed to safeguard borders. Unable to maintain a large standing army, Israel developed a small one with a core of full-time professionals and cadres of conscripts serving three-year tours of duty beginning at age eighteen. In wartime, the ranks were filled out by every able-bodied male from the age of twenty-one to fifty.

Because Israel's soldiers were civilians, however, the country's economy could not accept long wars, so Israel's strategists could not adopt a defensive posture. Instead, they planned for short, decisive wars. Israeli forces were to strike first, pierce Arab lines, cause disruption in their ranks, and gain swift, conclusive victories. In 1967, the strategy worked, leading to the particular Israeli version of the security dilemma.

In the course of the June 1967 war, Israel captured territory that most Israelis and the Arab states agreed belonged to the Arabs. To the north, Israel captured the Golan Heights. To the east, it captured the West Bank of the Jordan River. To the south, it took the Gaza Strip and Sinai peninsula. These captured territories added to Israel's military capabilities. They provided natural frontiers. The Suez Canal,

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the Jordan River and the Golan Heights were shorter and more easily defended than the cease-fire lines of 1949. Moreover, and this was particularly important for a small country, the territories served as buffer zones between the hostile states and Israel's population. In case of attack, they made it possible for Israel to trade space for the time in which its army could mobilize. In fact, that was exactly what happened in the war of 1973, demonstrating the value of the territories. Had that war begun at the 1967 borders, the heart of Israel would have been in jeopardy.

Yet Israel would also gain security by giving up the territory, if this would prevent future wars. If, in return for territory, the Arab states accepted Israel as a legitimate state, Israel would be more secure than if it retained what it had captured. Maximizing national strength was not necessarily the road to security. The Israeli version of the security dilemma was difficult in two ways. First, the exchange of land for peace would be an asymmetrical exchange. Israel alone would give up military assets; the Arab side simply had to say it had changed its mind.

Second, unlike most historical cases of unilateral conciliation, Israel was relinquishing something central to its security. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Britain accommodated the United States by waiving any political and military role in the New World and did so without reciprocal concessions. But what the British relinquished was not crucial for them. Even if the premise behind the concessions proved incorrect, Britain could still defend itself. This was not true of Israel.

Understandably, states have not often relinquished military assets critical to their survival. The risks are too great. But for Israel, the risks of not doing so were also great. The return of the territories offered Israel the prospect of peace, an end to the dangerous round of wars, and the chance to build the Jewish state without constant threat of attack. Muting the hostility of its Arab neighbors, which had dominated Israeli national life since the founding of the state, would mean achieving a supreme national goal.

The 1967 war created the conditions for the security dilemma. But nothing came of it. For their part, Israelis were not of one mind about which territories to give up, and what to require in return. Nor did they have any incentive to address such questions seriously unless it were necessary, which it was not. For the Arab states were not ready to make the exchange. The forces that had kept them from coming to terms with Israel in 1948 still operated. Consequently, Israel continued to carry out a security policy of maximizing military strength without serious efforts at conciliation.

The 1973 war broke the stalemate in Arab-Israeli relations, by changing attitudes in both Israel and Egypt. After 1973, Cairo was

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willing to make peace in exchange for the return of the Sinai peninsula. Egyptian leaders could make this trade because they had less need of the legitimacy conferred by a pan-Arab crusade against Zionism than the other Arab states. Their people felt an allegiance to Egypt in a way that had no parallel among the people of Syria or Jordan. Egypt's weight and place in the Arab world allowed it to end the conflict with Israel if it chose to do so. Anwar as-Sadat decided to make that choice.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Sadat's predecessor, Gamal Abdel Nasser, had pursued a confrontation with Israel, putting Egypt at odds with the United States and in alignment with the Soviet Union. At the same time, he had turned toward socialism at home. Sadat was determined to change these policies, for they had brought Egypt to a crippling impasse. In war Egypt bore the heaviest casualties; in preparing for war the heaviest military costs. Yet Egypt — bereft of natural resources, and lacking in modern skills with its people packed into a strip of land straddling the Nile — struggled just to feed itself, a task for which the Soviet Union provided little help.

Sadat sought to break the cycle of defeat, poverty, and dependence on the Soviet Union, to cast off economic controls and open up to the West. For all this, peace with Israel was necessary. To achieve peace, ironically, Sadat launched the 1973 war. He needed to redress the humiliation of 1967 with a modest military success, so that, brandishing that success, he could begin the peace talks that would make possible initiatives toward the West.

The 1973 war had a profound impact on Israel, too. In principle, Israel had been ready to negotiate since 1948, but after 1967, the Israelis merely waited for Arab initiatives. They believed that they could sustain the postwar lines without exertion, that the certainty of defeat would deter the Arabs from trying to recover their lands by force. Thus, Israel could afford to wait for an offer of peace. The 1973 war proved these assumptions mistaken. It made clear that the Arabs would fight to recover their territories. Though the war was won by Israel, its eruption was a defeat for Israel's policy. The status quo proved more costly than Israelis expected. In weighing the security dilemma after 1973, conciliation looked more attractive and provocation — perpetuating Arab hostility by retaining captured territory — more dangerous.

Israel and Egypt: Conciliation

Still, Israel's choice remained a difficult one. In trading land for peace, the Israelis were betting on their capacity to affect Egypt's intentions by adjusting their own military capabilities. If the calculation proved wrong, the costs might be high. If war broke out after Israel had returned the territory, its position could be a vulnerable

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one. And Israel had reason to be suspicious of Egyptian intentions: the Egyptians had sometimes said one thing about the Middle East conflict to one audience and something quite different to another. The Israelis wanted to trade land for peace and so they sought ways to minimize the risks.

Israel's principal method of risk reduction involved returning the Sinai to Egypt in installments, over the course of almost a decade. The process took place through a series of carefully calibrated, painstakingly negotiated steps, each building on previous ones. This step-by-step method had several advantages for Israel. The first steps were modest; Israel was not giving up significant military assets. The step-by-step approach addressed the problem of the credibility of Egyptian promises. Since one basis for believing a state will keep a promise is its record of having kept promises in the past, each step, when successful, gave reason to believe the Egyptians would observe the terms of another. The step-by-step process built Israeli confidence in Egypt's good faith, which was, from the Israeli perspective, its central purpose.

Israel negotiated five agreements with Egypt. The first, the "Six-Point Agreement" of November 8, 1973, confirmed the cease-fire between Egypt and Israel, established a United Nations presence between them, and provided for the exchange of prisoners of war. The second, on January 18, 1974, adjusted the Israeli and Egyptian lines in the Sinai east of the Suez Canal. This required Israeli withdrawal from positions occupied during the fighting, established a buffer zone patrolled by the United Nations, and set limits to the forces deployed in specified adjacent areas. This was the first Sinai disengagment agreement. In September 1975, Israel and Egypt concluded a second Sinai disengagement agreement. Israel abandoned approximately one-third of the Sinai, including the strategically important Gidi and Mitla Passes and the fields at Abu Rudeis that had been supplying almost all of Israel's oil. Three years later, in September 1978, a two-week meeting at Camp David produced one framework for peace between Israel and Egypt, another for negotiating the future of the West Bank. Six months after Camp David, in March 1979, the two governments signed a final peace treaty in Washington.

For all their differences, the five agreements had fundamental similarities. In each case, Israel withdrew from territory captured in 1967 (or 1973) in return for a variety of measures and promises. Ultimately Israel vacated the entire Sinai peninsula, and the agreements may thus be seen as one grand negotiation taken in successive stages. Indeed the parts themselves were subdivided. For example, Israel withdrew in stages from the territory given up in the second Sinai disengagement accord.

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This description of the step-by-step process would be incomplete, however, without mentioning the American role. At each new step, some Israelis thought the risk of going foward too great. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and his successors made it their business to remind Israeli leaders that failing to make concessions ran the risk of provocation. Of course, the Israelis themselves could imagine the consequences of failing to reach agreement, but the case for conciliation took on added force when the Americans made it, especially when they hinted Israel would be blamed for any failure to reach a settlement. This the Israelis had to avoid. Their security depended on support from the American government and the American people, and both wanted a settlment. If they came to see Israel as obstructing one, they would have less sympathy for the Israeli cause.

American advice to the Israelis not to risk provocation was usually tendered as a warning about what others would think, but sometimes the Americans were blunter. For example, direct application of American pressure came in the last days of the war when Washington asked the Israelis to stop their operations. Although they were on the brink of surrounding the Egyptian Third Army on the western side of the Suez Canal, they decided they could not refuse the request. When the cease-fire broke down and Israeli forces advanced, American leaders told the Israeli government to go no further, and the fighting stopped. But the Egyptian troops were surrounded anyway, and began to run short of food and water. Israel proposed to extract concessions in exchange for supplies; the United States insisted that non-military supplies be allowed without preconditions. Israel complied. Later, during the step-by-step negotiations, President Richard Nixon demanded concessions from Israel to make progress possible. And in 1975, after failing to secure Israeli agreement on a second disengagement pact with Egypt, a "reappraisal" of American Middle East policy restricted arms shipments to Israel and suspended consideration of economic aid.

Israel's leaders were not altogether unhappy with this pressure. They wanted agreement with their neighbors, and a policy of conciliation rather than (or at least in addition to) deterrence. But this required concessions, and the Israeli public was wary of surrendering territory. At each stage of the peace process, some segment of the Israeli public and its parliamentary representatives charged the government with not getting enough for what it had given up. The government found it convenient to blame American pressure, which they could say left them no choice but to yield.

Yet the Israelis were not gluttons for American pressure. Both sides recognized the danger in Israel's appearing to bow to American demands. The Arabs might then press the United States to extract concessions from Israel without giving the Israelis anything in return.

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And in truth, Washington could not compel Israel to meet its every wish. The Israelis could resist. One tactic was to appeal to Congress, where support for Israel was invariably strong. Another tactic, and an effective one, was sheer stubbornness. The Israelis were determined to do whatever was necessary to survive, and no amount of American pressure could budge them where they were convinced their vital interests were at stake. This determination the American government respected.

Although time, via the step-by-step process, provided some test of Cairo's commitments, these remained intangible and revocable. Israelis still had to accept what Egyptians said on faith, and so they sought as firm as possible a basis for this faith. Israelis sought some outward expressions of Egyptian intentions — specific symbolic measures attesting to the depth of Cairo's commitment.

Egypt's position was the reverse. It was giving peaceful intentions to get land. And just as Israel did not want to give back the entire Sinai without receiving in return everything that a full peace entailed, so Egypt did not want to take all the steps that Israel was demanding so long as Israel held part of its territory. One act both sides counted as an important symbol of Cairo's good intentions was direct negotiation between the countries. This was a basic Israeli demand, but from 1948 to 1973 the Arabs refused it. Precisely because it was an important symbol, the Egyptians did not wish to give it up early. They, too, wanted to make concessions in steps. As Israel offered a piece of land for a piece of peace, so Egypt subdivided recognition of Israel.

The United States facilitated Egypt's step-by-step recognition of Israel. When the Six-Point Agreement was reached in November 1973, Sadat told Kissinger: "Never forget, Dr. Kissinger, I am making this agreement with the United States, not with Israel." When Israel insisted on certain interpretations of the agreement, Sadat assented but would not embrace them publicly. Instead, they were put in a "Memorandum of Understanding" between the United States and Israel. Only when representatives of the two sides met at kilometer 101 on the Cairo-Suez road to sign the Six-Point Agreement did a formal accord between Arabs and Israelis occur.

The representatives to these discussions held relatively low ranks. Later, the meetings took place at higher levels and became increasingly public. The Geneva Conference on the Middle East, meeting in December 1973, was the first time high officials of Egypt and Jordan had sat at the same table with Israeli representatives. In 1977 secret contacts at higher levels began when the Israeli and Egyptian chiefs of intelligence met at Casablanca. When Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan met secretly with Egyptian deputy prime

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minister Hasan at-Tuhami, it led to the most dramatic direct talks of all: Sadat's visit to Jerusalem.

That visit had an extraordinary symbolic importance. The Egyptian president went to Israel's capital, he told the Knesset, to remove "all suspicion of fear, betrayal, and bad intentions." To a remarkable extent he succeeded. Golda Meir was moved to say, "When you sit here and I look at you and I heard you last night it's not the same. I believe in your sincere desire for peace."

Besides face-to-face talks, Israelis sought explicit acknowledgement of what these talks implied: Egypt's acceptance of Israel's legitimacy. In Jerusalem, Sadat said: "Today I tell you, and I declare it to the whole world, that we accept to live with you in permanent peace." That "whole world" included the Arab world.

Along with recognition, Israelis wanted the trappings of recognition, above all ambassadors. The opening clause of the first article of the 1979 peace treaty said that "The state of war between the Parties will be terminated and peace will be established between them upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of this treaty." The third clause promised "the Parties will establish normal and friendly relations." The treaty's third article pledged: "They will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means."

Beyond formal relations, the Israelis also sought informal ones — commercial ties, cultural exchanges and personal contacts. Moshe Dayan considered these as important as the treaty. For twenty-five years there had been virtually no such contacts, for the Arab governments prohibited them. In recognition of their significance, an entire Annex to the Peace Treaty was devoted to Israeli-Egyptian contacts. "The Protocol Concerning Relations of the Parties" committed the sides to promoting trade, cultural exchanges, freedom of movement, transportation and telecommunications.

All these elements of a normal relationship — direct talks, acknowledgements of legitimacy, the trappings of formal recognition, and informal relations — symbolized Egypt's peaceful intent toward Israel. They addressed the Arab-Israeli conflict at its root. That conflict arose from the conviction that Israel was transient and illegitimate. For Egypt to treat Israel like other nations was symbolically to abandon that position.

To a great extent, Israel conciliated Egypt by trading actual power for pledges of peace. But Israel's accord with Egypt also required some military concessions from Egypt, for example, that it not make military use of the Sinai. There was precedent for this. From 1956 to 1967, the Sinai had been a buffer zone, without heavy concentrations of Egyptian troops. Each of the Sinai agreements also

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included restrictions on the forces Egypt could put in that area. The final peace treaty also divided the Sinai and a narrow adjacent strip of Israel into four zones, and specified the forces permitted in each. Israel wanted to retain control of the electronic detection and monitoring stations it had built in the Gidi and Mitla Passes, but Egypt opposed this. It did, however, let the United States operate the stations, which diminished Egypt's military potential against Israel. In fact, some have argued that Israel may be stronger without the Sinai, so long as the territory is demilitarized.

Israel and Egypt: Deterrence

The test of time, ties of symbolism, and mutuality provided Israel with assurances that the Egyptians would keep their promises. To supplement these promises, the Israelis also sought military power, in new forms, to compensate for what they had given up. These were to serve as insurance in case Egypt's promises were not kept. The exchange of land for peace meant that Israel had to forego military assets without tempting Egyptians to take advantage of its diminished strength. At the same time, Israelis sought deterrent strength in forms that would not provoke Egypt, as retaining the Sinai would. Here the United States had a crucial role. The United States made Israel's concessions advantageous by providing it with three forms of assistance — economic, political, and military.

Even when there was no explicit connection between American economic assistance and the peace process, an implicit link was present, and occasionally economic aid was tied to a specific concession. For instance, the Americans promised a reliable supply of oil to make up for the loss of the oil wells in the Sinai. They also financed the relocation of air bases from the Sinai to Israel's interior.

The United States gave promises of political support as well. On the occasion of the second Sinai disengagement agreement, for example, Israel received assurances and commitments, including the promise that the United States would "view with particular gravity threats to Israel's security or sovereignty by a world power." The reference was to the Soviet Union. An American "Memorandum of Agreement" went on to say that "In support of this objective, the United States government will in the event of such a threat consult promptly with the government of Israel with respect to what support, diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance it can lend to Israel in accordance with its constitutional practices."

Most important from the point of view of the security dilemma, Israel received military assistance from the United States in return for relinquishing territory. For each major agreement, the United States gave Israel either specific weapons or a promise of a continuing supply of weapons. There was a logic to this, stemming from the

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character of the security dilemma. The territory Israel was giving up had military value. The United States therefore provided Israel with military strength in another form. Israel was giving up strategic depth by returning the Sinai, so the United States undertook to make depth less important for Israel's security. Just as important for the peace process as returning territory was strengthening Israel to help it cope with the possible failure of conciliation — without making Egypt more inclined to hostility.

On the whole, Cairo did not object to American arms for Israel, for there is a fundamental difference between a country's building up armaments within its borders and its occupying foreign territory. The first is almost always less objectionable. In this case, Egypt may have calculated Israel would get American aid anyway and that these weapons at least purchased recovery of Egyptian land.

In sum, the Israelis' security dilemma required them to accept Arab assurances in order to make peace, even though the long history of Arab hostility made them less than sanguine about the credibility of such assurances. To complement Arab promises and compensate for the territory they had to yield, Israelis sought and received American promises of support. This reinforced deterrence, even as it made possible conciliation. In the 1979 accord, the United States promised to monitor observance of the terms of the Peace Treaty by aerial surveillance and to consult with each side in the event of a violation as well as to "take such other action as it may deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance." An accompanying Memorandum of Agreement between the United States and Israel was even more explicit. It said "the United States will take appropriate measures to promote full observance of the Treaty of Peace" and listed actions the American government was prepared to undertake, including providing military aid and opposing hostile resolutions at the United Nations. In fact, the American government suggested privately, without saying publicly, that it was prepared to send troops to fight on Israel's behalf should developments in the Middle East place the Jewish state in mortal jeopardy.

But in the final analysis, even American assurances were not guaranteed; the United States government had not always made good on them in the past. For example, the Americans had tried but had failed to organize a multinational effort to break the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran in 1967. Like Egyptian pledges of good conduct, American promises of assistance were ultimately intangible. One particularly powerful form of military might was available to Israel independently of the United States: nuclear weapons.

Although Israel consistently said it did not have nuclear weapons, the belief that it did or easily could have them influenced Middle East politics and the peace process. Even before the 1973 war the

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Egyptian government may have believed that Israel had come into possession of the bomb. The Arab fear that if their armies attacked the core of the country Israel would retaliate with its nuclear arsenal would help to account for the war's limited aims. The Egyptian conviction that Israel had become a nuclear power may also have reinforced Cairo's desire for accommodation.

Nuclear weapons presented Israel with another of the security dilemma's difficult choices. Acquiring the bomb was a way of deterring without provoking; it offered a less challenging form of strength than the occupation of land claimed by others. Egyptians would go to war to recover the Sinai but not, in all likelihood, to destroy Israel's nuclear arsenal. Still, nuclear weapons were more provocative than the non-nuclear armaments the United States was supplying. Had Israel announced its possession of nuclear weapons, it might have prompted the Arabs to obtain the bomb themselves, or accelerated efforts to obtain it. The American government might have distanced itself from Israel because of its policy of opposing the spread of nuclear weapons.

The status of Israel's nuclear weaponry — rumored but not confirmed — gave Israel the best of both worlds: a measure of deterrence of its Arab neighbors and some independence of the United States, without forcing either the Arabs or the Americans to take steps that would make Israel less secure.

Israel and the Other Neighbors

Israel agreed to exchange land for peace with Egypt. But its security dilemma encompassed territories captured from neighbors to the north and east as well. Israel did not make the same exchange with them. Syria and Jordan differed from Egypt in crucial ways, and so too did the territories involved — the Golan Heights to the north and the West Bank of the Jordan River to the east.

The Golan Heights are a plateau overlooking Israel's Hula Valley, an important agricultural area. It is a smaller piece of territory than the Sinai; if Israel returned the Heights for the promise that the area would be demilitarized, and if Syria violated its promise, Israel would have very little time to mobilize and resist. It could be argued that Israel was stronger militarily without the Sinai so long as it was demilitarized, but the same argument was far less convincing when applied to the Golan.

As the Golan Heights differed from the Sinai, so Syria differed from Egypt. As suspicious as they were of Egyptian intent, Israelis were even less disposed to trust Syrian good will. For its part, the Syrian regime was not willing, and probably not able, to address those suspicions by offering assurances like Egypt's. Damascus lacked Cairo's flexibility because its government lacked the same legitimacy.

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Syria was a twentieth-century creation, smaller than Egypt, with less weight in the Arab world. The Syrian leader Hafiz al-Asad lacked Sadat's authority. He stayed in power through repression and terror, and what legitimacy he possessed derived in large part from zealous pan-Arabism, expressed in uncompromising hostility to Zionism.

The same obstacles were even more pronounced in the case of the West Bank, which was also much smaller than the Sinai and far closer to Israel's population centers. Shorn of the West Bank, Israel assumed an awkward and not easily defensible shape, less than nine miles wide at its narrowest point. Moreover, while Sadat could negotiate the return of the Sinai (and Asad could negotiate for the Golan Heights), it was not clear who should speak for the West Bank. There were two principal candidates: the king of Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

During the 1948 war, Jordan had seized the territory where a United Nations resolution had said a third state (besides Israel and Jordan) was to be established. In 1967, Israel drove Jordan out. Thus, those Israelis who sought a settlement comparable to the Sinai accord wanted to negotiate with Jordan's King al-Husayn, and a number of secret meetings took place over the years, without concrete results. Husayn was wary of departing from the pan-Arab consensus on Israel, for the state over which he presided suffered like Syria from its recent creation and an arbitrary quality. In fact, his throne was a gift from Great Britain to his grandfather, and many of Husayn's subjects considered him an interloper lacking a mandate to govern.

Husayn was cautious also because he faced the PLO as a claimant to Arab Palestine. The PLO was an association of groups of various sizes, founded under Egyptian auspices in 1964. Ten years later, an Arab summit meeting revoked Husayn's mandate to speak for Palestinians — at least those under Israeli control — and conferred it on the PLO. But according to the PLO's charter, Jews had no right to a state in the Middle East and Israel was simply illegitimate (the same position the Arab states had taken in 1948). Hence, the basis for conciliation between Israel and the PLO was lacking.

This similarity between the PLO's attitude toward Israel and that of Arab states was not accidental, for the dynamics of the groups making up the PLO resembled relations between Arab states. Some groups had no interest in conciliation, and none was prepared to take a conciliatory position toward Israel in public for fear of the others' wrath. Thus, the pressures that enforced hostility to Israel in the Arab world were also present in the PLO.

Nor was Israel's willingness to trade land for peace constant. After the 1967 war, the West Bank became a part of daily life in Israel as the Sinai and the Golan did not. For some Israelis this was natural and proper, for they considered the territory (which they

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called by its Biblical names, Judea and Samaria) to be part of Israel. Menachem Begin and his associates, who formed the core of what became the governing Likud coalition in 1977, had opposed the United Nations decision in 1948 to place a third state in that area. For them, Biblical and historical associations made Hebron and Jericho at least as much parts of Israel as Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. They never accepted the legitimacy of Arab rule west of the Jordan River. The 1967 war had, in their eyes, set right a historic wrong. For them, the Sinai could be surrendered in return for the appropriate concessions but not the West Bank. That was part of Israel.

Not all Israelis were resolved to hold the West Bank, but even those willing to return it to Arab rule insisted on terms more stringent than return of the Sinai had involved. There was near-unanimous determination to keep Jerusalem. There was a general Israeli consensus to keep areas around Jerusalem and Tel Aviv that had become suburbs of those cities since 1967. The consensus also included retention of Jewish settlements along the length of the Jordan River, and control of the Judean hills which bisect the West Bank and command the Plain of Sharon where most Israelis live. These terms were roughly embodied in the Allon Plan, a scheme for the West Bank devised by one-time deputy prime minister Yigal Allon. Though never adopted by any Israeli government, it expressed the views of the Labor party, which in turn represented most of those prepared to trade the West Bank for peace. But these Israelis found no Arabs — neither Jordan, the PLO, or anyone else — willing to negotiate such a trade for the Arab side.

Conclusion

Israel is the twentieth-century state for which the security dilemma has been most acute. Its example therefore illustrates this universal feature of international affairs not as a normal, but as an extreme case. Although aware of its security dilemma, and prepared to substitute conciliation for deterrence, Israelis have so far been able to do so only in dealing with Egypt. Attempting to practice a policy of conciliation safely, Israeli policies after 1973 were designed to reduce the risk that concessions required by conciliation might result in unsuccessful appeasement. Such reductions in risk were accomplished (often with American assistance) through step-by-step testing, symbolism, mutuality, and compensation. But the inability of Israel to carry out a similar process with its other adversaries demonstrates the difficulty of translating this theoretical alternative into concrete policies.

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THE SOVIET HISTORICAL DEBATE

by Jiri Hochman

The political legitimacy of the Soviet government derives largely from its historical role, and particularly from its ties to the Russian Revolution. For this reason, as *Pravda* puts it, "history is a sphere of acute ideological struggle."[1] Accordingly, the Politburo reserves to itself the prerogative to interpret and write history. It attempts to demonstrate that current policies legitimately embody the principles and traditions of the Revolution; or, when something has gone too obviously wrong to make this claim, it holds that the current policies mark the end to a limited departure from those guidelines.

In short, each shift in political course leads the Politburo to change the official reading. Such shifts have caused official Soviet history sometimes to depart so far from reality that it becomes fiction. This was the case before 1987, when the policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika* ("openness" and "restructuring") in conjunction with the seventieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution stirred a reform movement in historical studies. The reformers, led by Professor Yurii Afanasyev, director of the Moscow State Institute of Historical Archives and brother of Viktor Afanasyev, the editor in chief of *Pravda*, sought to correct some of the falsehoods that politicized historiography had engendered.

The reform movement questioned the fidelity with which Soviet leaders, particularly Stalin, had followed the principles and traditions of the Russian Revolution. It did not, even at its outer limits, cast doubt on those principles. Despite this restriction, the very existence of an inquiry that claimed the right to ask "what really happened" challenged the party's monopoly on historiography — and thus, in the end, the party's authority. The party leadership understood this and responded accordingly, first at the level of the minions, then through the general secretary himself. On November 2, 1987, in a report to the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev curbed the movement, reasserted the party's control over historiography, and set down a reading of Soviet history designed to legitimate his own policies.

[1] *Pravda* January 28, 1988.

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Seventy Years of Eyewash

Just how bad is the condition of Soviet historiography? It is bad enough that some Soviet novels — and not just those written by exiles — are much more realistic, truthful, and informative than the history books. This sorry state of affairs is no secret; many non-scholars in the Soviet Union have recognized the patent falsehoods that make up the official line and at least some established historians feel embarrassed. Professor Afanasyev has admitted that compared to fiction, "our historical sciences cut a poor figure."[2] Similarly, Professor Yurii Polyakov, a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, observed in July 1987 that "writers have long since overtaken the historians in the formulation of tricky questions."[3]

As even *Pravda* occasionally implies, the situation is worst with regard to the history of the Communist party.[4] Although the ultimate script in this field, *The History of the CPSU*,[5] is periodically updated and retouched, there has been no substantial change in the basic text since 1939 when Stalin published the *History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Short Course*,[6] the binding model for all other works dealing with Soviet and even pre-Soviet history. Untrue in the main, the *History of the CPSU* has nonetheless been repeatedly endorsed by party congresses and general secretaries. The Khrushchev era (1960) edition did avoid an adoration of Stalin, and adopted the code words "cult of personality" to explain past shortcomings and excesses. But Stalin's essential interpretation of the 1920s and 1930s was carried on, and not even the most recent congress of the party, nor the present general secretary, has departed from it in any substantial way. The myths, falsehoods, and omissions of that interpretation continue to be spread through thousands of volumes, from textbooks to encyclopedias.

Against this background, the historical debate of 1987 began by picking up where previous corrections of the official record had left off in the mid-1960s and early 1970s. At that time, only the grossest injustices, and not all of those, had been brought to light and rectified, when that could be done. Questions had been raised concerning the

[2] In an interview with *Polityka*, Warsaw, October 3, 1987, pp. 1-9; quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, D.C. — hereafter FBIS-SOV), November 13, 1987, p. 76.

[3] Interview of Yu. Yanovskyi with Professor Yurii Polyakov, *Literaturnaya gazeta*, Moscow, July 29, 1987, p. 10.

[4] *Pravda*, July 8, 1987.

[5] B.N. Ponamarev, et al., eds. *Istoria Komunistichesko partii Sovetskogo Soyuza* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1960). This one-volume edition was reissued in 1962 and 1964. A five-volume *History of the CPSU* was issued 1964-1980. It was edited by a commission, presided over by P. N. Pospelov during its first two years, then by P. N. Fedoseyev. It was published by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU Central Committee.

[6] *Istoria Vsesoyuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (bolshevikov), Kratkii kurs* (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Pravda, 1939).

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origins of those injustices and the possibility that some basic or systemic factors were at work, but then Khrushchev was ousted and soon after the debate was halted. Thus, the limited character of both the official corrections made under Khrushchev, and of the unofficial debate that was suppressed a few years after his downfall, cannot be overlooked. In 1987, much remained to be done.

During Brezhnev's long tenure (1964-1982), historical reexaminations were suppressed, and in some significant respects the trend of the late 1950s and early 1960s was reversed. Nevertheless, the Khrushchev breakthrough of 1956 and the ensuing years could not be completely corked, and the Brezhnev reversal may even have produced a stronger antipathy to lies. A Soviet magazine expressed this bitterness by characterizing the Brezhnev era as "twenty years of slander."[7] But this was only part of the story; as a young Soviet writer put it to a Komsomol meeting at Moscow State University: "Seventy years of eyewash, and it has still not been put right."[8]

Gorbachev's announced policy of *glasnost* seemed to sanction a new movement to correct errors, while *perestroika* called for a more realistic view of the past. In his first two years of power, 1985-86, this attitude had been making its way into works of fiction, literary criticism, and arts in the broader sense. In history proper, the late Brezhnev era was officially opened for reassessment; denigrating Brezhnev was part of the process by which Gorbachev sought to secure his position.

But the Politburo did not seem to intend that *glasnost* should begin a public debate about history. In February 1986, Gorbachev himself brushed aside criticism about Stalinism as fabrications put forward by communism's enemies.[9] As late as June 1986, debating official history did not appear to Gorbachev as suitable.[10] Not until January 1987 did he finally admit the relevance of the problem when he told the Central Committee of the CPSU that "the causes of the situation [in the USSR] go back far into the past."[11]

Limits on the 1987 Debate

The historiographical reform movement suffered from a number of limitations throughout 1987, the most basic being a lack of historical information, making access to state archives an issue. According to Afanasyev, the party has established special commissions to decide

[7] *Ogonek*, Moscow, No. 26, June 29-July 5, 1987, p. 7.

[8] *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 321/87, August 4, 1987; quoting a samizdat account of a speech by A. I. Strelannyi, a member of the editorial board of *Novyi mir*, before a Komsomol aktiv at the Moscow State University on May 15, 1987.

[9] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Moscow, February 8, 1986; quoted in *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 407/87, October 15, 1987, p. 2.

[10] A samizdat account of a speech before a meeting of Soviet writers; see *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 399/86, October 23, 1986.

[11] *Pravda*, January 28, 1987.

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which documents will be moved from the "limited access category" to open facilities.[12] *Pravda* reported that "quite a few documents previously not available for general use are being transferred from special depositories to the public rooms of libraries."[13] But this "openness" shows how sensitive the issue is: special party commissions have to deliberate whether records, sometimes over fifty years old, can be made publicly known. It seems certain that the larger part of the Soviet archives will continue to be closed.

The potential gains from such access were shown by a twenty-two-year-old graduate student of history, Dmitrii Yurasov, who volunteered to answer some questions on the Stalin period and its aftermath at an April lecture and discussion organized by Professor Afanasyev. Yurasov had done research in closed files of the Central State Archives and in the archives of the USSR Supreme Court, including the latter's Military Tribunal. As a result, he could give figures about the USSR Supreme Court's 1953-57 rehabilitation of victims of the Stalinist purges. According to his findings, 612,500 victims of the purges were rehabilitated by the Supreme Court at that time, most of them posthumously. The Military Tribunal rehabilitated 48,000 victims, of whom 31,000 had been murdered. Yurasov observed: "The most complete information is kept in the card index of the First Special Department of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. . . . Of course, I did not have access to it."[14]

Worse, the dissident journal *Glasnost* reported that Soviet legal files from the 1930s to the 1950s were being destroyed by order of Vladimir I. Terebilov, the president of the USSR Supreme Court and a former minister of justice.[15] *Glasnost*'s report contained a number of details apparently obtained from insiders: 5,000 dossiers were burned every month and many similar files had been "cleared out" over previous decades; technical problems arose from burning large amounts of paper in the middle of Moscow; opposition to the destruction of legal files had been expressed by two previous presidents of the Supreme Court; and some documents had been transferred to the KGB. These revelations were denied in *Trud*,[16] but it was a summary denial, unresponsive to the specific accusations, and therefore did not sound convincing.

Another attempt to limit debate, though not so drastic, was the call from V. Melnichenko, a Ukrainian party historian, to move the whole discussion from newspapers and literary journals to "the columns of scientific journals" — which conservative party historians

[12] Afanasyev's interview with *Polityka*. *FBIS-SOV*, November 13, 1987, p. 79.
[13] *FBIS-SOV*, November 9, 1987, p. 30.
[14] *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 207/87, June 3, 1987.
[15] *FBIS-SOV*, August 21, 1987, p. R-3.
[16] *Trud*, Moscow, October 21, 1987, p. 5.

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like himself can better control and which do not have wide readership.[17]

Similarly, much of the sanctioned debate took place outside the Soviet Union. An uncommon fact or view would usually appear in France, Italy, Austria, Yugoslavia, even Poland and Bulgaria, the result of a foreign correspondent's interview with a Soviet historian or social scientist (such as Afanasyev). It would not wend its way back to the USSR unless carried by foreign radio broadcasts. Seeing the interest in this, even the official Novosti agency provided an interview with Professor Afanasyev by its own correspondent — but for a Danish newspaper, *Det Fri Aktuelt*. In other words, *glasnost* had a significantly greater impact outside the Soviet Union than inside. The interest of the Soviet public in the issue of historical distortion — as judged by the number of letters that *Pravda* reported receiving — testifies more to the foreign media's penetration of the Soviet Union than it does to an outburst of domestic openness.

Glasnost had a significantly greater impact outside the Soviet Union than inside.

Criticism expressed in 1987 was, on the whole, remarkably restrained, for critics rarely failed to justify their opinions by showing off their essential loyalty to Leninist doctrine. Professor Afanasyev, who attacked Stalinism strongly, insisted that he was casting no aspersions on the founding father, Lenin. "Dogmatism and all other extreme deformations of socialist development," he wrote, "were not, of course, programmed by the teachings of Marx and Lenin."[18] Afanasyev also declared that "Lenin, as everyone knows, was a confirmed supporter of democratic norms of socialism."[19] The significance of the words "of course" and "as everyone knows" in the above statements merits close attention.

Controversy over the continuity between Lenin and Stalin is a staple of the Western historical debate[20] but in the Soviet Union it is a closed subject. The essentially Leninist character of the main policies carried out by Stalin have not been questioned. Only Stalin's "errors" and "excesses" have been described as departing from Lenin's ways.

[17] *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 31, 1987 (*FBIS-SOV* August 5, 1987, p. R-9).

[18] *Moscow News*, in English, September 13, 1987, p. 10; quoted in *FBIS-SOV*, September 23, 1987, p. 56.

[19] *Novosti* interview with Professor Yu. Afanasyev for *Det Fri Aktuelt* (Copenhagen), November 8, 1987; text given in *FBIS-SOV*, November 20, 1987, pp. 64-65.

[20] See, for example, Stephen F. Cohen, *Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History Since 1917* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

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Citing Leninism to justify openness may be a political necessity in the USSR, but it is also a treacherous undertaking, for the other side has a much better case. Lenin offers little to the reformers, for he is the problem. Moreover, if the reform-minded historians misportray Lenin to remain acceptable, they do not merely undercut the reform movement intellectually, they also betray it. They do what the Politburo does: distort historical truth for pragmatic purposes.

This restraint can be explained by a combination of factors. Official warnings had their effect, no doubt; and censorship was still there, though it was not much used. Training and experience certainly played a very important role — as the Soviets say, each of them has a little censor in his head.

Rehabilitation and Beyond

These many limits caused the historical reform movement of 1987 to develop cautiously. Major criticisms were confined almost entirely to Stalin's rule, particularly the purges of the late 1930s. Thus, Afanasyev disclosed that Stalin's accusations against Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev were "fabricated and shameless."[21] Earlier history arose chiefly as background to the purges. Later history was merely touched on.

The reform movement brought, or at least coincided with, some official response — a return from oblivion for some Bolshevik leaders who fell victim to Stalin. In his November 2 speech Gorbachev announced a special Politburo commission to investigate the period of the Great Purge (1937-38), apparently with the aim of reviewing these famous cases. Note that a *Politburo* commission was entrusted to do the job, to avoid taking any chances with other agencies. In February 1988, Bukharin and Rykov, together with eight other lesser known victims of the purges, were formally cleared by the Supreme Court, although Bukharin's political sins were reconfirmed.

Trotsky fared even worse. Recognized as a member of the "general staff of the Great October" in one publication,[22] his role was denigrated in another by the assertion that his contribution was only "delivering speeches."[23] Viktor Afanasyev, the chief editor of *Pravda*, actually argued against Trotsky's rehabilitation on the grounds that he had had "a fairly odious personality."[24] Nicolai Muralov and Ivan Smilga, two supporters of Trotsky, were rehabilitated, however.[25]

[21] Professor Afanasyev in an interview with *NIN*, Belgrade, May 24, 1987; see *Radio Free Europe Research*, Situation Report No. 4, Yugoslav SR/5, June 4, 1987.

[22] *Politicheskoye Samoobrazovaniye* (no date give), according to Tanjug (Belgrade), September 1, 1987; *FBIS-SOV*, September 1, 1987, p. 29.

[23] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, September 27, 1987, p. 4.

[24] *Le Monde*, September 17, 1987, p. 6.

[25] *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 334/87, August 18, 1987.

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In June 1987, the Soviet Supreme Court created a special commission for the rehabilitation of some victims of Stalin who had not been exonerated in Khrushchev's time.[26] In July, the Court quietly rehabilitated fifteen distinguished agrarian scientists, such as Professors Chayanov and Kondratiev, who had been falsely implicated in a non-existent Working Peasants' party.[27] In August, over a thousand victims of false trials held in 1930 and 1931 were likewise rehabilitated. On the other hand, no word was heard about victims of other faked trials from the same period, such as the case of the nonexistent Union Bureau of the Menshevik Central Committee.

In only a few instances during the 1987 debate did historical criticism go beyond the question of rehabilitating purge victims. Take the issue of collectivization. Stanislav Kul'chyts'kyi, from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, argued that it was a legitimate policy needed "for the integration of the peasantry into the Socialist system."[28] Its enormous human losses were characterized by a leading Soviet expert as "obstacles" and "difficulties."[29] Judging by the writings of party historians, the issue of Stalin's collectivization still cuts too close to the justification of the whole system. The only daring view of collectivization to appear was offered by Vladimir Shubkin, a sociologist (and therefore probably not subject to quite the same constraints as a historian), who wrote about untold suffering for "tens of millions."[30]

A retired diplomat, Valentin Berezhkov, opened another area to scrutiny in an interview with the Latvian Komsomol newspaper *Sovetskaya molodezh*. Having served as an interpreter to Molotov in Berlin in 1940, and to Stalin in Tehran (1943) and Potsdam (1945), Berezhkov was able to make an important observation contrary to Soviet textbooks. In the late 1920s, he said, Stalin imposed on the Comintern the course of fighting the Social Democrats, rather than the Fascists, as the main enemy. This policy, he noted, "facilitated Hitler's rise to power."[31]

Then, in an article in *Sovetskaya kultura*, Professor Afanasyev touched on a highly delicate two-part question about socialism in the early years of the Soviet Union.[32] To understand his daring, it must be recalled that Lenin was (among pre-revolutionary Russian Marxists) a rather lonely proponent of a direct passage to socialism, without

[26] *NIN* interview with Professor Afanasyev.

[27] Tanjug, in English, August 14, 1987, referring to *Moscow News* (date not given); quoted in *FBIS-SOV*, August 17, 1987, p. R-6.

[28] *Pravda Ukrainy*, Kiev, September 11, 1987; reported in *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 373/87, September 17, 1987.

[29] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, October 11, 1987, p. 4.

[30] *Znamya*, Moscow, No. 4 - 1987, p. 183; quoted in *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 156/87, April 14, 1987.

[31] *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 354/87, September 1, 1987.

[32] *Sovetskaya kultura*, March 21, 1987, p. 2.

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a preparatory period of capitalist development and bourgeois democracy. Afanasyev, in one part of his article, implicitly questioned whether the Russian economy and society before 1917 were in fact fit for the application of Marxist ideas in 1917; which means, he implicitly questioned whether Lenin's approach had been correct. This topic had been cautiously debated by Soviet historians in the 1960s and early 1970s[33] — until the debate was cut short.

The second part of Afanasyev's article touched on alternatives to Stalin's "great leap forward" in 1929. Were crash programs of collectivization and industrialization the only possible course for the Soviet Union at that time? These issues go to the core of Soviet history and, evidently, neither was as yet a permissible topic, for Afanasyev was rebuffed by two establishment heavyweights, F. M. Vaganov and A. N Ponomaryov, who refused to consider any doubts about the fundamental Leninist assumptions.[34]

In October, Professor Anatoliy Butenko (chief of the section on general problems of world socialism at the Economics of the World Socialist System Institute) posed another fundamental historical question. He asked whether the Great Purge was just a "mistake" on Stalin's side, or a conscious, deliberate policy. If the second explanation were correct, Butenko said, "it is a much more serious problem and we should not talk about simple shortcomings in this connection." Instead, Butenko went on, we must recognize that Stalin came to power and acted with the support of certain social forces, which he characterized as "administrative-bureaucratic forces."[35] In other words, Stalin represented a systemic defect, at the root of which lay the Leninist one-party dictatorship and the *nomenklatura*. He went on to note that the same forces had prevented implementation of the conclusions of the 20th and 22nd Party Congresses (of 1956 and 1961).[36]

Containing the Debate

Despite the limited scope of the historiographical debate, the Soviet leadership apparently worried about public pressure to demythologize the official version of history. And with regard to this worry, no difference seems to have existed within the Politburo: criticism must be kept to the limits set down by the Party, with no spillover from Stalin's excesses to fundamentals.

[33] See, for example, E. A. Lazareva, ed., *Voprosy istorii kapitalisticheskoi Rossii* (Sverdlovsk, Uralskii gosudarstvennyi universitet im. A. M. Gorkogo, 1972). A similar collection of essays was published in Moscow in 1970. Historians participating in these debates included P. V. Volobuyev, I. F. Gindin, P. G. Galuzo, V. V. Adamov, V. V. Timoshenko. et al.

[34] F. M. Vaganov and A. N Ponomaryov, "Neither Idealize nor Dramatize," *Sovetskaya kultura*, July 4, 1987, p. 2; reported in *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 255/87, July 8, 1987.

[35] Professor A. Butenko's interview in *Narodna mladezh*, Sofia, October 15, 1987, p. 4; text given in *FBIS-SOV* (October 22, 1987) pp. 52-54.

[36] Ibid., p. 53.

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Speculation about differences between Gorbachev and Igor Ligachev, often considered the second most powerful Soviet leader, was based on two statements. The general secretary said "there should be no forgotten names and blank pages in Soviet history"; a month later, Ligachev said that Soviet history should not be depicted as "a chain of errors."[37] These statements do not overtly contradict each other, for Gorbachev's remark does not address the question of how the forgotten names should be recalled and who should fill in the blank pages. Without more evidence, his statement is most reasonably understood in a traditional Soviet context. The party is responsible for retrieving "forgotten names" and filling in "blank pages." Otherwise, as Gorbachev himself soon explained, comrades "can get lost altogether" in the historical problems.[38]

By the end of July, one could see the limits that the leadership would set on the new official view of history. As is customary, the main lines of these Politburo-approved corrections and additions were then communicated through intra-party channels to lower echelons of the apparatus, and the propaganda system was instructed to function accordingly.

One of the sharpest attacks on unauthorized historical criticism came from Ivan Laptev, chief editor of *Izvestia* and a CPSU Central Committee member. Addressing the Board of the USSR Union of Journalists, he apparently conveyed to these chief editors the party's instructions on how the press should behave in the period before the seventieth anniversary of the revolution. Laptev accused critics of the official history of "sensationalism" and "generalizations." He also attacked them for not being "specialists in Party history." (Professor Afanasyev, for example, specializes in French history.) Finally, like Gorbachev and Ligachev, he warned against criticism of "socialism as a system," though it is precisely that to which a serious revision of Soviet history undoubtedly must lead.[39]

Critical views regarding Soviet history were predictably unwelcome to conventional party historians and to the legion of experts on "scientific communism." Preaching the official doctrine is their bread and butter, and they felt threatened by the possibility of a thorough historical revision. That would cast doubt on their whole enterprise. The power of these figures should not be underestimated, for they represent a direct extension of the party apparatus. Though they tended to work behind the scenes, a few of their representatives openly defended their interests. A. N. Ponomaryov and F. M. Vaganov rejected any corrections to the Stalinist version of the 1920s,

[37] *Pravda*, Moscow, February 14, p. 1; quoted in *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 189/87, May 18, 1987.
[38] *Pravda*, July 15, 1987, Second Edition, pp. 1-3. *FBIS-SOV*, July 15, 1987, R-11.
[39] *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 255/87, July 8, 1987.

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then restated the denunciations of various "deviations" as formulated in the *Short Course*.[40] V. I. Yurchuk, director of the Institute of Party History in Kiev, bluntly stated that history must be approached" in the spirit of Leninist principles and of Party-mindedness."[41] ("Party-mindedness" is a code word justifying factual distortions in the service of the party.)

Pravda joined the effort to keep the debate in line by publishing an article based on "a big bundle of letters" expressing public displeasure with historical revision. It was not right to reduce all developments during Stalin's era to the notion of the "cult of personality," *Pravda* wrote. What about industrialization and collectivization? "It is impossible to rewrite history, to amend parts of it," the article declared.[42] Two months later, *Pravda* again referred to its readers' displeasure with historical criticism, under the headline "We Are Given a Motherland Once, Until Death Itself."[43]

Though warnings to respect socialism and the Motherland might work at home, foreign correspondents in Moscow presented a much trickier challenge, and this was handed to the Novosti agency. Its new chairman, Valentin Falin, is a veteran of Soviet "active measures" and a former Soviet ambassador to Bonn. Under him, Novosti has shown a growing sophistication in handling Soviet public relations. Novosti has also benefited during the last two years from personnel changes in key ideological positions, from the Politburo on down. The key positions were taken over by younger and better qualified men, many of whom, like Falin, have spent long years in the West.

As the anniversary of the Revolution approached, foreign correspondents were increasingly grasping the importance of the historical debate. Instead of letting them shop around for uncontrolled views, Novosti brought well-chosen academics before regular press conferences. In October 1987, two such meetings for external consumption took place.

The main speaker at both press conferences was Yuri Polyakov, a respected, conservative historian who has shown an ability to be flexible. He admitted that the recently released *Encyclopedia of the October Revolution* was wrong not to state that Bukharin and others had been purge victims. Polyakov also said that "Stalin knowingly exaggerated the danger of enemy activities and expanded the charges to include his former opponents." He went significantly beyond Gorbachev's subsequent estimate of "many thousands" of victims of Stalin's crimes, saying that over one million people perished in the late

[40] F. M. Vaganov and A. N. Ponomaryov and F. M., *Sovetskaya kultura*, July 4, 1987, p. 2.

[41] *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 227/87, June 16, 1987.

[42] *Pravda*, Moscow, July 23, 1987, p. 3.

[43] *Pravda*, Moscow, August 21, 1987, p. 3.

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1930s alone.[44] But when confronting the critical question of whether Stalin had created the system or the system had created Stalin, Polyakov backed off, saying: "Stalin used the system skillfully."[45]

G. L. Smirnov (a member of the CPSU Central Committee and director of the Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism) also answered journalists' questions and surprised all by his unorthodoxy. Considering his rank, he caused a sensation by admitting that the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia "needed a new assessment."[46] Professor P. V. Volobuyev, a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, dealt with the question of whether the party had ever committed any "collective errors" (an allusion to the issue of responsibility for Stalin's actions), Volobuyev said it had. He then limited his example of a collective mistake to the Brezhnev-era theory of "developed socialism."[47]

Gorbachev's Speech

On November 2, 1987, Gorbachev delivered a speech commemorating the seventieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution.[48] To set the stage, the general secretary started with the customary reference to determinist doctrine: "October is truly mankind's hour of genius and its morning dawn. . . . The objective logic itself of the historical process of mankind led to this frontier." Lenin, Leninism, and the party's license to power remain beyond reproach. The speech described the establishment of the one-party dictatorship as the fundamental Leninist act from which the party was still gathering "spiritual support and instructive lesson."

Aspects of the New Economic Policy (NEP) received a more spirited appreciation than in the past, and Gorbachev recalled that Lenin's views on cooperatives changed after the party assumed power. An indirect reference to Lenin's essay *On Cooperation* (1923) also appeared in Gorbachev's reservations regarding the methods used during collectivization. These reservations, however, were not carried any further.

He endorsed the decision to launch industrialization and collectivization with enthusiasm (and his statement was met by applause): "Could a course have been chosen in those conditions other than that put forward by the Party? If we wish to remain on a standpoint

[44] Quoted in a report by Tanjug (Belgrade) dated October 9, 1987, and in a Radio Moscow report in English to Great Britain the same day (*FBIS-SOV* October 16, 1987, pp. 58 and 59).

[45] Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland, October 9, 1987; text given in *FBIS-SOV*, October 16, 1987, p. 59.

[46] *New York Times*, November 5, 1987.

[47] *Moscow News* in English, November 15, 1987, p. 4; text given in *FBIS-SOV*, November 20, 1987, pp. 32-33).

[48] Gorbachev's report to the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and RSFSR Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin, on November 2, 1987. Reported on Moscow Television November 2, 1987, and in *Pravda*, November 3.

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of historic method and truth of life, there can be only one answer: No, it could not." Gorbachev specifically condemned the less drastic policies of Bukharin and left no doubt that collectivization continues to be viewed positively. "If we are to assess the importance of collectivization overall," he said, "then in the final analysis it was a turning point of fundamental importance. Collectivization denoted a radical change in the whole structure of the basic mass of the population of the country on socialist foundations."

The general secretary noted that the "struggle against the kulaks . . . also brought losses." These "losses," according to Gorbachev's report, were due only to secondary errors.[49] What happened was simply "a deviation from Leninist policy in relation to the peasantry. . . . The conduct of the struggle against the kulaks did not proceed without excesses." (The human cost of so-called dekulakization proper is estimated at 7.5 million lives lost. By contrast, two million Russians died in World War I.)[50] Most striking is the report's conformity with Stalin's rhetoric and terminology.

Gorbachev fully endorsed Stalin's gradual elimination of his partners during the 1920s. "The leading nucleus of the Party, which was headed by Stalin, defended Leninism, formulated the strategy and tactics in the initial stage of socialist construction." He condemned Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev as leaders of the opposition, which the Central Committee "smashed." Gorbachev added: "Both Bukharin himself and his supporters soon recognized their mistakes," without mentioning the conditions under which these mistakes were "recognized."

In dealing with the purges of the 1930s, Gorbachev declared, "Many thousands of members of the party and nonparty members were subjected to mass repressions." What sounds like an admission actually amounts to a complete distortion of the record. Just with reference to the Party, it is estimated that one million members and candidates perished at that time. And according to Roy Medvedev, if we speak only of people executed or imprisoned after 1934, and subsequently rehabilitated under Khrushchev, the proper figure is 17 to 18 million.[51] Obviously, these facts are better known to the Politburo than to anyone else. To snub this holocaust by speaking of "many thousands," (and giving Party members first mention), was not just an understatement: it was a lie made worse by being barefaced.

[49] It may also be useful to recall that during this time (1929-1933), in Solzhenitsyn's words, "a mere 15 million peasants, maybe even more, were driven out into the taiga and tundra." (Alexandr I. Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956* [New York: Harper & Row, 1973], pp. 24-25.)

[50] Robert Conquest, *Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror Famine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 299-303.

[51] Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge, The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), p. 234.

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Gorbachev's report endorsed Stalin's pact with Hitler, comparing it to Lenin's Brest-Litovsk Treaty as a strategic necessity. Then, the period between the pact and the Nazi invasion in June 1941 was skipped over. Soviet support of Germany in that period, the large Soviet territorial annexations in 1939 and 1940, and war against Finland were completely ignored. But Stalin received praise for "his ability to organize and discipline people" during the war.

Gorbachev did deplore a major fabricated case of the postwar era, the Leningrad affair of 1948-49, but then he omitted the persecution of several thousand innocent people.[52] Nor did he mention some three million Russian prisoners of war sent to the Gulag after their return.[53] Khrushchev won partial exoneration, praised for his courage in exposing the "cult of personality," but reproved for his "subjectivism," a Brezhnevian formula. The overthrow of Khrushchev in 1964 was sanctioned, making it easier to limit criticism of Brezhnev to the later years of his rule.

If the past now looks less perfect than it did under Brezhnev, basic tenets remain intact. One could say, simply, that Gorbachev is cautious about rewriting long-standing lies.

Finally, Gorbachev spoke about relations between states of the Soviet bloc, which are based on "unconditional and total equality." He specified that this applied when "the ruling (Communist) party was responsible for the affairs in its state," and within the framework of "the general interests of socialism." He added that these relations were "a combination of mutual interests and those of socialism as a whole." In other words, this was the Brezhnev Doctrine reformulated with a touch of elegance.

Assessment

The overall tenor of Gorbachev's speech was clearly intended to rebuff the historiographical reform movement of 1987. On most key historical issues, it followed standard Soviet interpretation, though it shifted the Soviet system's self-justification to a slightly new position. If the past now looks less perfect than it did under Brezhnev, basic tenets remain intact. One could say, simply, that Gorbachev is cautious about rewriting long-standing lies.

[52] Roy Medvedev in *L'Espresso*, January 10, 1988, pp.118-119. Nikolai Tolstoy, *The Secret Betrayal, 1944-1947* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977).

[53] Nikolai Tolstoy, *The Secret Betrayal, 1944-1947* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977).

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Whether Gorbachev thinks otherwise than what he said on behalf of the Politburo can only be a subject of speculation. Some indications suggest that he may have wanted to go further in his criticism of Stalin, but certainly not toward "a radical revision of Party history," as a few observers have suggested.[54] There is simply no basis for such a conclusion.

But there is more to it than mere truth and falsehood. If history serves as a source of political legitimacy in the Soviet Union, then the historiographical reform movement of 1987, and the official rebuff to it, provide clues to the political thinking of the present leadership.

In this regard, one of the most intriguing sections of Gorbachev's report has to be his treatment of the NEP. Historically, there is no other period on which the current leadership could draw to legitimize policies of liberalism. What, then, does NEP mean to this leadership? Gorbachev began by saying "it would be wrong to equate NEP with what we are doing today," and it is clear why. He praises NEP for employing "personal involvement, personal interest and financial autonomy," but "directed at constructing the material foundations of socialism." He then goes on to speak of "the time when socialist Russia would emerge from the Russia of NEP." In short, NEP belongs entirely to the past, and Gorbachev praises Stalin for putting an end to it. Gorbachev's view of NEP is apparently the view Lenin expounded in October 1921, when he defined NEP as a form of temporary retreat.[55] That may indicate something about prospects for the current reforms.

No less striking was the absence of allusion to the nationalities issue. The topicality of this problem is obvious — as witnessed by events in Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, Estonia, and Armenia — and it has imposed itself on this leadership more urgently than any other issue. Too, Poland presents an external version of this problem. Gorbachev might have admitted that all in the past was not harmonious in the "Soviet family of nations." By doing so, he might have won some credit for honesty, similar to the credit achieved through rehabilitating Stalin's victims. In the end, however, the leadership did not just put off the whole issue, it endorsed the old policies. That will make future changes more difficult.

As for signs of "new thinking" in foreign policy, the report was disappointing. No attempt was made to indicate a new approach by correcting even the most obvious lies. Except for two allusions to possible flaws in Stalin's foreign policy, in late 1920s and early 1930s, the standard historical record remained beyond criticism. Moreover,

[54] Henry S. Rowen and John B. Dunlop, "Gorbachev *versus* Ligachev," *The National Interest*, Spring, 1988, p. 23.

[55] Lenin, *Collected Works*, Volume 33 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966), pp. 83-101.

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it may be important that the three cases defined in Soviet history as tactical "breathing spaces" — the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the launching of NEP, and the first Nazi-Soviet Pact — received explicit praise. It is difficult to escape the impression that this is the category to which *perestroika* belongs, another creative application of dialectics. A restatement of the Brezhnev Doctrine completes this impression.

But the most disquieting aspect of Gorbachev's speech was the discussion of Stalin's opponents. That, after all, had seemed to be the greatest success of the historical reform movement, publicizing the fact that the old Bolsheviks were killed by a power-hungry and bloodthirsty ruler. Yet Gorbachev conceded as little as possible. Beyond individual cases of old Bolsheviks, the scope of the wider purges was downplayed, as was the human cost of collectivization. The notion that collectivization might have been a mistake did not even get a hearing.

Conclusion

Those who made the effort to bring out the truth could hardly have been satisfied with what they had achieved by November 2, 1987. The party conceded only minimal changes in the official record, resolutely protecting all points believed essential to preserve its legitimacy. The controversy, however, is not over. The proponents of a more thorough revision were certainly rebuffed in November and then intimidated in March 1988, when *Sovetskaya Rossiya* published "I Cannot Forsake Principles," allegedly a letter from a reader, though widely interpreted as a high-level manifesto against liberalization.[56] The revisionists were not silenced by this manifesto, however, and a political climate generally favorable to historical criticism still prevails. Forced by pressing needs to pursue its program of economic modernization, the leadership reconfirmed its commitment to *glasnost* three weeks later, by rebuking *Sovetskaya Rossiya* in a *Pravda* editorial.[57]

So far, unfortunately, all this effort has yielded very little real change. It appears that even a younger leadership, replete with modernizing zeal, is unwilling to denounce the abominable actions of its predecessors. This offers a poor start for the reform program and a far-from-reassuring signal for the outside world.

[56] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, March 13, 1988.
[57] *Pravda*, April 5, 1988, p. 1.

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SOUTH AFRICA'S BOMB: A MILITARY OPTION?

by Michèle A. Flournoy and Kurt M. Campbell

The South African government's ability to build nuclear weapons, though undeclared, has been presumed for about a decade. In the West, the conventional wisdom has been that South Africa's leaders would use a nuclear arsenal only for non-military purposes, such as enhancing the republic's status or increasing its diplomatic leverage. However, this assessment of Pretoria's nuclear intentions has not been re-examined in light of the dramatic domestic, regional, and international changes that have reshaped the South African landscape in recent years.

South Africa has become the first state possessing nuclear arms, or at least the means to build such arms, that ultimately faces a fundamental internal reorientation of political power — from white minority to black majority rule. Under these circumstances, Western policy makers need to think anew about how Pretoria might use its nuclear arsenal. There are indications on the horizon that the South African government, as it becomes increasingly embattled, may envision potential military applications for its nuclear weapons capability. This possibility raises the question of what steps the United States and the West might take if such a course were clearly contemplated.

South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Capabilities

South Africa first entered the nuclear arena as a uranium supplier, providing the material for the early nuclear weapons programs of both the United States and Great Britain.[1] These years of coop-

[1] See Leonard S. Spector, *Nuclear Proliferation Today* (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), pp. 279-87; and U.N. Centre for Disarmament, *South Africa's Plan and Capability in the Nuclear Field* (New York: United Nations, 1981) for concise historical overviews of South Africa's nuclear development.

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eration with the West led to the development of a uranium mining industry, a uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba, a light-water research reactor (SAFARI I), a research center at Pelindaba, and two light-water power reactors (KOEBERG I and II) near Cape Town. Although most of these facilities lack a direct application to weapons, together they have created a pool of nuclear technicians with the know-how and experience to launch an independent nuclear weapons program. By refusing to sign the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to open its Valindaba enrichment facility to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), South Africa protected its access to un-safeguarded nuclear material and kept its nuclear options open.

South Africa's efforts to test a nuclear device — the rite of passage for a nuclear power — first surfaced in August 1977. At that time, the Soviet Union informed the United States that a Soviet surveillance satellite had detected the telltale signs of a nuclear test site in the Kalahari desert. After confirming this Soviet finding, Washington (together with Great Britain, France, and West Germany) successfully pressured Pretoria into foregoing any plans to detonate a nuclear bomb. Some U.S. analysts have since concluded that South Africa did not have the highly enriched uranium needed for a test in 1977. They suggest that the test site was prepared on the basis of over-optimistic projections.[2]

Whatever the case, this incident was a milestone in South Africa's nuclear program, for it showed the powerful influence of a nuclear potential. The strength of Western reaction indicated how much leverage Pretoria might gain from nuclear threats. But the risks involved in making threats also became clearer. The discovery of the test site added impetus to the declaration of a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa by the United Nations, increasing the country's isolation.

South Africa became embroiled in a second testing controversy in September 1979, when a U.S. satellite detected a double flash of light in the vicinity of the Indian Ocean, the South Atlantic, and southern Africa. Although many initially presumed that South Africa had detonated a small-yield nuclear device, a debate arose over whether a nuclear explosion had actually taken place. A panel of

[2] Leonard S. Spector, *Going Nuclear* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987), p. 221. For more detailed accounts of the 1977 event, see U.N. Centre for Disarmament, *South Africa's Plan and Capability in the Nuclear Field*, pp. 29-31; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1978* (London: Taylor & Francis, Ltd., 1978), pp. 70-79; Spector, *Nuclear Proliferation Today*, pp. 291-94; Richard K. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa?" *International Security*, Fall 1979; *South Africa: Time Running Out*, The Report of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa (Calif.: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 251-53; Murray Marder and Don Oberdorfer "How West, Soviets moved to Head Off S. Africa A-Test," *Washington Post*, August 28, 1977; and John F. Burns, "South Africa Stirs New A-Arms Flurry," *New York Times*, August 31, 1977.

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scientists convened by the White House concluded that the flash was probably not from a nuclear blast, while the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency and the Naval Research Laboratory reached the opposite conclusion. The type of device and party or parties responsible were also hotly debated. Some suggested the event was a neutron bomb test; others argued that the apparent low-yield of the explosion indicated a battlefield nuclear weapon, a trigger for a thermonuclear device, or a larger bomb that fizzled. Testifying before Congress, representatives of the CIA pointed to Israel and South Africa as the states most likely behind the test, although at least one author has postulated that India was responsible.[3] These issues have never been conclusively resolved.

In any event, during the late 1970s South Africa's ability to design and produce nuclear weapons was strongly suspected. Today, it is virtually undisputed. Since 1981, when officials announced that the Valindaba plant was yielding 45 percent enriched uranium to fuel the SAFARI research reactor, it has been clear that there is no technological obstacle to South Africa's production of weapons-grade uranium. In 1985, South Africa may have obtained two flash X-ray machines used to test the non-nuclear triggering package for nuclear weapons; these greatly add to confidence in the reliability of an untested or inadequately tested nuclear device.[4] Whether or not the South Africans have actually assembled weapons, they are capable of doing so, and quickly.

Estimates of the number of weapons range, as of mid-1988, from nine to twenty-three. These estimates assume that South Africa's Valindaba pilot plant operated at full capacity throughout the 1981-86 period, that the plant has produced fifty kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) annually since 1981, and that fifteen to twenty-five kilograms of highly enriched uranium are used per twenty-kiloton weapon. The lower estimate assumes that, each year, approximately fifteen kilograms of HEU produced at Valindaba have been used as fuel for the SAFARI I research reactor. The higher estimate assumes that all HEU produced at the pilot plant has been used for weapons purposes. If the plant ran at less than full capacity, the stockpile would of course be smaller.

South Africa's capacity for manufacturing nuclear weapons may increase when its semi-commercial uranium enrichment facility at Valindaba begins operation sometime in 1988. If low-enriched uranium from this new plant is used as feed for the Valindaba pilot plant,

[3] Arnold Kramish, "Nuclear Flashes in the Night," *Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1980, pp. 3-11.

[4] See Leonard S. Spector, *The New Nuclear Nations* (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), pp. 220-21 and *Going Nuclear*, p. 231.

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the latter could more than triple its production of weapons-grade material.

As for South Africa's ability to deliver nuclear weapons, that too is virtually undisputed. The republic has a sizable and versatile arsenal of nuclear-capable aircraft and is in the process of developing missiles which might be capable of delivering nuclear warheads. It possesses a variety of combat aircraft capable of dropping a 1,300-pound nuclear bomb: 6 Buccaneers, 12 Mirage F-1s, and 5 Canberra B(I)12s. In addition, 19 Mirage 3CZ/EZs could be modified to carry nuclear payloads. It is rumored that South Africa's long-standing missile program is moving toward an intermediate-range ballistic missile.[5] Recent reports say that South Africa is building an airstrip on Marion Island, in the South Atlantic, that may have a function in the testing of missiles, and it is feared that South Africa may one day deploy missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.[6]

This steady growth in nuclear weapons capability suggests that Pretoria seeks more than bargaining leverage, for if leverage were its only purpose then demonstrating an ability to build nuclear weapons would have sufficed. And that ability was demonstrated long ago. South Africa's capacity to produce weapons-grade material and its arsenal of delivery vehicles imply an intent to go beyond diplomatic demonstration.

But why, if nuclear efforts have already deepened the South African regime's isolation, do officials pursue the risky course of preparing for the use of nuclear weapons? The answer lies in the changing domestic, regional, and international circumstances of South Africa.

The Domestic Situation

During the 1980s, South Africa has increasingly come to resemble a state under siege, as a result of four major changes. The internal cycle of anti-apartheid resistance and government repression has intensified since late 1984, leading the government to adopt draconian measures; the decades-old guerrilla effort has become bolder and more effective; the military has come to exercise more influence over security policy; and the (white) South African electorate has shifted toward conservatism and reaction.

Resistance and Repression. The implementation of a new constitution in September 1984 set off political violence in the townships that has since claimed more than 2,500 lives. Attacks on police and

[5] Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World," *International Security*, Winter 1984/85, pp. 166-78. For an overview of South Africa's missile development in the past, see Barbara Rogers and Zdenek Cervanka, *The Nuclear Axis: Collaboration Between West Germany and South Africa* (New York: New York Times, 1978), pp. 229-37.

[6] "Reports Say South Africa on Verge of N-Test," *Los Angeles Times*, December 30, 1986.

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local government representatives have plunged many townships into periods of anarchy. Nationwide labor strikes have paralyzed South Africa's industrial sector for days at a time. Black protest has spawned school, shop, and rent boycotts.

In June 1987, President Pieter W. ("Pik") Botha extended a year-old nationwide state of emergency, banning unauthorized meetings and imposing press restrictions. In February 1988, in one of the most extensive crackdowns on political opposition in many years, the South African government banned political activity for seventeen opposition groups — including the nearly 3,000,000-member United Democratic Front and the 800,000-member Congress of South African Trade Unions. In addition, the police have won the power to arrest suspected subversives and conduct searches without warrants, a power they have used to detain an estimated 30,000 anti-government activists without charges. Not surprisingly, the government's budget for fiscal year 1987-88 calls for a 43 percent increase in police expenditures.[7] That same budget also requests a 30 percent increase in spending for the military. In part, this reflects the most remarkable security measure to date: the deployment of 35,000 military troops in ninety-six black townships. Unprecedented before 1985, the use of the South African Defense Force (SADF) in areas where unrest has overwhelmed the police is now accepted practice — and one that is expected to continue.

The Guerrilla War. At the same time, the guerrilla war waged against the South African government by the African National Congress (ANC) has become more sophisticated, more effective, and less discriminating. In the 1960s and 1970s, the ANC targeted its sabotage primarily against public buildings and an occasional police station. In the 1980s, it has struck oil production facilities, nuclear reactors, and military sites — targets of strategic importance and symbols of the regime's technological prowess. In 1980, the ANC used limpet mines to destroy part of the original Sasol 1 (South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corp.) plant which produced oil from coal. In 1981, the Durban Defense Force recruiting office was bombed and the Voortrekkerhoogte Military Base attacked. In 1982, the ANC claimed responsibility for an attack in which four bombs severely damaged the Koeberg nuclear reactor construction site and delayed the project's completion. In 1983, an ANC car bomb damaged the facade of the South African Air Force military intelligence building in downtown Pretoria and caused about twenty casualties. In November 1985, the strategic Sasol 2 complex near Pretoria was hit by rockets. By attempting to render symbols of the state's strength vulnerable to attack, the ANC seeks to hit Pretoria where it hurts. More recently,

[7] "Pretoria Slates $4.10b for Police, Defense," *Boston Globe*, June 10, 1987.

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guerrillas claiming to be with the ANC have planted bombs in public places such as shopping malls in downtown Johannesburg, bringing the guerrilla war to white South Africa's doorstep.

The Military in Politics. The rise of the military establishment in South Africa's decision-making elite has also had a profound effect on the domestic situation. Since the late 1970s, the increasing importance of the military's counsel in the formulation of policy, both foreign and domestic, has been manifested in the State Security Council (SSC). This powerful and secret body, composed of senior military officials, government experts on security, and cabinet ministers, has emerged as the crucial actor in all security-related planning. It has managed to eclipse the more liberal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the so-called *verligte* (enlightened) wing of the Nationalist party.[8]

Some outside commentators suggest that South Africa's military has in effect staged a bloodless and quiet coup.

Professor Peter Vale of Rhodes University has described the South African military as "a government within the government, able to exert a dominant influence both in the back rooms and on the battlefield."[9] Indeed, some outside commentators even suggest that the generals have in effect staged a bloodless and quiet coup.[10] There are clear indications, for example, that the military elite have followed a line in Mozambique — arming and supplying Renamo insurgents — that is in violation of Pretoria's stated policy of rapprochement with Maputo. And the ability of the military to impose its will on the foreign-policy establishment was forcefully demonstrated in June 1986 when SADF attacks on alleged ANC outposts in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Botswana — all Commonwealth states — successfully scuttled the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group's mission to South Africa.

Nevertheless, the South African security establishment has been especially sensitive to public suggestions that the military leadership has usurped power from civilian authorities.[11] And the loyalties and policy outlook President Botha developed during his twelve years as

[8] See Philip H. Frankel, *Pretoria's Praetorians* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); and Kenneth W. Grundy, *The Militarization of South African Politics* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1986).

[9] Interview with author Kurt M. Campbell, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa, August 6, 1986.

[10] This point is alluded to by Simon Jenkins, "Destabilization in Southern Africa," *Economist*, July 16, 1983, pp. 19-28.

[11] See for instance the rejoinder written by the former Secretary of the SSC: Lt. Gen. A. J. van Deventer, "State Security Council: Not Sinister," *Paratus* (South Africa), November 1983, pp. 9-11.

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defense minister do suggest another conclusion: that the military has risen to power under him rather than against him.

Intransigence. Finally, South Africa has experienced a significant political shift toward conservatism and reaction. In the most dramatic electoral swing since 1948, 78 percent of South African white voters in the May 1987 elections supported either the ruling Nationalist party or the Conservative party, which broke away from the Nationalists in 1982. Support for the Nationalists among English-speakers rose from around 30 percent to 57 percent, as voters defected from the anti-apartheid Progressive Federalist party. At the same time, a growing number of Afrikaners turned from the Nationalist party to the Conservative party. While the Nationalists enjoyed 87 percent of the Afrikaner vote in 1977, they captured only 50 percent in the May 1987 election. Taken together, these trends enabled the Conservative party to replace the PFP as the official opposition, redefining the predominant electoral threat to Botha's Nationalist regime.[12]

In addition to this electoral shift, there has been a growing backlash against Botha's reforms. The leader of the Afrikaner Resistance Movement (an organization of militant white extremists that models itself after the Nazi movement of the 1930s) has reportedly threatened that if Botha's policies lead to civil strife, "true nationalists will retake control of the government by force."[13] However unrealistic such threats may be, the Botha government apparently believes that it must placate this instransigent constituency to ensure its own political survival.[14] Ultimately, the drift of South African whites toward conservatism and reaction increases support for draconian means of handling threats to South African security, and further precludes the chances for moderation, accommodation, and peaceful change.

The Regional Situation

Although South Africa wields predominant power on the African continent, tentative indications signal that its hegemony is eroding.[15] The improving military capabilities of several Front Line States, cou-

[12] For a more detailed discussion of this political shift to the right, see Pauline H. Baker, "South Africa: The Afrikaner Angst," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1987-88, pp. 61-79.

[13] Eugene Terre Blanche, quoted by Ned Tenko, "South African Ruling Party Tries to Rein in Right," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 10, 1986.

[14] This trend in Afrikaner political history is described in Andre du Toit and Hermann Giliomee, *Afrikaner Political Thought: Analysis and Documents*, vol. 1, 1790-1850 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Ivor Wilkinsand Hans Strydom, *The Super-Afrikaners: Inside the South African Broederbond* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1978); and Rene De Villers, "Afrikaner Nationalism," in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson, eds., *The Oxford History of South Africa*, vol. II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).

[15] Robert Jaster noted this trend as early as 1980. See his *South Africa's Narrowing Security Options*, Adelphi Papers 159 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980).

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pled with profound economic and political dislocation within South Africa, may change the regional balance of power over the next ten to twenty years.

Specifically, Moscow's supplies of advanced equipment to the Front Line States (Angola, Zambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique) may be changing the region's military complexion.[16] Angola has received perhaps $2.5 billion worth of sophisticated Soviet weaponry since 1983, including two squadrons of MiG-23 fighters, an integrated air defense system with mobile radars, Hind battle helicopters, and an assortment of surface-to-air missiles.[17]

The United Nations arms embargo against South Africa, initiated by the U.N. General Assembly in 1963 and made mandatory by the Security Council in 1977, further aggravates this trend. Although some arms imports have slipped through, the embargo is taking its toll. If the arms ban is enforced in the future, South Africa's prolonged isolation from new developments in Western military technology could cause its armory to fall behind.[18] Israel, which has been South Africa's most consistent supplier of defense and electronics hardware, recently announced it would not negotiate new military contracts with Pretoria. Although Israel will continue to honor existing military contracts, and although some have suggested that this announcement was merely cosmetic,[19] the U.S. government has stated its intention to pressure Israel to reconsider its defense relationship with Pretoria.

South Africa's state-supported arms company, the Armaments Corporation of South Africa, Ltd. (Armscor), has been successful in manufacturing small arms, small-arms munitions, and a rather narrow range of military aircraft, rockets, artillery, armored cars, small naval craft, and communications equipment. But its success is overshadowed by the company's chronic inability, due to insufficient technology and skills, to produce a number of heavy and sophisticated weapons, including tanks, submarines, naval equipment, heavy artillery, radar, and, most particularly, advanced fighter aircraft.[20] These are precisely the weapons the Soviet Union has delivered in quantity to others in the region.

In addition, South African military planners must contend with the chronic problem of limited manpower. Currently, South Africa fields about 100,000 regulars and 300,000 reserves. In contrast, the

[16] Spector, *Going Nuclear*, p. 223.

[17] See Francis Fukuyama, *Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World*, Rand R-3337-USDP (February 1986); Peter Clement, "Moscow and South Africa," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1985; and Bruce D. Porter, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 147-81.

[18] Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security Options."

[19] Rafael Medoff and Mordechai Haller, "South Africa in the Mind of Israel," *National Review*, April 15, 1988, pp. 38-39.

[20] However, some speculate South Africa may be recruiting the engineers from Israel's cancelled Lavi project. *Jane's Defence Weekly*, April 2, 1988, p. 619.

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five Front Line States combined deploy about 200,000 soldiers.[21] But this situation is likely to change over the next ten to twenty years, to South Africa's disadvantage. There are five reasons to expect this change. First, ground forces in neighboring states are expanding and foreign troops in the region continue to bolster their numbers. Kenneth W. Grundy estimates that ground forces in the states surrounding South Africa grew by approximately 300 percent between 1977 and 1986.[22]

Second, internally, the pool of white males on which South Africa can draw for its military and police forces is becoming smaller in relation to the numbers of non-whites. Demographically, the birthrate of non-whites in South Africa is outstripping that of whites.[23] In 1983 (the most recent year for which official South African government statistics are available), there were 40 births per thousand for blacks, 31.3 for coloureds, 25.6 for Asians, and 17 for whites. In addition, draft dodging and "white flight" have become trends of real concern to Pretoria's military planners. In the January 1985 intake, 7,589 men failed to report for national service; and in 1986, South Africa experienced a net outflow of more than 5,000 whites.[24]

Third, many in the military are reluctant to boost manpower by relying on blacks in the SADF. They fear that too large a percentage of black soldiers (less than 5 percent of the SADF is now black) might compromise the armed forces' reliability as the defender of white rule.[25] Fourth, a massive call-up of the country's 300,000 reserves could cause serious economic and social dislocation. The same white male population needed to defend the republic is needed to run the economy.

Finally, the SADF has already committed significant financial and manpower resources to Namibia. Fighting wars on the border as well as inside South Africa would require an unmanageable overextension. The portion of the national budget explicitly allocated for "protection services" rose to 22 percent in the 1987-88 budget from less than 10 percent before 1982.[26]

Other changes in the region may also weaken Pretoria's ability to impose its will. After white-ruled Rhodesia became black-ruled Zimbabwe in 1980, nine states formed the Southern African Devel-

[21] See *The Military Balance, 1986-1987* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986).

[22] See Grundy, *The Militarization of South African Politics*, p. 32.

[23] See *South Africa 1986*, Twelfth Edition (Cape Town: CTP Book Printers, 1986), pp. 24-28.

[24] See Jaster, "Strengthening Military Security in Southern Africa," a paper presented to the Conference on Peace and Security in Southern Africa, Arusha, Tanzania, April 1987.

[25] See Kenneth Grundy, "A Black Legion in South Africa?" *African Affairs*, vol. 80 no. 318 (1981); and Grundy, *Soldiers Without Politics: Blacks in the South African Armed Forces* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

[26] Jaster, "Strengthening Military Security in Southern Africa." Also, "Pretoria Slates $4.10b for Police, Defense," *Boston Globe*, June 10, 1987.

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opment Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), an association seeking economic independence from South Africa and greater collaboration on aid projects. Although this effort is only fledgling and fragile — South Africa maintains an economic hold on the region — developments like the SADCC eventually may loosen Pretoria's grip.

The International Situation

International demands for an end to white rule, and subsequent sanctions, have made Pretoria's isolation acute. Over 100 foreign companies have pulled out since 1985, and all the OECD governments have imposed sanctions. While South Africa's economic isolation has been partially offset by Japanese trade and investment, its political and cultural dissociation have only increased. Pretoria has suffered a loss of diplomatic relations with several states and is an object of constant criticism in international fora.

These events have increased Pretoria's resistance to reform, and its determination to go it alone. Botha has warned, "If we are forced until our backs are against the wall, we will have no alternative but to stand up in self-respect and say to the world, 'You won't force South Africa to commit national suicide.' "[27]

Much of this bitterness is directed toward Washington. General I. R. Gleeson, chief of the Defense Force and senior member of the SSC, commented in mid-1986, "American support has been quite uneven, and it is becoming more difficult to do business with your country. There are even some among us who argue that South Africa should break with the West to avoid the unwanted intrusions into our internal affairs . . . South Africa has been burned before by the U.S., and we will continue to be wary."[28] The U.S. Congress's vote to impose sanctions in October 1986 made Pretoria even more anti-American and more prone to stand firm. President Botha declared that South Africa is now facing a challenge from the capitalist West as much as from the communist East.[29] His Nationalist party ran on an anti-American platform in the May 1987 elections.

In sum, increased isolation has hardened South Africa's resistance to pressure for change.

The World Through Pretoria's Eyes

In addition to these objective factors — a domestic drift toward a state of siege, the gradual decline of South Africa's regional hegemony, and its increasing international isolation — we must also

[27] Allistair Sparks, "Botha Refuses Plea to Free Mandela," *Washington Post*, July 30, 1986.

[28] Interview with author Kurt M. Campbell, South African Defense Force Headquarters, Pretoria, South Africa, August 5, 1986.

[29] Kurt M. Campbell, "Pretoria's Total Onslaught," *Washington Post*, September 23, 1986.

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consider subjective factors affecting Pretoria: How does the world look from inside the republic? How does Pretoria view its military situation?

Four ideas appear to be central: the sense of an all-out threat to South Africa's survival; a belief that its enemies are directed by the Soviet Union; a feeling of having been abandoned by the West; and a fear of massive conventional attack.

South African leaders see themselves engaged in a fight to the finish. Police Commissioner General Johan Coetzee has characterized it as "a war of attrition. There is no cutoff point. He who lasts longest wins because, in the final analysis, it is about the will of the nation to exist and that of others to wear them down."[30] South African defense minister General Magnus Malan describes the situation as a "total onslaught." It is, he says, "an ideologically motivated struggle and the aim is the implacable and unconditional imposition of the aggressor's will on the target state."[31] According to Malan, this onslaught employs all available means and encompasses all realms, from the military to the social, from the political to the economic. "South Africa is today . . . involved in total war. The war is not only an area for the soldier. Everyone is involved and has a role to play."[32]

In Pretoria's worst-case scenario, the total onslaught becomes a multi-front war: comprehensive economic sanctions are widely imposed by the international community; outside governments provide advisers, arms, equipment, and perhaps troops to enemy forces; multinational conventional forces attack the republic; guerrillas infiltrate South Africa's borders; and the townships explode in civil unrest.

Inherent in this view is the equation of national survival with the maintenance of white rule. As country after country in southern Africa made the transition from white to black rule, Pretoria's sense of threat by a "total onslaught" has grown. The coup in Lisbon of April 1974, which brought the end of the Portuguese empire, significantly changed the balance of power in southern Africa. Newly independent governments in Angola and Mozambique emerged with proclaimed Marxists in power and with Soviet treaties of friendship and cooperation. In addition, the transformation of Rhodesia into Zimbabwe removed an important ally and buffer.

Second, South African leaders perceive the Soviet Union to be the mastermind behind these efforts, and therefore the country's greatest enemy. Pretoria is convinced that the Kremlin places great

[30] John D. Battersby, "South African Dismisses a Blast as Theater,'" *New York Times*, May 22, 1987.

[31] As quoted in Deon Geldenhuys, *Some Foreign Policy Implications of South Africa's "Total National Strategy"* (Braamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs, March 1981), p.3.

[32] As cited in Grundy, *The Militarization of South African Politics*, pp.10-18; see also General C. L. Viljoen, "The Scourge of the Civilized World," *Paratus*, August 1983, pp. 22-33.

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stress on establishing communism in southern Africa. A 1982 White Paper on Defense asserted that because

> the ultimate aim of the Soviet Union and its allies is to overthrow the present body politic in the RSA [Republic of South Africa] and to replace it with a Marxist-orientated form of government to further the objectives of the USSR, therefore all possible methods and means are used to attain this objective. This includes instituting social and labor unrest, civilian resistance, terrorist attacks against the infrastructure of the RSA and the intimidation of black leaders and members of the Security Forces. This onslaught is supported by a worldwide propaganda campaign and the involvement of various front organizations and leaders.[33]

In line with this, the South African authorities see opposition groups as communist rather than nationalist. "The ANC," says General Gleeson, "is a communist organization, coordinated by Moscow, and wholly committed to indiscriminate terrorist acts. The military is tasked to repel the 'total onslaught' set against us by international communism, and to achieve its goal, South Africa is prepared . . . to bear any burden."[34] The majority of the white population shares this perception. A 1981 poll showed 80 percent of the whites felt the government was not exaggerating the communist threat; the figure was 87 percent among Afrikaans speakers.[35]

Third, South Africa perceives itself as abandoned by once-trusted friends. The unwillingness of the U.S. and West European governments to make military and other commitments to preserve the white regime has embittered South African officials. With its two-camp perspective, Pretoria now sees the West as part of the problem. South Africa's 1975-76 intervention in Angola at the behest of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (followed by its humiliating withdrawal) taught the regime a particularly bitter lesson and heightened Pretoria's perception of its own danger. These perceptions have fueled a grim determination to wage the anti-communist crusade alone, if need be.

Fourth, Pretoria perceives a conventional attack as the most threatening challenge it faces. A 1984 White Paper argues that although not immediate, "a conventional threat does exist due to the fact that the USSR, through its sustained supply of advanced armaments and personnel to these states [in southern Africa], is disturbing the military balance in respect of the availability of military equipment in Southern Africa. Thus a situation is created that the USSR

[33] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defense and Armaments Supply*, 1982 (Cape Town: South African Navy Printing Unit, 1982), p. 2.

[34] Interview with author Kurt M. Campbell, South African Defense Force Headquarters, Pretoria, South Africa, August 5, 1986.

[35] Deon Geldenhuys, "What We Think? A Survey of White Opinion Foreign Policy Issues," *Occasional Paper*, South African Institute of International Affairs (November 1982), p. 6; Jaster, "Strengthening Military Security in Southern Africa."

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could exploit should it, due to favourable conditions, decide on direct action against the RSA."[36]

Guerrilla attacks and internal unrest are no longer seen as the only threats to South African security. Coordinated, large-scale conventional attacks have to be considered as well. Accordingly, Pretoria's defense posture — as its doctrine, military exercises, and weapons purchases all show — has moved beyond preparedness for counter-insurgency warfare to preparedness for a multi-front war.[37] In preparing for this contingency, the South African military may well be contemplating a deterrent that would compensate for its own vulnerabilities and counter the strengths of its adversaries — nuclear weapons.

South Africa's Nuclear Intentions

South Africa's nuclear potential raises serious concerns not only for its politically disenfranchised black population but for its neighbors and the world. South Africa's nuclear weapons options form a continuum stretching from the present into the distant future, from the relatively benign to the most malevolent.

In the near term, a suspected but undeclared ability to deploy nuclear weapons gives South Africa an instrument for diplomatic maneuvering and manipulation. Pretoria's skillful use of this instrument was most recently demonstrated when President Botha announced in September 1987 that "South Africa hopes that it will soon be able to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has decided to open discussions with others to this end."[38] His announcement came as a group of Third World countries sought to suspend South Africa's membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency, one of the very few international organizations to which the republic still belongs. The announcement staved off the challenge, for the Soviet bloc governments declined to support the resolution. Having accomplished this short-term aim, however, Mr. Botha is unlikely to hasten to remove the shroud of ambiguity veiling his country's nuclear plans and capabilities. As long as South Africa's nuclear intentions and status are ambiguous, Pretoria can attempt to mitigate its increasing isolation by flirting with the idea of joining the non-proliferation regime. Actually, joining would hold very few advantages.

In the medium term, ambiguity is likely to give way to nuclear saber-rattling. As its isolation grows and its margin of military superiority declines, South Africa may choose to declare its possession

[36] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defense and Armaments Supply*, 1984 (Cape Town: Department of Defense, 1984), pp. 1-3.

[37] Ronald Walters, *South Africa and the Bomb: Responsibility and Deterrence* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1987), p.71.

[38] Michèle A. Flournoy, "South Africa May Sign Non-Proliferation Treaty, Botha Says," *Arms Control Today*, October 1987, p. 27.

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of nuclear weapons or flex its nuclear muscle with a test explosion. Either of these actions would have major repercussions, abroad and domestically.

Foreign-policy incentives for going nuclear stem from the psychological and political impact such weapons could have, particularly on the West and the rest of Africa.[39] Psychologically, nuclear weapons operate as a status symbol, bestowing on the South African regime an aura of permanency and invincibility. A South African nuclear arsenal would undoubtedly reinforce the republic's image as a fortress, intimidating its adversaries by making it seem militarily impregnable and technologically superior. A nuclear arsenal could also give Pretoria greater bargaining leverage with both the West and the Front Line States, posing an important question for South Africa's friends and foes: What are they willing to give or guarantee South Africa to forego its nuclear options? Although diplomatic disincentives certainly exist, the ability to constrain South Africa's nuclear actions may decrease as the country becomes ever more isolated internationally. As the regime has less to lose, provocative behavior entails fewer costs.

There are also domestic incentives for the government to announce its nuclear capability. To some white South Africans, the state's possession of nuclear arms could seem a promise to preserve "the South African way of life." As symbols of the legitimacy, power, and control of the government, nuclear weapons might boost the morale of the embattled Afrikaner community, as well as support for the Nationalist party.

It is more difficult to predict the effect a revealed nuclear arsenal would have on South African blacks. A declaration of possession could mobilize or demoralize, unify or further divide them. Nevertheless, the authorities appear to anticipate the latter effect, and therefore may see their nuclear weapons capability as something of a domestic deterrent.

In the long term, if the struggle to end white rule intensifies and the regime glimpses its own political extinction, the government may contemplate using its nuclear weapons capability more brazenly. In the context of acute international isolation, the weight of world opinion is unlikely to constrain the government's choice of means and actions. Pretoria could, for example, use its nuclear arsenal to bolster its bargaining leverage with the West, the Front Line States, and anti-apartheid forces within the republic. In a crisis, the South African government could threaten to use nuclear weapons as a means of inducing the West to intervene on its behalf. Alternatively, the nuclear threat might be wielded to buttress South Africa's at-

[39] This discussion draws from Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa?" pp. 101-105.

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tempts to impose a regional settlement on the Front Line States or even to obtain assurances of safe passage for its white population.

How might a desperate South Africa use its nuclear weapons for military purposes? It seems unlikely to use them against the Front Line States to stop their support of ANC guerrillas, for in the absence of simultaneous and overwhelming uprisings the republic's military forces can handle virtually all threats. Further, its effective counter-insurgency tactics provide much less costly means to achieve these ends. Absent a radical shift in the regional security balance and a loss of more viable alternatives, nuclear weapons will remain ill-suited to the task of depriving adversaries of sanctuary and support.

Given the likelihood that South Africa's margin of military superiority will decline over the long term, nuclear weapons appear to be the "great equalizers."

Or Pretoria might use nuclear weapons against Cuban or Soviet forces in the region. But given the largely defensive nature of Cuban troop deployments in Angola and South Africa's conventional military might, the use of nuclear weapons against them seems improbable. The Soviet Union has provided weapons, logistical support, and military advisers, but it has resisted introducing combat forces into Angola and will probably continue to do so. The positioning of Soviet ships off the coast of South Africa, poised to strike, seems equally unlikely. And even if the Soviet Union became more directly involved in southern Africa, Pretoria would have much to lose and little to gain in using nuclear weapons against a superpower.

More likely is the battlefield use of nuclear weapons to stop a large-scale conventional attack by neighbors or the combined armies of several adversaries. Indeed, it is this scenario that drives Pretoria's strategists. Given the likelihood that South Africa's margin of military (especially air) superiority will decline over the long term, given the unlikelihood of Western intervention on the regime's behalf, and given Pretoria's perception that its conventional military forces might be stretched to the limit by a multi-front war, nuclear weapons appear to be the "great equalizers."[40]

At some point, as South African isolation increases and military superiority declines, a conventional attack could require more than a conventional response. As Minister of Information Connie Mulder threatened more than a decade ago: "If we were attacked, no rules

[40] Steve Chan, "Incentives for Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of International Pariahs," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, May 1980, p.32.

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apply at all if it comes to a question of our existence. We will use all means at our disposal, whatever they may be."[41] A credible threat to use tactical nuclear or enhanced radiation weapons (if Pretoria were able to meet the greater technical requirements of assembling such weapons) would certainly improve South Africa's ability to deter adversaries.

Finally, although domestic military uses of South Africa's nuclear arsenal are generally dismissed as unthinkable, some have raised the possibility that the minority government might use nuclear arms inside the country in a desperate act of national suicide or white revenge. Bishop Tutu proposed this scenario in January 1986:

> I myself actually fear that in the end, because they [the South African whites] are so irrational, they seem to have a Samson complex. . .They are going to pull down the pillars and everybody must go down with them. . . .If as most of us believe, they do have a nuclear capability, I don't put it past them to have their own version of a scorched earth policy.[42]

However implausible and distant the military uses of South Africa's nuclear arsenal may seem to outsiders, they may not appear altogether unreasonable from Pretoria's perspective.

Conclusion

Over the past decade, speculation concerning the existence of a South African nuclear weapons program has focused almost exclusively on its potential diplomatic uses. But the significant challenges that have confronted the South African government in recent years and its responses to those challenges require us to ask whether Pretoria might also consider military uses for its nuclear arms.

The very idea of nuclear weapons being used in the unfolding racial conflict in South Africa raises profound and unsettling concerns. What can the West do in response to Pretoria's nuclear weapons and to the possibility of their use on the African continent? Denying the republic its ability to manufacture and assemble nuclear arms would be difficult; that ability is largely indigenous. Nor can the United States expect to determine or veto South Africa's nuclear intentions. While some degree of U.S. and European diplomatic influence still exists, it was significantly depleted with the imposition of commercial sanctions. (Once imposed, they cannot be imposed again.) It is thus highly unlikely that any U.S. president or European leader could negotiate away Pretoria's prized and protected nuclear arsenal.

Nevertheless, there are several ways in which the United States and other countries could intervene to lessen the nuclear threat in southern Africa. Obviously, maximum concerted worldwide diplomatic pressure could and presumably would be applied to keep South

[41] Jim Hoagland, "S. Africa with U.S. Aid, Near A-Bomb," *Washington Post*, February 16, 1977.

[42] Bishop Desmond Tutu, as quoted in Spector, *Going Nuclear*, p. 217.

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Africa from using or threatening to use its nuclear weapons. If South Africa appeared to be plummeting into an ungovernable condition, however, the United States might offer to relieve it of its nuclear burden. If the government in Pretoria feared that its nuclear weapons were about to be seized by enemy forces, it might consider allowing a Western power to remove its nuclear arsenal in order to avoid what one author has called "nuclear inheritance."[43] Long before such a point arrives, the United States and others might also open discreet discussions with South African opposition groups on the subject of nuclear inheritance, paving the way for crisis management and for the possibility that a future South African regime would sign the NPT.

If all else failed, and the situation merited such drastic measures, the United States and other powers might be forced to raise the prospect of a pre-emptive strike against South African facilities (something along the lines of Israel's pre-emptive attack on Iraqi nuclear facilities.) Such an attack might be the only way to deny South Africa its weapons capability, and there would of course be a host of obstacles to any such action.

In any event, it is only by debating policy options before a crisis is upon us that we can hope to react wisely and swiftly when South Africa plays its atomic ace.

[43] See the chapter entitled "The Nuclear Inheritors" in Spector, *Going Nuclear*, pp. 15-63; and his earlier treatment of the subject in *The New Nuclear Nations*, pp. 213-15.

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GETTING TO MARS

by John W. Garver

The idea of a joint U.S.-Soviet mission to explore the planet Mars is gaining impetus. The *New York Times* has recently endorsed the idea editorially, and a cover story in the *New York Times Magazine* has declared that"it makes no sense to reject cooperation out of hand."[1] In fact, a number of considerations are "at hand" that should lead the United States to reject a U.S.-Soviet exploration of Mars. At the same time, however, one also finds persuasive reasons why the United States should look to Japan as its potential partner in the exploration of the solar system.

Toward a U.S.-Soviet Mission

In April 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on cooperation in space that provided for sharing data and coordinating missions to avoid duplication. Last December, Moscow formally requested that the American Mars Observer spacecraft, which is scheduled to be launched in 1992, carry a transmitter to help relay pictures from a Soviet Mars mission that is scheduled for 1994. U.S. officials are now considering that request, as well as the possibility that NASA's Deep Space Tracking Network provide tracking services for the 1994 Soviet mission, and also for a 1989 Soviet mission to the Martian moon of Phobos.

Such measures are meant to open the door for broader Soviet-American cooperation in the exploration of Mars. Toward this end, joint symposia of American and Soviet scientists meet periodically to explore areas of possible cooperation in Mars exploration. According to Bruce C. Murray, professor of planetary science at the California Institute of Technology, "They [the Soviets] keep saying 'Let's do these missions together.' "[2]

For some American scientists, such as Carl Sagan, the idea of a joint Soviet-American exploration of Mars has great political appeal. What better way to reduce mutual suspicion and the danger of war, they ask, than for the leaders and scientists of both countries to

[1] "The Greening of the Red Planet," *New York Times*, May 31, 1988; "Destination: Mars," by John Noble Wilford, *New York Times Magazine*, March 20, 1988.

[2] Ibid., p. 28.

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cooperate in mankind's first journey to another planet? What better way to make clear to the people of both countries the common humanity of Soviet and American citizens, and to encourage them to cooperate rather than to confront one another? What better way to ensure that the new technology developed in exploring the solar system will not be put to military uses — will not trigger a new arms race — than to ensure that both superpowers have the technology and know that the other side has it too?

The idea of a joint venture also has a less abstract appeal. The exploration of Mars will be immensely expensive. According to a study done in 1984 for the The Planetary Society (a private organization promoting planetary exploration) such a project would cost approximately $40 billion with an equal amount required for preliminary development in space.[3] Given the massive deficits in recent budgets of the United States, the country simply cannot afford to undertake a Mars mission alone. Further, Mikhail Gorbachev's depictions of the Soviet economy suggest that the USSR too can ill afford such an expense. Why not let both countries save money by mating powerful Soviet rockets with sophisticated American microelectronics?

Against a U.S.-Soviet Mission

There are several reasons why not. The most serious has to do with the likely impact of a Soviet-American exploration of Mars on U.S. public opinion. If mankind's first journey to another planet is an international effort, it will be a potent symbol of political cooperation. Indeed, this is much of its attraction for those who see it as a way to ameliorate Soviet-American tensions. Therefore, we have to ask: Would Americans continue to accept the financial and emotional burden of countering Soviet thrusts around the world if this putative enemy were a partner in such a major undertaking? Probably not. Rather, the joint venture would lead to reduced vigilance against Soviet expansion.

Of course, if one assumes that the new Soviet leaders have abandoned the long-term effort of the Soviet leadership to shift the global correlation of forces to their advantage, and if one concludes that the United States should no longer be concerned with containing Soviet thrusts around the world, then there need be no objection to a joint exploration of Mars on these grounds. But if one assumes that such a historic shift has not taken place, and that (*glasnost* notwithstanding) the same interests and perceptions that have fueled Soviet expansion for seven decades still remain in place, then serious prob-

[3] "Manned Lunar, Asteroid, and Mars Missions: Visions of Space Flight circa 2001. A Conceptual Study of Manned Mission Initiatives," conducted by the Space Sciences department, Science Applications International Corp., Schaumburg, Ill. (September 1984).

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lems emerge. How could, say, the introduction of MiG-23 aircraft into Nicaragua be looked upon as threatening when the United States and the Soviet Union were cooperating in the exploration of the solar system? If the United States and the Soviet Union were partners in space, what would it matter if the Soviet navy became responsible for the safe transit of foreign oil tankers through the Persian Gulf?

Assuming U.S. and Western security will continue to demand active countering of such Soviet advances, a joint exploration of Mars is therefore not prudent. It would almost certainly lead to a drastic lowering of the U.S. and Western resolve necessary to thwart Soviet imperialism. As Americans are confronted with the need to spend their tax dollars and possibly offer their sons to impede Soviet advances, as the Kremlin and its sympathizers plead that only American "flexibility" can save the peace — will not Americans be tempted to seize on the powerful symbolism of a joint exploration of Mars and conclude that "cooperation rather than confrontation" must somehow still be possible?

If the U.S. government did move to counter Soviet advances in some region, Moscow and its minions would probably claim that U.S. aggressiveness was endangering bilateral cooperation. In extremis, American astronauts would become Moscow's hostages against a forceful U.S. reaction to Soviet advances. It is difficult to imagine any American president telling the electorate in time of peace that he had decided to abandon several Americans to lingering death in space — or even to risk abandoning them — because of some Soviet move in Central America or the Middle East.

In an extreme case, the decision to counter Soviet advances might require, quite literally, a decision to abandon U.S. astronauts in space.

Even in non-crisis situations, American public officials would probably be influenced by the symbolism of this mammoth long-term cooperative venture. As the Soviets displayed their wrath over various U.S. moves or criticisms, and grumbled about endangerment of the Mars program, it could be considered unacceptably reckless for an official to speak forthrightly about the Soviet Union. American public officials might begin to practice a form of self-censorship, the most insidious kind of censorship.

This scenario should not be considered far-fetched. Consider what happened in May 1972: After a long but gradual military buildup in Cuba under the cover of détente, a Soviet Golf II class diesel-powered ballistic missile submarine visited Cuba just as Richard Nixon arrived in Moscow to sign the SALT I treaty in May 1972. Moscow

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chose the moment to cross a strategically significant threshold very carefully, correctly expecting that Nixon would not wish to endanger the Moscow summit by making a major issue of the submarine visit. The calculation proved correct and the Soviet military position in the Caribbean moved forward another notch.

But perhaps Mikhail Gorbachev is different from Leonid Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders? Perhaps he recognizes the gravity of the Soviet Union's economic problems, wants to abandon the struggle for ultimate superiority over the United States, and seeks to work out a modus vivendi? Perhaps so. And it even may be the case that the bureaucratic interest groups ruling the Soviet Union are willing to go along with Gorbachev.

But perhaps not. Gorbachev's tenure is now just over three years old and it has already undergone some major changes. He began as an upholder of the status quo, it should be recalled, only later emerging as a reformer. His reform efforts have encountered substantial, and apparently growing, opposition. Such considerations make it very difficult to predict what Gorbachev will do in the future, or even whether he will be in charge of Soviet policy. Assuming that a journey to Mars would occur in about 2010 to 2020, it is clearly imprudent to base a long-range policy with enormous strategic consequences on so shaky a foundation.

Further, the record suggests that Gorbachev will not change Moscow's long-range goals or strategy. In Central America, for example, secret Soviet-Nicaraguan agreements (revealed in 1987 by a defector, Major Roger Miranda, and confirmed by Nicaragua's defense minister, Humberto Ortega) commit the Soviets, through 1995, to supporting a huge buildup of Nicaragua's armed forces — supplying tanks, helicopters, and a squadron of MiG-21 fighters. For its part, Nicaragua is supposed to maintain a regular army of 80,000, with reserve and militia forces of 420,000.[4] Support of this scope for Nicaragua indicates that Moscow has not abandoned the drive to alter the global correlation of forces. This is a reality the United States will probably face for many years to come, and it should preclude a joint Soviet-American exploration of Mars.

As for the desire of American scientists to express a sense of common humanity with the Soviet people, surely there are alternative and better ways to do that. Perhaps joint medical projects, such as cooperation in the effort to eliminate cancer, might be considered.

Toward a U.S.-Japanese Mission

Even if the USSR is not the right partner, many of the arguments for a multi-national exploration of Mars make good sense. Such a project *will* be extremely expensive. Talents and resources of several

[4] *New York Times*, December 14-16, 1987.

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countries *should* be pooled. The joint endeavor *will* draw the peoples of the countries involved psychologically closer. These considerations point to a partnership between the United States and Japan.

The security of the United States will largely rest for the foreseeable future on the continued alliance of the major democratic and industrial countries — the largest and most dynamic of which are Japan and the United States. Because these two countries share so much, including quite similar views on international politics, maintaining the Japanese-American partnership is of paramount importance. But this will not be easy. Japan will continue to challenge U.S. leadership technologically, financially, and industrially — and in some areas it will surpass the United States. How will that partnership cohere if Japan becomes "Number One" in many fields?

The United States will continue to press against Japanese protectionism, and this pressure will cause resentment among certain groups in Japan. At home, the United States will also face the protectionist temptation, and there may well be an American inclination to push for economic concessions by threatening a reduction in security protection. Such pressures would, of course, rouse further resentment in Japan, and could lead to sharp tensions between the two countries. In sum, major frictions in Japanese-American relations are virtually certain and leaders of the two countries should think of ways to shore up the bilateral relationship. One way would to be to find symbols and activities to draw the two peoples together. A joint exploration of Mars would exactly fit the bill.

If Japanese and Americans cooperate in the exploration of the solar system, many of the same principles will operate as would operate in the case of a U.S.-Soviet expedition — but with much more salutary effects. The good will and comradeship created by a joint exploration of Mars would make the economic problems in Japanese-American relations seem more mundane. It would create an atmosphere conducive to calm problem solving. It would lessen the anger caused by short-term frictions and make it easier to remember the two countries' deep and long-range harmony.

A joint Japanese-American Mars mission would also help remedy a concrete problem: the Japanese reluctance to shoulder a defense burden commensurate to Japan's economic strength. Due to memories of World War II, as well as a reluctance to divert funds from capital investment, Tokyo has not done much to offset the rapid expansion of Soviet power in the Pacific Ocean. It spends just over 1 percent of GNP on defense. In contrast, the West European countries spend an average of 3-4 percent, while the United States spends 6.6 percent.[5] Japan's "free ride" creates wide resentment in the United States. But were the Japanese substantially to increase defense

[5] Todd Sandler, "Sharing Burdens in NATO," *Challenge*, March/April 1988, p. 33.

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expenditures, that too might exacerbate tensions in Japanese-American relations. It would also cause alarm in the People's Republic of China (PRC), pushing Peking toward Moscow.

The ideal solution would be for Japan to contribute to the democratic alliance without arming. Again, this is where a joint Japanese-American exploration of Mars comes in. Superiority in space offers benefits roughly comparable to superiority in the air fifty years ago. Even a strictly civilian mission to Mars would develop technology with important military implications, without being in itself military. This distinction has great importance both for the Japanese public and the neighbors of Japan.

A joint Japanese-American exploration of Mars would bring the two peoples closer together while giving the Japanese a symbol through which to express their nationalism.

A joint Mars program could also help promote other long-range U.S. interests in Asia. For example, although the United States is committed to assisting PRC efforts to modernize, Washington must avoid becoming too closely associated with Peking, so as not to alarm China's neighbors. A Japanese-American partnership for exploring Mars might help do this, by dramatically demonstrating that Tokyo remains America's most important partner in East Asia.

The complementarity between sophisticated U.S. electronics and powerful Soviet rockets is often cited as a key reason for Moscow and Washington to cooperate in this area. But this is short-sighted. Even though Japan does not possess rockets such as the Soviet Union does, a Japanese-American consortium could build them, though this might add a few years to the program. The delay is not critical, for the financial and technological resources of the United States and Japan offer a combination far superior to any U.S.-Soviet consortium.

While it might make sense to expand a Japanese-American consortium to include contributions from Canada and the West European countries, a true multilateral endeavor would likely be too cumbersome to be workable. This argues in favor of a core Japanese-American endeavor, providing the political and technological leadership for a broader Free World venture.

Would the Japanese people and government be interested in such an endeavor? I strongly suspect they would. A joint Japanese-American exploration of Mars would strengthen the alliance upon which America's and Japan's security has rested for the past forty years. It would help perpetuate that alliance into the next century

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and facilitate the mutually beneficial integration of the Japanese and American economies. It would bring the two peoples closer together while giving the Japanese a symbol through which to express their nationalism.

Conclusion

What I envision, therefore, is a partnership between the two wealthiest and most technologically advanced democracies, for the joint exploration of our solar system. Japan and the United States share many common values, not least, a commitment to free inquiry and pluralistic politics. Their joint exploration of Mars would celebrate and advance those shared values.

By contrast, the Soviet Union is profoundly opposed to the values on which U.S. liberty is based. In addition, as Soviet policy in Central America indicates, Moscow remains dedicated to shifting the global correlation of forces against the United States and its allies. For Americans as a people to join Moscow in a mission to Mars would be a symbolic betrayal of all who seek freedom. For the United States as a nation it could be strategic suicide.

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Review Essays

THE USE (AND MAINLY MISUSE) OF HISTORY

by Richard N. Haass

The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. By Paul Kennedy. New York: Random House, 1987. 677 pp. $24.95.

Two of my Harvard colleagues are making a small fortune with a book describing how policy makers and others often err by applying historical lessons to inappropriate situations.[1] Not every challenge is another Rhineland, not every concession another Munich, and not every engagement of U.S. forces promises to be another Vietnam. After reading their book, one can only conclude that a little bit of history is a dangerous thing.

In Paul Kennedy's case, however, we have something altogether different. Kennedy's recent book — *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* — includes 540 pages of text, more than eighty pages of notes, and thirty-seven pages of bibliography. Whatever else it is, it is no little bit of history. On the contrary, the volume is a prodigious, impressive tour d'horizon, certain to seem to many readers and reviewers a veritable tour de force. What it demonstrates, though, is that a lot of history can also be a dangerous thing.

Economic vs. Military Power

The basic proposition of Kennedy's already influential tome is by now widely known: states rise to become great political and military powers on top of economic foundations, but the strategic re-

[1] Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers* (New York: The Free Press, 1986).

Richard N. Haass is Lecturer in Public Policy at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. His most recent publication is *Beyond the INF Treaty: Arms, Arms Control, and the Atlantic Alliance.*

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quirements of maintaining great power status — something Kennedy attributes to "imperial overstretch" — normally tend to undermine the economic foundations of the state. History thus becomes a record of powers that emerge and then suffer relative decline compared to those states that do not shoulder large imperial burdens. More often than not, war both occasions and contributes to this pattern, by stimulating the potentially strong and draining the essentially weak.

Kennedy demonstrates his thesis in an often compelling fashion by surveying the last several hundred years of European history, and also some global history. The first two-thirds of the book deals with the emergence and decline of a succession of European hegemons, including the Hapsburgs, Napoleon's France, Hitler's Germany, the tsar's Russia, Ottoman Turkey, and Great Britain.

In the process, the strength and weakness of Kennedy's effort become readily apparent. Although relative impoverishment contributes to imperial decline, comparative weakening is not simply a function of overseas commitment (or, in Kennedy's view, over-commitment). In the first place, domestic economic mismanagement quite apart from the drain of foreign folly deserves greater weight than it receives. High tax rates, protectionism, inadequate promotion of investment, poor labor relations -- these and other similar phenomena go a long way toward explaining the relative weakening of the Western European powers in the aftermath of World War I.

Second, attention must also be afforded to the quality of the political system and to the ability of governments and rulers to adjust to altered external and internal circumstances. The tsarist regime's refusal to decentralize political power to any meaningful extent gave too few in Russia a stake in the regime's survival. An inability to come to terms with the rising tide of nationalism explains better than anything else the decline of both the Hapsburg and the Ottoman empires.

But it is not for its history that *The Rise and Fall* graces so many coffee tables. Professor Kennedy's book becomes most relevant and controversial for a broader audience when he assays the present and future. And here he is necessarily on shakier ground, for he no longer has the luxury of hindsight. Indeed, Kennedy performs much better as an analyst of the past than of the present or future. What emerges from his study is a mix of economic and historic determinism, a blend that is for the most part unpersuasive. It is undercut by Kennedy's tendency not to place sufficient weight on the capacity of modern states (particularly those characterized by free markets and open political processes) to adapt in the face of challenge.

This is never so true as when Kennedy turns his gaze upon the United States. Kennedy poses the problem facing the United States as follows:

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Although the United States is at present still in a class of its own economically and perhaps even militarily, it cannot avoid confronting the two great tests which challenge the *longevity* of every major power that occupies the "number one" position in world affairs: whether, in the military/strategical realm, it can preserve a reasonable balance between the nation's perceived defense requirements and the means it possesses to maintain those commitments; and, whether, as an intimately related point, it can preserve the technological and economic bases of its power from relative erosion in the face of ever-shifting patterns of global production.

Kennedy goes on to answer his question, at least in part, suggesting that the United States is already in its decline.

The United States now runs the risk, so familiar to historians of the rise and fall of previous great powers, of what might roughly be called "imperial overstretch": that is to say, decision-makers in Washington must face the awkward and enduring fact that the sum total of the United States' global interests and obligations is nowadays far larger than the country's power to defend them all simultaneously. . . . The task facing American statesmen over the next decades, therefore, is to recognize that broad trends are underway, and that the need is to "manage" affairs so that the *relative* erosion of the United States' position takes place slowly and smoothly, and is not accelerated by policies which bring merely short-term advantage but longer-term disadvantage.

Kennedy makes some valuable points. He is certainly correct to argue that there is often a close tie between economic power and military power. It is unarguably true that since World War II the United States has been declining in terms of relative economic power. And he is right to warn that over-commitment abroad could drain the U.S. economy and undermine its ability to remain a great power.

Yet each of these points requires some comment. The link between economic power and military power is not always so close as he suggests. Japan offers a good example of a country where military strength lags far behind economic might. Similarly, the oil-rich Arab states were unable to translate their sudden wealth into lasting political or military power. At the other end of the economic spectrum, the USSR, China, and India all demonstrate that an advanced military sector can thrive amid overall economic weakness.

Second, while it is true that the United States is declining relative to Japan and even Western Europe, it must be recalled that a principal objective of American foreign policy since World War II has been to engineer the economic decline of the United States relative to Western Europe and Japan. This was the natural legacy of the Marshall Plan and the reconstruction of Japan. Only economically strong countries can share alliance defense burdens, engage in significant trade, and provide the economic basis for domestic political stability. Indeed, a further *modest* decline in the performance of the U.S. economy relative to those of Western Europe and Japan might, for these same reasons, actually serve U.S. foreign-policy objectives.

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Third, several things can be said about the drain of military expenses. Kennedy's point that the United States cannot defend all its interests simultaneously is a red herring. Since the Second World War, U.S. defense planning has called for sequential operations. That was also true during the Second World War, and probably it will always be true. No one expects the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan for simultaneous fighting on a large scale in Europe, Asia and the Pacific, the Persian Gulf, and Central America. U.S. forces would need to be nearly twice their current size — at a cost in resources that might indeed exemplify Kennedy's theory of overstretch.

While it is true that the United States is declining relative to Japan and even Western Europe, it must be recalled that a principal objective of American foreign policy since World War II has been to engineer the economic decline of the United States relative to Western Europe and Japan.

In addition, though Kennedy is quick to see America's economic woes as the effect of excessive military spending, he does not consider what effect markedly less spending on defense might have. He does not consider, for example, that the near-term economic benefit from the savings in defense (itself not automatic, but contingent upon how resources are spent) might be more than overwhelmed by the long-range costs resulting from unwarranted retrenchment. It would be the height of irony if savings in defense spending triggered shifts in the balance of power that led to conflicts consuming vast amounts of American resources. "Penny wise, pound foolish" is an injunction to take seriously.

Also, by emphasizing the absolute level of defense spending, Kennedy focuses on a secondary aspect of the national security issue. A better-managed Pentagon that set some strategic priorities could accomplish as much or more than it presently does with a lower level of resources. This concern, rather than a guns versus butter argument, ought to constitute the core of the defense debate.

Finally, even if we look at the sheer quantity of defense spending, the present 6-7 percent of GNP is hardly overstretch by the historical standards of great powers. It is not even high by U.S. standards, for the share of GNP devoted to defense was substantially higher throughout much of the post-World War II era. And that was the era during which the United States assumed global primacy, owing in part to impressive levels of absolute economic accomplishment.

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A Comparison of Great Powers

None of this is meant to deny the real economic ills of the United States — the large trade and budget deficits, poor productivity, slowing growth. But they cannot be attributed to its defense commitments, just as Japan's economic success cannot be attributed to its relative lack of defense spending. South Korea provides an example of economic accomplishment amid high defense spending. South Africa and Taiwan provide two others.

If America is in decline, other causes will have to be found. One must look to more fundamental political, economic, social and cultural forces that affect the marketplace and the work-place. The United States could arrest its relative economic decline through reforms in the classroom, the factory, and even the family that would not entail a cutback in overseas commitments or defense spending. Less dramatic changes in domestic social and economic policy — a slight increase in tax revenues, a modest cut in entitlements — would also go a long way toward restoring a sound economic foundation. If America fails, it will be for reasons within its boundaries and not beyond.

This last point suggests a larger issue. The economic determinism animating much of Kennedy's work underestimates the adaptive power of capitalist economies and democratic societies. Over time, the United States has proven quite good at exploiting new technologies and taking advantage of immigration and human resources. Moreover, the American body politic — Congress, the media, public opinion — has pulled the United States back from costly imperial ventures, pushed for sharing burdens with allies, and provided pressure for a degree of intelligent accommodation with adversaries.

Indeed, Kennedy's thesis is one drawn from a history that, with the exception of the United Kingdom, is a history of states that were politically authoritarian or totalitarian and economically statist or oligarchic. These were states and empires that possessed the often counter-productive ability to pursue policies abroad for prolonged periods at the expense of the domestic society and the economy alike. For better, although sometimes worse, the United States enjoys no such luxury. The executive branch lacks the necessary monopoly of political power that is required if a government is to stay the course abroad despite substantial resistance at home.

The British parallel also requires some qualification. The United States enjoys many advantages not available to Britain in the age of Victoria or since. These advantages would include U.S. access to resources of all kinds — ranging from minerals and energy to human talent — and the size of the American domestic market. In addition, since the Civil War, this country has avoided draining experiences on a scale of either of the two world wars that so weakened the

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United Kingdom. What is more, the inhibiting effect of nuclear weapons makes it likely that the United States will continue to avoid the prolonged, manpower-intensive conflicts that characterized several centuries of European history and so depleted the European powers of the time.

Interestingly, if Kennedy's history applies, it is likely to apply to the Soviet Union, which more closely resembles the states that declined in the past. It is the USSR that is highly centralized and finds it difficult to adapt. Moreover, the inhabitants of the Kremlin do not have the option of jettisoning many of the burdens of empire, for the Soviet Union is an empire itself, with a Moscow-centered Russian elite dominating a restless mixture of various Slavic and non-Slavic peoples. Nor could any Soviet leader harboring long-term ambition allow Eastern Europe to move significantly out of the Soviet sphere of influence.

As Kennedy points out, the USSR is declining relative to just about every other state. How much Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika* can turn things around is uncertain, given the Soviet need to retain imperial control over its own population as well as Eastern Europe. Decentralization of economic power — almost certainly a prerequisite for Soviet economic revival — will be limited by the opposition of officials who fear the loss of their own power and by those who understand that no state can orchestrate significant economic autonomy for its people without providing some political autonomy as well. Until now, this is something no communist regime has been willing to contemplate.

What makes matters worse for Moscow is that the USSR is highly dependent upon military force for order at home and influence abroad. This has required that the Soviet Union devote some 15 percent of its GNP to defense (or more, according to some estimates), a level two or three times that of the United States. The result is a real contribution to economic decline. This said, Kennedy rightly suggests that a declining USSR is not necessarily a more responsible power. Soviet leaders who face a deteriorating "correlation of forces" could be tempted to use the military power they possess to arrest trends before Soviet insecurity mounts. Alternatively, and consistent with more than one epoch of Russian history as well as with what we are thus far experiencing with Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union might choose to pull in its horns for a generation. In that way, it could tap Western technology and devote scarce resources to economic revival, only later to adopt a more assertive policy beyond its borders.

Kennedy also looks at the other power centers of today's world and reaches largely familiar conclusions. Western Europe will continue to be less than the sum of its parts owing to political divisions,

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particularly the unresolved and (for the foreseeable future) insoluble nature of the German problem. Western Europe, like the USSR, is likely to lag behind the United States and Asia both — something that hardly contributes to the relative decline of the United States, by the way. Despite the often inflated hopes and predictions of the disciples of European unity, Europeans will continue to exert less influence on Europe (not to mention the world scene) than calculations of economic might alone would suggest.

Kennedy is less likely to be correct when it comes to China. Like the recent Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy *(Discriminate Deterrence* for short),[2] Kennedy is a China enthusiast. He notes with admiration and some optimism the economic reform taking place in that country. But, again like the authors of *Discriminate Deterrence*, Kennedy pays insufficient attention to the reality that almost any increase in Chinese productivity or output will be absorbed by its own population, leaving few resources with which Peking could pursue a major role beyond its borders. And again, his analysis pays scant attention to political factors, above all the record of political instability that has plagued modern China and diluted its economic performance.

Japan constitutes perhaps the key question mark regarding the applicability of the argument for the primacy of economic forces. Kennedy paints a robust future for the Japanese economy. And it is beyond dispute that Japan's projection of political and military power lags behind its economic capacity. The basic question is whether with time Japan will become a great power in political and military ways that parallel its economic position. Kennedy's basic thesis suggests that it will.

But even a quick assessment of contemporary Japan shows this is unlikely. The era of Japan's relative economic gain could come to a close given the likely surges of other states. Indeed, this is already the case in some mature industries where South Korea and the ASEAN states are crowding traditional Japanese markets. Japan will also suffer from rising tensions within Japanese society stemming from an aging population, poor entitlement and especially retirement programs, and a younger generation less disposed than its elders to place so much emphasis upon social cohesion. At the same time, there is little evidence that a significant number of Japanese desire a markedly more influential or assertive overseas role. Just as important, there is reason to believe that Japan will prove sensitive to the fact that most of its neighbors — remembering the experience of the 1930s and 1940s — do not wish to see a revived Japan seeking regional

[2] This report, published in January 1988, was written under the co-chairmanship of Fred C. Iklé and Albert Wohlstetter. It was prepared for the secretary of defense and the assistant to the president for national security affairs.

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influence commensurate with its wealth. As a result, we can expect to see a more active Japan, militarily, economically and diplomatically, but one still constrained by political factors — at least as long as the Japanese-American relationship remains strong and the United States continues to contribute significantly to Asian-Pacific stability.

There are a number of other trends that will shape the opportunities and constraints for all the great powers. Some are economic: the continued dependence on inherently uncertain foreign resources, the emergence of newly industrialized countries competing for markets, challenges to a liberal trading order, and a debt problem that makes the strong vulnerable to the weak. Some trends are political: the continued allure of non-alignment, fitful steps towards regionalism, the pull of powerful ideologies, including religion. A number of developments in the military realm deserve mention: the proliferation of conventional arms industries, the wider availability of chemical and possibly nuclear weapons, and the spread of relatively cheap technologies, such as surface-to-air missiles or anti-ship weapons, that can neutralize the more advanced systems held by the great powers.

There is risk, though, in concluding too much from any of these trends. Despite everything, significant elements of the Bretton Woods edifice remain — and with it the policy preferences of the United States and a key role for the dollar — as America muddles through one economic crisis after another without falling victim to gross protectionism or monetary breakdown. Similarly, the U.S. alliance network continues to prove more robust than its detractors are wont to admit. And in the military sphere the core interests of the United States remain threatened only by the USSR.

All this adds up to a world of greater political, economic, and military pluralism, but still one of American primacy. To say that the challenge for U.S. policy makers is to manage American decline begs the key questions of how far and how fast that decline might be. It also ignores just what sort of political and military arrangements might come about. Most important, the image of decline is overly defeatist. It ignores the capacity of the United States to put its economic and political house in order, to sustain advantages in some areas of competition, to open up new advantages in others. It also overlooks the fact that there is no single state or constellation of powers ready to challenge the United States for primacy. As a result, and for the foreseeable future, the United States will possess greater capacity to affect world order than any other country or league of countries.

For all the deficiencies of Paul Kennedy's analysis, it is in the end difficult to be harshly critical of someone who tries intelligently to bring history to bear on current events. Kennedy himself, it should

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not be forgotten, is quite careful to note the dangers he faces when taking off his historian's hat and assuming the mantle of a journalist or seer.

Unfortunately, Kennedy's popularizers have been less careful. For many in the West, and particularly in the United States, Kennedy's notions of rise and fall can be used to justify policies ranging from protectionism and "ally bashing" to indiscriminate defense reductions, retreat, and isolation. Such radical departures ought to be avoided. The United States continues to be well-served by strategic deterrence, a system of political-military alliances, and the largely liberal economic order that has characterized the post-World War II world. Those who advocate dramatic changes must not only demonstrate the availability and desirability of alternatives, but must also provide some assurance that America can safely navigate its way from here to there. Until these requirements can be met, American policy makers would be wise to resist the arguments of those peddling prescriptions predicated upon analyses of decline.

Any decline of the United States is more likely to be brought about by prescriptions for "managing decline," and by under-commitment rather than by overstretch. There is a real risk that predictions of decline could become self-fulfilling.

Any decline of the United States is more likely to be brought about by prescriptions for "managing decline," and by under-commitment rather than by overstretch. There is a real risk that predictions of decline could become self-fulfilling. Paul Kennedy should not be singled out for too much blame here; his book is as much a reflection of American pessimism as a cause. But it is after all his book that is giving such pessimism its greatest currency — *The New Republic* boldly predicts *The Rise and Fall* will be 1988's book of the year —and so Kennedy cannot escape some responsibility for what promises (or threatens) to be this country's latest intellectual fad. Fortunately, reality looks rosier than his vision.

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IS GORBACHEV A REVOLUTIONARY?

by Vladimir Tismaneanu

Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World. By Mikhail Gorbachev. New York: Harper and Row (A Cornelia and Michael Bessie Book), 1987. 254 pp. $19.95.

Since coming to power in March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev has adopted a political style that contrasts strikingly with that of his predecessors. He excoriates the gulf between rulers and ruled, and deplores Soviet economic performance. His outspoken way of addressing even the most embarrassing issues has enthralled Soviet liberals and intellectuals. Personally, the general secretary seems to feel more comfortable talking to the editors of *Moscow News*, *Novyi Mir*, or *Ogonyek* than to party apparatchiks. His politics of openness lets the press attack major Soviet institutions and permits literary journals to publish explicit accounts of Stalinist atrocities. For the first time since Khrushchev's downfall in October 1964, therefore, it is not preposterous to speak of political reforms in the Soviet Union.

Now, with the publication of *Perestroika*, we have the opportunity to weigh the general secretary's own ideas about the political changes in his country: their nature, their scope, and their chances. Gorbachev candidly concedes that some party leaders have not yet embraced the new course: "The revolutionary situation requires enthusiasm, dedication and self-sacrifice," he writes. "This particularly applies to the leaders. We still have a long way to go to achieve this goal. Too many people are still 'in the state of evolution,' or, to put it bluntly, have adopted a wait-and-see attitude." But because he is here addressing a Western audience, Gorbachev portrays his new policy, which already goes beyond the limited de-Stalinization permitted under Nikita Khrushchev, as a movement endorsed by the whole of the party elite, and he seeks to dispel suspicions about factious struggles inside the Kremlin. "I must tell our opponents a few disheartening things: today members of the Politburo and the Central Committee are unanimous as they have never been before, and there is nothing that can make this unanimity waver."

In truth, support is far from unanimous. Gorbachev has, to be sure, placed his supporters in key positions within the Politburo and the Secretariat. In the Secretariat, for instance, he can count on such powerful figures as Lev Zaykov and Aleksandr Yakovlev. In addition, he has reshuffled much of the party and government elite, and can now count among his supporters the political-technocratic strata interested in modernizing the Soviet system. These people were sickened with the all-pervading corruption and sycophancy of the

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Brezhnev era. They were dreaming of an imaginative and dynamic ruler, and Gorbachev has fulfilled their wishes.

But when we examine more broadly the balance of power in the Soviet Union, the prospects for reform are not as rosy as depicted in *Perestroika*. Already, many party and government bureaucrats are looking askance at the attempt to let society breathe a bit, and they are appalled by the specter of democratization. Gorbachev's politics of *glasnost*, his criticism of red tape and his war on corruption have antagonized the party apparatus — that huge, amorphous, supercilious institution whose hostility to reforms can hardly be underestimated.

At the outset of Gorbachev's reign, these conservative bureaucrats were on the defensive. Later, as Gorbachev became increasingly radical in his demands for a restructuring of society, they realized the mortal dangers associated with the new course and closed ranks behind such people as Yegor Ligachev, the party's second-in-command, and Viktor Chebrikov, chairman of the KGB. Ligachev has several times warned against the dangers of "anarchy" and "petty bourgeois liberalism,"[1] and warned against excessive emphasis on the abuses of the Stalin era.[2] In addition, he has encouraged dogmatic intellectuals to engage in slanderous campaigns against liberal publications such as *Ogonyek* and *Moscow News*. Nor are Ligachev and Chebrikov the only ones to fear that winds of change might become a tornado; others known to worry include Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov, President Andrei Gromyko, and Ukrainian party leader Volodimyr Shcherbitskiy.[3]

Increasingly self-confident, the conservatives are apparently regrouping and preparing for a counter-offensive. Boris Yeltsin, the Moscow first secretary and one of Gorbachev's most loyal associates, was their first prominent victim. Although it is difficult to fathom all the implications of the Yeltsin affair, his demotion in November 1987 was clearly a major setback for Gorbachev.

[1] *Pravda*, September 17, 1987.

[2] "Of course, one must not ignore the failures and calamities. But if one focuses only on them and ignores the Soviet people's real and genuinely great social, cultural, and economic gains achieved under the party's leadership, it will be impossible to educate strong-minded people with a highly developed sense of their own, native country and their own social system" (*Pravda*, January 7, 1988). In a previous speech at the teachers' conference in the city of Elektrostal, Ligachev advocated "constructive openness," and rejected calls for market economy and ideological pluralism. He bemoaned the attempts "to denigrate the entire path of the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R., to present it as an unbroken chain of errors and to use the instances of groundless repressions to obscure the feat of the people, who created a mighty socialist power" (FBIS, Soviet Union, August 28, 1987). On Ligachev's rivalry with Gorbachev, see "Wert und Wurde," *Der Spiegel*, December 14, 1987.

[3] See, for instance, Elizabeth Teague, "Gorbachev Answers His Critics," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 280/87, July 15, 1987; Viktor Chebrikov's report delivered on the 110th anniversary of Feliks Dzerzhinskiy's birth, *Pravda*, September 11, 1987; and Roman Solchanyk, "To the Right of Gorbachev: Shcherbitskiy's October Revolution Anniversary Speech," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 469/87, November 18, 1987.

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To confuse matters even more, however, important domestic and international considerations make the conservative bureaucrats reluctant to oust Gorbachev. They merely want him to renounce the most ambitious goals of *perestroika* — such as the multiple-candidate and secret-ballot system for party elections; price reforms and economic decentralization; and ideological relaxation. But this is not likely to happen. The general secretary will not wittingly accept political emasculation. He knows that the *nomenklatura* will not forgive or forget the blows he has dealt to it. The failure of Gorbachevism will necessarily result in Gorbachev's removal from the pinnacle of power.

How did Gorbachev find himself in this position? Initially, it seems, his plans were modest. He sought to make the system less repressive and more effective, invoking as his model the original Leninist state. But rejuvenation of the Soviet system had a logic of its own that led Gorbachev deeper and deeper into reform. He found that one cannot restore Leninism simply by denouncing the cult of personality, as Khrushchev did. He found that one must also question the repressive institutions that reached their full flowering under Stalin — the party bureaucracy, the command economy, political police, and censorship. And so, today, we see the more liberal Soviet publications hinting that Stalin betrayed Lenin's whole legacy, both in theory and in practice

But the logic of Gorbachev's course demands that he go further still, eradicating Stalinism even to its Leninist roots. This would mean permitting factions to organize within the party, questioning the party's monopoly on power, and ultimately introducing legal guarantees for the free exercise of basic human rights. Is this even thinkable?

One turns to *Perestroika* for answers, not so much from Gorbachev as about him. Will he stand up to the mounting opposition? Or will he back down, succumbing to the forceful pressure exerted by the bureaucratic Leviathan? Ultimately, the answers to these questions are anyone's guess, but reading Gorbachev's book makes our guess better informed.

Perestroika is less an analysis of the Soviet system than a political manifesto, and as such it is remarkable in two respects. To begin with, Soviet leaders do not often assume personal responsibility for programmatic documents. The party tradition calls for such texts to be attributed to the "collective wisdom" of the Central Committee. Gorbachev's tone here is not personal or intimate, to be sure, but informal parentheses are frequent and diverge from the wooden language of official documents. One feels that the general secretary speaks in his own voice and that he believes these statements, even though his arguments must have been approved by the Politburo.

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Second, Gorbachev's mood differs strikingly from the usual triumphalism of Soviet ideology. Although obviously its candor has strict limits, *Perestroika* cannot be dismissed as simple and routine propaganda. The book apparently reveals genuine concerns and genuine plans, and therefore bears careful reading.

On the other hand, to applaud this book as a watershed in Soviet ideology would be naive; anyone expecting revolutionary ideas of systemic change will be disappointed. Gorbachev's program is still confused and hesitant, plagued with half-truths and wishful thinking. Like most of his speeches, Gorbachev's book maintains a constant tension between the assertive and the restrictive. Yes, but no. Sic, et non.

For example, in support of democratic communication, Gorbachev reiterates a point he has frequently made in conversations with Soviet intellectuals: "The thorniest issues have to be discussed with due respect for one another. Even the most extreme viewpoint contains something valuable and rational, for the person who upholds it honestly and who cares for the common cause in his own way reflects some real aspects of life." Then, as if frightened by the implications of his own boldness, Gorbachev sends an ultimatum to those who would ignore the party's directives: "The worst thing that can happen is if, in these revolutionary times, the creative intelligentsia allows itself to get bogged down in trifles, if it gives vent to personal ambitions and expends its energies on senseless high words rather than creative endeavors."

With regard to Stalin, Gorbachev uses strong words. He condemns the strict centralization, the administration by injunction, the arbitrary rule, and the reign of lawlessness. Against those who condone Stalinist crimes, Gorbachev asserts that "any attempts to justify that lawlessness by political needs, international tension or alleged exacerbation of class struggle in the country are wrong. Violations of law had tragic consequences which we still cannot forget or forgive." But neither in his book, nor in his speech on the seventieth anniversary of the October Revolution, does Gorbachev elaborate on the systemic flaws that allowed Stalin to do away with Leninism and impose his bloody dictatorship.

And this returns us to the central question about Gorbachev: How far will he pursue the logic of reform? At present, there is not even the slightest indication that he understands how Stalinist terror originated in the Leninist experience. Instead, he advocates a return to "true Leninism," and his references to Lenin and Leninism are always reverential, almost mystical. "Turning to Lenin," he says (as another might say "Turning to God"), "has greatly stimulated the Party and society in their search to find explanations and answers to the questions that have arisen."

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Peter Reddaway is therefore correct in suggesting that so far Gorbachevism is

> an updated, more sophisticated development of Khrushchevism — of the strategy of ending Stalinist oppression; mobilizing the whole people; modernizing culture and society; opening up dramatically to the outside world; revamping ideology, law, and political and economic structures; creating incentives; encouraging innovation; competing economically with the West; and finally promoting glasnost and democratization.[4]

But Reddaway's characterization also indicates the present limits of *perestroika*. In its foreign policy, for example, *perestroika* is not what George Kennan called it in his review of Gorbachev's book, "a new dialectic of the common human and class interests and principles in our modern age."[6] Indeed, it is difficult to perceive any conceptual change that takes Gorbachev beyond Khrushchev's doctrine of peaceful coexistence and Brezhnev's strategy of détente. And neither of these doctrines, it should be recalled, kept the Soviet Union from maintaining its grip over Eastern Europe.

In *Perestroika*, Gorbachev piously pleads for international reconciliation and cooperation, but Soviet divisions still occupy Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Indeed, so far, Gorbachev has shown no willingness to re-evaluate, let alone reverse, the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia or the 1956 invasion of Hungary.

So, Gorbachevism may be extending Khrushchevism, but it shows no signs of transcending Khrushchevism. Both movements are half-way strategies of reform, still attempting to deny the Leninist foundations of the Stalinist system. They are political strategies rooted in Leninist illusions and nostalgia for Bolshevik ideals.

The conspiratorial rule that characterizes Bolshevik political culture has been streamlined since Gorbachev came to power, not abandoned.

It is precisely this obsession with the Communist party's "predestined" leading role that determines — and distorts — Gorbachev's understanding of the basic problems of Soviet society. Although Gorbachev knows of the widespread malaise in his country and the lapse of the Leninist appeal in the West, he keeps referring to the October Revolution as an everlasting source of inspiration. There are no suggestions in his book about ways to democratize the party's Politburo and Secretariat. The conspiratorial rule that characterizes Bolshevik political culture has been streamlined since Gorbachev came to

[4] *The New Republic*, February 1, 1988.
[6] *New York Review of Books*, January 21, 1988.

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power, but not abandoned. Public opinion is still deprived of accurate information about the proceedings of the Soviet highest echelons.

How then can we sum up Gorbachev's efforts? Is he truly intent upon democracy? Is his use of generous concepts like dialogue and participation genuine?

Perestroika confirms that he will not renounce any of his party's prerogatives but will further enhance its controls over society. His "revolution from above" does not aim to make fundamental alterations in the basic Soviet institutions, but to make them more responsive. His purpose, in this revolution, is to create a new consensus based on a re-invigorated sense of civic duty and responsibility. And his strategy is to assimilate values and ideas developed by movements critical of the system he hopes to improve. Adam Michnik, the oppositional Polish intellectual, has therefore given us the best description of the Gorbachev strategy by calling it a counter-reformation:

> A counter-reformation is . . . not a restoration of the pre-reformist order, but rather an attempt to transform the institutions from within. It is a self-critical show of strength with the aim of incorporating those values created against the will and outside the social institution in order to stop them from becoming antagonistic and subversive. So if we accept that Solidarity was a great reformist movement within the boundaries of the Communist world, then Gorbachev must therefore earn the title of the "Great Counter-Reformer." . . . This is the counter-reformation which is to rescue the Communist system.[5]

Three conclusions emerge from these observations. *Perestroika* is a political event rather than an intellectual achievement. Its conceptual architecture is unimpressive, but Gorbachev's goal was less to write a justification for reform than to spell out his present views on it, and this he has done. Second, an analysis of these views shows that Gorbachevism is a genuinely new movement within Soviet history. It is a counter-reformation aimed at revivifying the Soviet system, and Gorbachev believes in it. But, third, the Soviet general secretary remains a radical Leninist at heart, faithful to his creed above all, and convinced that the future of mankind lies in communism.

[5] *Labour Focus on Eastern Europe*, July-October 1987.

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
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TORTURE

The following brief speech was addressed to the United Nations Committee on Human Rights by Armando Valladares, the U.S. representative, on February 23, 1988. It is a striking contrast to the usual bureaucratic prose heard at the United Nations and is a powerful statement in its own right.

As Valladares himself notes in the first sentence, he is hardly a conventional diplomat. Indeed, Valladares may be the most unusual ambassador ever to represent the United States. Born in Cuba in 1937, he was an obscure twenty-three-year-old official in the postal ministry when he was sentenced to thirty years in prison (for expressing doubts about the political direction of the Cuban government). He served twenty-two years of the sentence, from December 1960 to October 1982, seven years in solitary confinement.

After having developed polyneurapathy, a condition that weakened his muscles so he could not walk for five years, Valladares wrote the poems that were smuggled out of prison and collected in his first book, From My Wheelchair.[1] *As a result of this and a second book published in 1980 (*The Heart with Which I Live*),*[2] *he became a recognized poet and spokesman for the oppressed. He left prison eight years before the end of his sentence thanks to Amnesty International's making him a "prisoner of conscience." President François Mitterrand of France personally intervened on Valladares's behalf and Castro released him as a "personal favor" to Mitterrand. Valladares's subsequent book about his experiences,* Against All Hope,[3] *quickly established itself as a classic of prison literature. It also severely diminished Fidel Castro's reputation internationally.*

Following his release from prison, Valladares became active in humanitarian work and only four months after his release attended his first United Nations Commission on Human Rights. He became a U.S. citizen in January 1987 and one month later joined the U.S.

[1] *Desde mi Silla de Ruedas* (Miami: Ediciones Interbooks, 1976).
[2] *El Corazon con que Vivo* (Miami: Ediciones Universal, 1980).
[3] *Contra Toda Esperanza* (Barcelona: Editorial Plaza y Janes, 1985). English translation, *Against All Hope* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1986).

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delegation to the commission. President Reagan then — a mere five years after his release from jail — appointed Valladares head of the 1988 delegation.

— D.P.

Statement to the 44th Session of the Commission on Human Rights on Agenda Item 10: "Torture"

Mr. Chairman:

I am not a career diplomat nor am I an expert on the technical aspects of this Commission. I will not, therefore, make a detailed presentation on the reports and subjects that are considered under Item 10. We will listen to other interventions on those important subjects. Mr. Chairman, I would like to talk today about torture, of what it means for a human being to be tortured, humiliated, and what is almost worse, of what it means to watch a friend or a companion or a relative being tortured.

As many of you know, I spent twenty-two years in prison for political reasons. Perhaps I am the only Delegate in this Commission that has spent such a long time in prison, although I do know that some of you here know in your own flesh what torture means. I do not care what your political ideology might be; human beings are more important than any ideology — I offer you my solidarity, that of one tortured person to another.

I had many friends in prison. One of them, Roberto Lopez Chavez, was practically a child. The guards denied him water. Roberto, on the floor of his punishment cell, delirious and in agony, asked only for water.

Water. The guards entered his cell and asked, "You want water?" They urinated into his mouth and onto his face. He died the following day. We had been cellmates. When he died, I felt something wither inside me.

I remember when they had me in a punishment cell, naked, my leg fractured in several places — fractures that were never treated and eventually fused into a mass of deformed bones. Through the wire mesh that covered the cell, the guards would pour over me buckets of urine and excrement that they had collected earlier.

Mr. Chairman, I know the taste of other men's urine and excrement. That form of torture leaves no physical trace. What does leave traces are the beatings with metal bars or bayonets. My head is covered with still detectable scars and wounds. But what is more harmful to human dignity? Buckets of urine and excrement thrown in one's face or blows from a bayonet? Under which item should we discuss this question? Under which technical point should this be

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discussed? Under what mass of numbers, hyphens, or strokes should we include this trampling of human dignity?

For me and for so many others around the world, human rights violations were not a matter of reports, negotiated resolutions, and elegant and diplomatic rhetoric. For us, it meant daily sorrow. For me, it meant eight thousand days of hunger, systematic beatings, forced labor, solitary confinement, sealed punishment cells, solitude. Eight thousand days of struggling to show that I was still a human being. Eight thousand days trying to prove that my spirit could triumph over the exhaustion and the pain.

Eight thousand days of testing for my religious convictions, my faith, of struggling not to allow the hatred that my atheist guards sought to sow with their bayonets to flower in my heart. Eight thousand days of fighting not to become like them, not to think of torture as a weapon, of trying to forgive, of trying never to think of vengeance, of retaliation, and of cruelty.

And when cruelty is extended to one's relatives, is that not a form of torture? My father is an elderly man. He is very ill. He also served time in political prisons. Because he is my father he is not allowed to leave the country. Over the past two years the authorities have been tormenting him — revenge for my activities. They do not beat him, but they call and tell him that he may leave the following day. My father makes the long trip to the capital full of hope. And when he is almost on board the airplane, they tell him that there was a bureaucratic error, that he has to return to his town. They do this to him every four or five weeks.

The world of those who suffer and endure pain often has certain poetic characteristics. I think it was in a book by Victor Frankel, a survivor of the Nazi extermination camps, where I read that in the midst of their total despair, the camp inmates were kept alive by a violinist — a companion in misery who every afternoon played a piece of classical music. Everyone in the concentration camp would suddenly become quiet to hear him. That violin, with its musical notes scraped out in the midst of so much pain, was a ray of hope.

Bertolt Brecht, the German playwright, tells a similar tale about a young Jewish couple imprisoned in a labor camp and separated by a fence. They had never talked, but had seen each other and loved one another. On the wall that separated them both left a daily testimony of their love: a little flower picked from the fields. One day, her flower was missing. The next day his would not be there either. Despair killed them.

Totalitarians treat their adversaries like animals. They bind them, lock them up, beat them with no explanations. The tyrant's arbitrariness reduces victims to beasts. It dehumanizes them. At times, when one is treated like a beast, the only thing that saves him

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from humiliation, that keeps him strong, is knowing that somewhere, someone loves him, respects him, fights to return to him his dignity. I was lucky, Mr. President: I had someone to fight for my freedom; I had my wife, who traveled the world knocking on doors and on the consciences of peoples and governments, pressuring them to demand my freedom. But the majority of those that suffer violations of human rights have only the hope that the international community, against all hope, will think about them. You are their only hope.

About these painful matters, unfortunately, I have some personal knowledge. Many years ago, perhaps twenty, a political prisoner named Fernando Lopez Del Toro, came to my cell. In a tone of despair, he said to me that what hurt the most out of all of the torment, the beatings, the hunger we suffered, was that our sacrifice might be in vain. It was not the pain, but the apparent uselessness of enduring it that was defeating Fernando. I sought to explain to him that despite the ignorance and indifference of the rest of the world, our suffering still had a purpose and a transcendental significance. I do not believe that I convinced him.

Some years later, we were now in different prisons, I found out that one night Fernando could no longer endure; he took his life. Later, I learned the details of his death from his cellmates, who, also almost annihilated by the physical and moral abuses they had undergone, had stood by immobile. Fernando climbed up on his bunk, coiled a dirty towel around his neck, and with a sharp piece of metal tore open his skin, searched with his fingers for the jugular vein and in one stroke cut it. It was said that his jailers had direct responsibility for his death; I know that Fernando was also the victim of indifference, of silence, of that terrible echoless universe in which, in this century of horrors and violations, so many good men and women die.

Torture, violations of human rights, come from where they might, are offenses against all and must be fought with equal vigor. That is what makes our message efficacious. International condemnation is the only thing capable of pressuring the torturers, it is the only thing capable of forcing them, in order to repair their public image, to free prisoners, to be more careful, to transgress less.

Denouncing the criminal does not always ensure his punishment, but, possibly, it could prevent new crimes. We must raise our voices without fear and use all available means in defense of those who are persecuted, of the tortured of the world. We have to shout about the pain that they suffer and we must accuse their executioners without fear. We have to reach into the cells of all the world's Fernando Lopez Del Toros to tell them with firmness and solidarity, "Listen, do not take your life; men of good will are with you. Your dignity as a human being will prevail. In some corner, in your honor and in

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your memory, there will always be a flower, the note of a violin, or the voice of compassion of those who feel they are your brothers and who will defend you. Look, you are not an animal. Do not take your life. Liberty will never disappear from the face of the earth."

Thank you, Mr. President.

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ABD AL-QADIR

CONFESSIONS OF A SOVIET MUSLIM REBEL

The Soviet army's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 raised the iron curtain which had long isolated Soviet Central Asia from the Muslim world. The frontier between Central Asian republics and Afghanistan has become relatively permeable. Stories fill the Central Asian media telling of many violations of the Soviet Union's southern borders by the Afghan mujahidin *(fighters). They also confirm that "subversive" literature published in Peshawar has been for years smuggled into Central Asia and that foreign broadcasts (from Radio Gorgan and Radio Tabriz in Iran, as well as Radio Urumchi in China) are recorded on cassettes and locally distributed.*

Less widely known is that the Afghan border is being crossed by Central Asian Muslims leaving the Soviet Union. One hears occasional rumors in Peshawar and in the refugee camps of Pakistan about Soviet Muslims who have come to Pakistan where they blend in with the Afghan refugee population and pass themselves off as Afghans. Some, in fact, join the mujahidin.

The following previously unpublished text is a rare document relating the story of a Turkish-speaking Muslim from the USSR who went to Afghanistan to wage jihad *(war in accord with Islamic law) against the Russians. The conversation took place in the spring of 1985 in the area of Wardak, south of Kabul. It was recorded by a young Afghan living in Paris who returned to Afghanistan twice a year to serve as a medical assistant to the* mujahidin.

One year earlier, in 1984, this man had discovered in that same area of Wardak several Turkmen families — men, women, children, and their cattle — who had crossed the Soviet-Afghan border somewhere in the province of Badghis. They were traveling slowly toward Pakistan. He returned in 1985 to the area but the Turkmen families had left, probably for Pakistan where it was impossible to locate them because they refused to acknowledge their Soviet origins.

Nevertheless, he found a young Soviet Uzbek who had joined the mujahidin *and was fighting with them against the Russians. The Afghan from Paris conducted the following interview with the Uzbek. It took place in three languages: He asked the questions in Dari, a* mujahid *translated the questions into Uzbek and the Uzbek answered in Russian. (This last was for my benefit.) The whole conversation was recorded and I have the tape in my possession. The Uzbek's Russian was perfectly fluent with only a slight accent. Unfortunately, the record breaks off in the middle of a sentence, but despite its incomplete form, the document is most interesting.*

Recent religious/nationalistic incidents in Central Asia (Alma Ata in December 1986, Kurgan Tube in February 1987, and even

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Sumgait in March 1988) confirm the story of the young Uzbek.
— Alexandre Bennigsen
Paris

Q. What is your name? Where are you from?

A. My name is Abd al-Qadir. I am originally from the city of Termez[1] in the Soviet republic of Uzbekistan. I cannot give you my complete surname, nor the name of my father, as my family still lives in the Soviet Union and such information can jeopardize my relatives and my parents. A year and a half ago, I left Termez and emigrated to Afghanistan.

Q. What is your profession?

A. I am a philologist by profession and specialization. I graduated from the department of philology at the Pedagogical Institute of Rostov. After having finished my studies, I returned to my native city of Termez and was made a teacher in one of the schools. There I taught Russian language and literature. I worked regularly.

Q. How did you, your relatives, and your friends react to the invasion of Afghanistan?

A. As everyone knows, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a wave of discontent swept the Soviet Union. Fathers, mothers, and brothers — in a word, everyone was worried over the fate of their close relatives who were dying in Afghanistan. Popular discontent grew and resulted in a general movement. At the end of April, mass demonstrations took place in the region of Termez. Many people took part in these demonstrations, entire crowds went out to demonstrate. Soviet combat helicopters attacked the demonstrators. There were many deaths and arrests. Some demonstrators were certainly taken to prison and executed. Seeing such a situation and having taken part in the demonstrations, I could no longer stay in the USSR. I went underground. For several days, I remained in the frontier region, then with the help of people who were in contact with the Afghan *mujahidin* I tried to slip into Afghanistan. Thanks to this help from the *mujahidin* — who often pass the frontier making raids on Soviet territory in Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, and in other frontier republics — I succeeded in slipping into Afghanistan. Once there, I joined the *mujahidin*.

Q. How were you informed of the war in Afghanistan?

A. Much can be said on this subject. Everyone knows that the Afghan *mujahidin* often slip past the frontier and conduct military raids along the length of the frontier and on Soviet territory. I can affirm that there are many roads and means of passage beyond the

[1] Termez is a town of approximately 75,000 (1988 estimate) on the Amu Darya River that forms the boundary between the USSR and Afghanistan. It lies only forty miles north of the Afghan city of Mazar-i Sharif.

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frontier but for evident reasons of security and in order not to reveal them, I refuse to answer this question.

Q. How did the Soviet media present the Afghan war to the population of Central Asia?

A. Communism as a sociopolitical system is a closed system which does not permit one to know what is happening beyond the iron curtain of communist countries. This is why many things that happen in the Soviet Union or abroad remain as incomprehensible to foreigners as to Soviet citizens themselves. The war in Afghanistan has been unfolding for five years already. In the beginning Soviet mass media let nothing out on the war. In the beginning, the authorities sought to hide the war and events in Afghanistan and also the losses in men and in technical matèriel. Then, with these losses becoming sizeable, the media were obliged to announce them, to publish or to put on television some information. But the information from television, radio and newspapers was all false, lying and cooked up. Everything was inside out.

Q. What do you personally think of the Afghan war?

A. Communism as a socioeconomic system is characterized by its isolation and lies. The regime does not unveil its secrets and hides events from the scrutiny of world public opinion. The USSR is a socialist country which seeks to hide, by tradition, all that passes there. After five years of war in Afghanistan, the USSR is still seeking to hide its losses and its inability [*ne umenie*] to end the war and to break the Muslim hold in Afghanistan. The USSR has lost many soldiers during this war, as well as matériel, but she never speaks of it. All that is said on Soviet TV and all that is written in the newspapers is exactly the opposite of the truth, just exactly the contrary.

Q. Do you feel solidarity with the Afghan *mujahidin*?

A. Soviet Muslims have not forgotten their past and remember their lost liberty. They also remember the lives they gave to defend that lost liberty. The Russian occupiers have seized our lands, have exploited them without pity and after the October Revolution forced them to become part of the Soviet state. But the Muslim peoples all aspire to liberty and wish to free themselves from the communist yoke and the Russian tyrants. Thus, Soviet Muslims consider the war unfolding in Afghanistan a continuation of their war, the one which brought the Soviet occupation of Central Asia. The Afghan people have fought, are fighting, and will fight for their liberty, and all of us, Muslim peoples of the Soviet Union, know that the Afghan people will prevail and that the victory of the Afghan people will bring the liberation of Central Asia, of the Muslims of Central Asia.

Q. What are the relations between the Muslims of Central Asia and the Russians?

A. It has been sixty years [sic] since the communist October

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revolution; much has changed in the life of the Muslims of Central Asia and of other regions. Muslims live worse than Russians and than the other peoples of the USSR. Muslim students cannot enter the VUZ [institutions of higher learning] where they could learn techniques and sciences necessary to an industrialized country. Muslims only have access to the secondary schools and only work as simple laborers. They have no access to [high positions] or skilled employment. They are reduced to simple and primitive work. In the technical domain, the power — the Kremlin — has constructed nothing in our area. There are neither factories nor products of which to be proud, nothing comparable to what is found in the European part of the USSR. Here in Central Asia there are only factories for light industry. Heavy industry does not exist; it is entirely concentrated in Europe.

Q. How do the Russian Communists treat Islam?

A. Communists often pretend to be the defenders and partisans of religion. They pretend to respect religion, especially Islam, but informed people know that communism and religion are incompatible. Since the October Revolution, communists have fought everywhere against religion and continue to do it. Since the Revolution, they have destroyed all the churches and those that survive serve only to be shown to tourists and to foreign religious leaders visiting the USSR, as models of well-decorated churches and mosques. But those who truly undermine these religious establishments are members of the KGB who have no rapport with religion. Even today in the USSR, believers are closely watched, arrested, spied on — and some are imprisoned. Religious rites are forbidden. The young cannot go to pray in churches or mosques; were they to go or were they to perform religious rites, they would be imprisoned. Religious rites are strictly forbidden.

Q. What example do the *mujahidin* give you?

A. As I have already said, I emigrated a year and a half ago. Since then I have fought with the Afghan *mujahidin* against the Russian occupation forces. But my duties, my obligations, are not yet discharged. All is not finished. As a Muslim, I consider it my duty to fight until the last drop of the Russian invaders' [*zakhvatchiki*] blood and if I live, I will carry out that decision. I consecrate my life to the revolution, to the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan which is a source of inspiration for all the Muslims of the world, including the Soviet Muslims.

Q. What is your message to the Muslim world on the subject of the Afghan *jihad*?

A. I want to say to the Muslims of the whole world: it is their *arz* [obligation], in Russian, *obiazatel'noie predpisanie* to fight the infidels, the unbelievers, the *kafirs*. It matters little whether I am

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from the Soviet Union or Afghanistan. I am a former citizen of the USSR but I am going to avenge myself on the Russians, I will fight as much as I can. I will fulfill the *jihad* in Afghanistan. What matters to me are the religious regulations, not my Soviet nationality. I will fight my former fellow citizens. My status is as a Muslim; the Islamic brotherhood represents my citizenship.

Q. Are there many Muslims in Central Asia who have joined the Afghan resistance?

A. I think that there are a thousand immigrant families originally from the frontier territories of the USSR who went to Afghanistan. These émigrés find themselves today in zones freed from the Russians. Their settlement is a secret and I will not reveal it. Many émigrés were killed by the border guards as they crossed the frontier.

Q. How do you personally feel among the *mujahidin*?

A. I had heard a lot about the Afghan *mujahidin* before I crossed the frontier. It was said that they kill innocents, burn homes, and blow up bridges, mosques, and schools. According to the Soviets, they are bandits. Having crossed the frontier and joined the *mujahidin*, I can certify that they are my Muslim brothers. They are pure men who are fighting for Islam and for the liberation of their country, for the freedom of all Muslim countries. Everything in the Soviet media on this subject is false. I can state the real nature of the truth. In spite of all that the Russians have said, the *mujahidin* conduct themselves very well towards us; they treat us as brothers in religion.

Q. What is your message to the Muslim world about the Muslims of Central Asia?

A. As a settler in Afghanistan who has known the Soviet reality, I say to all those — peoples of the free world, whether in the capitalist countries or in the developing countries — who dream of the Soviet system, I say to them: Do not forget Afghanistan, do not forget the Muslims of Central Asia. Come to their aid, to the aid of the Afghans and to all Muslims who are under the Soviet yoke, the yoke of Soviet communism. Help them in all the ways you can, do not delay, help the Muslims while there is still time — for, if it is too late, help will no longer do anything. I call all the Muslims of the world to unite around Islam, help the *jihad* against the Communists and the *kafirs* for the victory of the Islamic Revolution in the entire world, including . . .

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Correspondence

COMMENTS ON GARVER AND MOSHER

To the Editor:

Reading John W. Garver's comments (Spring 1988) on Mosher's "Three Steps Toward Opening Mainland China" (Fall 1987), I am struck that Mosher and Garver actually agree, not about everything, but about many specific policies. Measures that Mosher calls for to pluralize China are not, after all, particularly earthshaking. They amount really to no more than an increase in radio broadcasting, attention to human rights, and pressure for decentralization of exchange programs. Indeed, Garver appears willing to consider the first and third of these. The disagreement between the two authors seems, therefore, to have less to do with the specifics of China policy than it does with the conceptual framework from which it is derived.

Arguably the best place to begin any consideration of foreign policy is with United States interests. What are they? How can we promote them? Neither author really addresses this issue. Mosher argues for his approach by asserting that, without pluralization, "the upper echelons of the Chinese Communist party will persevere in political excess at home and (after the current preoccupation with development is sated) may revert to adventurism abroad." In other words, he justifies measures that he suspects may reduce stability in the short run by making them necessary for increasing stability in the long run. Garver does not accept this, and defines the issue differently. The choice is between building "a friendly and cooperative relationship with Communist China" and "working to undermine Communist rule in China."

The choices the authors make seem to be based not so much on identification of American interests as on other considerations. Although it is couched in the terminology of international politics, Mosher's argument really derives from what John Fairbank calls the new "American religion" of human rights. The justification for attempting to foster pluralization in China is not so much Realpolitik as it is revulsion at human rights abuses, and a sense that one aspect of America's role in the world is to try to increase freedom, even if the price is to create difficulties with a particular country. Garver, on the other hand, takes the need for a "friendly and cooperative" relationship with China as the most important goal, and argues against Mosher because he fears that the measures he advocates would un-

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dermine that. But Garver does not explain why that goal is important: what American purpose is served by exempting China from human rights concerns?

After all, we do not exempt any other country, and if we are going to make an exception for China, this demands a clear rationale. Incorporating human rights considerations into foreign policy is not easy, though it has had some success recently — in the Philippines, in South Korea, and in Taiwan. Garver's argument against adopting such a policy toward China (and I suspect that it is the tone rather than the substance that concerns him) seem to be that it would not work, for reasons deeply rooted in Chinese history.

Certainly attention to human rights could backfire, but only were it pursued loudly and publicly. In the other cases mentioned above, though, American influence was used tactfully and effectively, and the kind of offense to national pride that Garver fears was avoided. To go one step further, it is hard to envision a "friendly" relationship with China that does not include a moral component. How, realistically, could the United States government be friendly with a country that clearly oppresses its own people? Some sort of moral consistency is needed in our foreign policy, or Americans will not support it.

But Mosher and Garver's disagreement about how hard to press human rights is more than tactical. Their differing approaches to China diplomacy today grow out of differing understandings of China's recent and not-so-recent past. To oversimplify a bit, the key issue is that of "nationalism" versus "communism" in the Chinese political mix.

Like many contemporary scholars of China, Garver stresses the first of these factors. "Nationalism," he says in his letter, "has been an extremely potent force in twentieth-century China." He reminds us that since the seventeenth century "Jesuit monks . . . American missionaries . . . and Americans and Soviets . . . [have] tried mightily to change China, and each ultimately met with very limited success." China's sense of itself, its "deeply rooted values, traditions, and pride" have always "proved . . . resistant to foreign pressure." The apparent opening to the West at the moment must not be overestimated: in his study, *China's Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1968-1971*, Garver locates its origins in a rather close-run factional struggle of the sort that could be reversed. There is wisdom in this approach: other authors who stress it include Jonathan Spence (*To Change China*) and John Fairbank (most recently in the concluding chapters of *The Great Chinese Revolution*).

Mosher's China is quite different. It is not a united country, but rather one where party and people are in conflict. He sees China the way the great wartime correspondents did, and to read *Broken Earth*, his account of the research in the south China countryside

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that precipitated his expulsion both from China and from Stanford University, or the story of his van trip through the poverty-stricken southwest, *Journey to the Forbidden China*, is to be transported back to the emotional world of the 1940s. Mosher's real kinship is with the committed China correspondents of the time, such as Theodore White (*Thunder Out of China*) or Graham Peck (*Two Kinds of Time*). The fact that the Communists, heroes to the writers of the forties, have turned out to be the villains of Mosher's books should not obscure this deep parallel.

Like Mosher, these authors were struck by contrasts: contrasts between the poverty of the masses and the way the elite lived; between the patriotic rhetoric of the government and the seemingly desultory prosecution of the war with Japan. They were irritated by the elaborate evasions of official government spokesmen but deeply engaged by the moral and patriotic visions of the dissidents. Above all, they were frustrated by America's unwillingness to "get on the side of change." Although China was very important, these authors argued, that very fact dictated extreme caution in dealing with the government that was suppressing all that was most vital and positive in that society. Rather than imagine that the party government was somehow "China," we had no choice but to face the reality of a struggle for power within that country.

Mosher does not see the Communist party as embodying Chineseness, Chinese national aspirations, or mass nationalism anymore than White or Peck saw the Nationalist party as doing so. Rather (and as they saw the Nationalists), he sees it as primarily repressive and an obstacle both to internal development and good international relations. It exerts great pressure to keep the lid on a potentially explosive social situation created by widespread poverty, disillusionment, and sense of oppression.

Garver's China, by contrast, is one where patriotism and nationalism are far stronger than internal tensions, and where the government derives considerable legitimacy from these forces.

My own view takes a bit of each. I am highly skeptical, however, of two of John Garver's points. The first is the suggestion that China has somehow resisted outside influences: in fact since earliest times Chinese culture has changed profoundly in response to foreign influences, whether from the nomadic people of the steppe, the Buddhists of South Asia, or the Jesuits of the seventeenth century. "Changeless China" is a myth invented in Europe.

Second, as I have argued elsewhere,[1] there are problems with the idea of nationalism (an elusive concept if ever there was one) as a force, or a source of cohesion and direction in China or anywhere

[1] In "Theories of Nationalism and Historical Explanation," *World Politics*, April 1985, pp. 416-33.

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else. In Chinese history, the issue of "Chineseness" has not united the country but rather defined and embittered internal political battles (who is a traitor? who is a patriot?).

Mosher is right to note that there are considerable possibilities for change and instability in China at the moment. Yet Garver's gut reaction to the limited possibility for U.S. influence is also correct, for change will be internally generated, and only marginally affected by American actions.

Nevertheless, U.S. policy must consider the courses that change may take and what Americans can do — in a low-key way — to affect it. The United States is deeply involved with China in everything from education to military supplies, and it simply does not make sense to foreswear the use of leverage this creates.

There is something very good about having normal relations with China: relations like those with other countries, characterized neither by a gripping desire to change them nor by a paralyzing fear that to criticize anything will somehow scuttle the whole thing. Such an approach may appear bland, but it is a considerable achievement and it suits our national interest.

Arthur W. Waldron
Princeton University

WHO WILL BENEFIT FROM *GLASNOST*?

To the Editor:

The tremendous expansion of the permissible in the Soviet media has led to public expressions of a wide range of views which had previously been restricted to the second Soviet world of information, word-of-mouth. Soviet economic reformers, social critics, poets, fiction writers, engineers, philosophers, scientists, and others have taken advantage of the new opportunities to have their say on Soviet television and in the press.

Professor Aron Katsenelinboigen calls attention ["Will *Glasnost* Bring the Reactionaries to Power?" ORBIS, Spring 1988] to the important fact that *glasnost* gives opportunities to dangerous movements as well as to positive ones. However, his argument is marred by errors that can be classed under two headings: failure to discriminate and incompleteness.

First, he lumps together a variety of movements and views, as if all of them were chauvinistic and anti-Semitic. In speaking of the nineteenth-century antecedents he fails altogether to distinguish between the several widely different generations of Slavophiles (whom he prefers to call Russophiles). He also fails to discriminate between them and the quite different proponents of the tsarist ideology of "Official Nationality." In speaking of contemporary Soviet Russia, he

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sweeps under the same labels truly reactionary groups (some of the Pamyat groupings) and such harmless phenomena as the printing of pictures of stands of birch trees in the Soviet press as symbols of Russia. He tars everybody with the same brush of anti-Semitic reactionism.

Katsenelinboigen refers to Iulian Semyonov (on p. 221) as author of a story that "condemned nationalism and anti-Semitism," then five pages later he makes the highly improbable suggestion that the same Semyonov's television series, "Seventeen Moments in Spring" (which deals with the heroic and successful Soviet spying on Hitler's Germany during World War II) inspired neo-Nazi groups in more than fourteen Soviet cities. To Katsenelinboigen, any sign of interest and pride in the Russian past is an ominous, menacing sign of anti-Semitism. His zeal is understandable (anti-Semitism has been a horrible blight), but when he lumps together everybody and everything, he obfuscates rather than illuminates.

The second error is that of omission. Katsenelinboigen leaves out those in the Soviet Union who speak out for a generous conception of Russianness — those who reject and militate against xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and anti-Asian prejudice, and who stress the tolerant tradition of the Russian national heritage. Katsenelinboigen does not even mention Academician Dmitri Likhachov, by far the most prominent and vocal advocate of such Russian patriotism. Likhachov presents his views in the Soviet media with astonishing frequency and has many admirers and followers. The Russian patriotism that he and others advocate should be distinguished from nationalism, and the failure to discuss it is a glaring omission.

Perhaps Katsenelinboigen has relied too much on secondary accounts (why did he quote from *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* in footnote 15, instead of going to the easily accessible source, in the Soviet monthly *Nash sovremennik*?). He quotes mostly from Western sources. I submit that these sources distort the picture. Reading the Soviet press, poetry, and fiction (and speaking with Russians inside the Soviet Union) reveals far greater heterogeneity.

One of the most interesting phenomena has been the appearance of polemics around various conceptions of Russianness: presentations of images expressive of the significance of Russian history and of both ideal and negative constructs that indicate or symbolize what their creators think is a desirable course for the Russian future.

The proliferation of these verbal creations of Russian national identity supplies us with a spectrum of views which have important implications for the future of the Soviet Union. Two aspects have the greatest importance: the remarkable resonance which these new polemics around Russianness have found at all levels of the Soviet Russian population; and the heterogeneity of the various attitudes

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expressed. We in the West should follow these developments attentively if we wish to understand the Soviet Union. We should attempt in our relations with the USSR to establish a rapport with these phenomena, looking for positive, fruitful sides as well as maintaining watchfulness for ominous, dark aspects. Communist ideology is moribund in the USSR; the vacuum may be filled with some new Russian sense of identity.

Space does not permit doing more than giving a partial listing of attitudes towards the Russian national identity. In addition to the anti-Semitic reactionaries, there are at least these five other groupings:

(1) Cherishing the national heritage: Russian identity as modesty, even humility, welcoming the otherness of non-Russians. As noted earlier, Dmitri Likhachov represents this strain.

(2) The Eurasian identity: Russianness in combination with Oriental attitudes; anti-racism. George Kuzmin stands for this definition.

(3) Stress on religious faith: Russian Orthodoxy.

(4) Neo-Dostoevskian: Russian universality.

(5) Self-deprecating views: "Little Russia"; withdrawal to the North-East; need for several generations of recuperation.

Things are fortunately not so simple and uniform as Katsenelinboigen would have us believe. The groups interested in the Orthodox Church or Russian poets or Soviet spies in Berlin are not all the same nor are they all reactionary and anti-Semitic. One does not serve the cause of fighting anti-Semitism by applying the term indiscriminately.

George Gibian
Department of Russian Literature
Cornell University

The Author Responds

To the Editor:

Professor George Gibian kindly mentions that my article draws attention to dangerous tendencies in the USSR's era of *glasnost*. But his appreciation seems merely polite, for obviously he thinks that I have made some very essential errors; and he goes on to lodge objections that, if true, would nullify my article. He particularly accuses me of failing to differentiate between various types of Slavophiles. In addition, he holds that I "tar everybody with the same brush of anti-Semitic reactionism."

How shall I answer these allegations? I believe a scholar should not rush to accuse his opponents of making errors, but should try to understand their position and the assumptions under which it might be correct. Only after this attempt has been made is it time to express disagreement with basic assumptions.

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Let me, therefore, clarify the assumptions of my article, in order to see whether Gibian's criticisms hold up.

Gibian is completely right in saying that, historically, Slavophiles have had many different opinions and that I did not discuss these differences in my article. But the assumption of my article was that, in addition to having many facets, the Russophile movement is also in some ways a single movement; and under that assumption I sought to emphasize the aspects that make it a unity. Those aspects are the special status of Russia among nations; the special status of Orthodoxy among religions; and authoritarianism as the appropriate type of regime for Russia. Undoubtedly, the weight given to each aspect varies from one Russophile to another.

Thus, I agree that the present Russian nationalists include different groups. As a matter of fact, I noted this in my article: "No doubt, an appreciable number of moderate nationalists do live in the Soviet Union, and do believe that Russia would benefit from political liberalism" (p. 218). But the Soviet Union lacks elections in which such beliefs can be transformed into power. Therefore, I concentrated my attention on the reactionary groups of nationalists.

I did so on the basis of two further assumptions: first, that the Soviet empire is (in Gorbachev's words) "on the eve of a crisis"; and second, that in a period of crisis, moderate nationalists "tend to become allies of the chauvinists, attracted as they are by the latter's ideals and resolve" (p. 218). Looking at Russian nationalism not as a pollster but as a political scientist, I expressed fear that the fanaticism and sincerity of the chauvinists would overcome the resistance of their more moderate brethren. In a time of emergency, the moderate Russian nationalists (one could call them Russian patriots) might well end up following the reactionaries, even while expressing disgust at their fanaticism and immorality. I believe an analogous dynamic may have occurred at the time Hitler took power.

Such are the assumptions under which I posed the question whether *glasnost* might bring to power a reactionary regime. I remain convinced that it is not an idle question.

A second aspect of Gibian's criticism also merits a response. He says I leave out "those in the Soviet Union who have spoken out for a generous conception of Russianness — who reject and militate against xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and anti-Asian prejudice, and who stress the tolerant tradition of the Russian national heritage." He particularly cites Academician Dmitri Likhachov as "the most prominent and vocal advocate of such Russian patriotism." Gibian calls my failure to mention Likachov's generous conceptions "a glaring error."

No doubt, Likhachov is a Russian patriot who is doing a lot of great things to develop Russian culture, to bring together Russia and

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the West, to criticize Stalin's era (when he himself was in prison), and so forth. Nevertheless, I hope that Gibian has had the opportunity to read the long interview that Likhachov gave to the liberal journal *Ogonyek* (No. 10, March 1988, pp. 9-12) concerning the millennial anniversary of the conversion of Russia to Christianity. Westerners and non-specialists might find this interview innocuous enough. But to readers familiar with the Russian skill in making points by indirection, it is anything but "generous Russianism." Let me give some examples.

"To the extent that Christianity is international, it is a great religion," says Likhachov. "I do not want to mention religions belonging to one folk. There are several such religious but it is a great deficiency of these religions." This is someone who rejects anti-Semitism?

"The state simply can not live with divided beliefs," Likhachov maintains. "This was a multinational state and that is why it required an international religion." This is an advocate of tolerance?

"Novgorod did nothing to unite Russia because it was a republic; the Metropolitan of the Russian world moved to Moscow [an autocracy] and Moscow became the symbol of the spiritual integration." This is an advocate of autocratic rule.

Likhachov says that from the baptism of Russia came a "synthesis with the culture of the Byzantine empire, the most advanced country of that time." This "most advanced country" was then ruled over by Basil II, a ruler perhaps best noted for having put out the eyes of 15,000 prisoners of war. For all these reasons, I would not wish to count on Academician Likhachov to represent the forces of moderation and liberalism in a time of systemic crisis.

Finally, I must respond to Gibian's criticism that I have "relied too much on secondary accounts," and that I quote "mostly from Western sources." Of course, Gibian could not know that my original article drew almost exclusively on Russian sources, and that it was only while working with the editors of ORBIS that so many "secondary" and "Western" sources were added for the benefit of non-specialists.

Aron Katsenelinboigen
Professor of Decision Sciences
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania

TERRORISM

To the Editor:

It is always flattering to have one's article mentioned prominently in a review essay on terrorism, as Patrick Clawson did in the

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Spring 1988 issue of ORBIS ("Terrorism in Decline?"). However, Clawson cites my *Foreign Policy* article, "Misunderstanding Terrorism" (Summer 1987) as representing the view that "terrorism really does not matter very much." Nothing could be farther from the truth. Of course terrorism matters; it matters to the victims, to their families, and to all compassionate human beings. The thrust of my article was that terrorism is not always a threat to vital U.S. interests, and by creating a crisis atmosphere in Washington every time terrorists strike, we may be placing at risk other issues that are more critical to our national security.

Mr. Clawson also inaccurately states that I am among those who oppose military retaliation. I clearly state in my article that military responses to terrorism may be necessary at times. What I argue against is viewing terrorism as "war," and thereby pursuing a regular policy of military retaliation, which may at times place U.S. troops and U.S. interests at great risk.

John D. Simon
The Rand Corporation

The Author Responds

To the Editor:

Mr. Simon is correct that I should have noted he did not rule out in principle military measures against terrorists; he simply decried every single use of deadly force he cited, approving of only a "low-risk military operation." In his letter, as in his *Foreign Policy* article, Simon sees terrorism as a problem primarily due to the sufferings of individual terror victims, not due to its attack on Western democratic values. I disagree.

Patrick Clawson
Scientists' Institute for Public Information

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Brief Reviews

WORLD POLITICS

Bargaining for National Security: The Postwar Disarmament Negotiations. Lloyd Jensen.

Claiming the Heavens: The New York Times Complete Guide to the Star Wars Debate. Philip M. Boffey, William J. Broad, Leslie H. Gelb, Charles Mohr, and Holcomb B. Noble.

Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered. David P. Forsythe.

Iron Destinies, Lost Opportunities: The Arms Race between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., 1945-1987. Charles R. Morris.

The Key to Failure: Laos and the Vietnam War. Norman B. Hannah.

Long Cycles in World Politics. George Modelski.

Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age. Joshua S. Goldstein.

Moral Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence. Gregory S. Kavka.

Nuclear War and Nuclear Strategy: Unfinished Business. Stephen J. Cimbala.

A Peace Reader: Essential Readings on War, Justice, Non-Violence and World Order. Joseph Fahey and Richard Armstrong, eds.

The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage. Todd Gitlin.

Wild Blue Yonder: Money, Politics and the B-1 Bomber. Nick Kotz.

The Year of the Barricades: A Journey Through 1968. David Caute.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

Buying into America. Martin and Susan Tolchin.

Gorbachev's Economic Plans. John Hardt and Richard Kaufman, eds.

Japan: Facing Economic Maturity. Lincoln Stevens.

The Microelectronics Race. Thomas Howell, William Noellert, Janet MacLaughlin, and Alan Wolff.

The Pacific Rim and the Western World. Philip West and Frans A.M.A. von Geusau, eds.

Threats to International Financial Stability. Richard Portes and Alexander Swoboda, eds.

WAR STUDIES

The Geopolitics of Super Power. Colin S. Gray.

How Haig Saved Lenin. Brian Pearce.

The Last Gaiter Button: A Study of the Mobilization and Concentration of the French Army in the War of 1870. Thomas J. Adriance.

Military Effectiveness. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds.

The U.S. Maritime Strategy. Norman Friedman.

THE MIDDLE EAST

The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949. Benny Morris.

Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question. Edward Said and Christopher Hitchins, eds.

Deterrence without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy. Avner Yaniv.

The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations. James A. Bill.

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The Geopolitics of Israel's Border Question. Saul Cohen.

King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan. Mary C. Wilson.

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ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

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Miguel Marmol. Roque Dalton.

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The Geopolitics of Southern Africa: South Africa as Regional Superpower. Kent Hughes Butts and Paul R. Thomas.

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WORLD POLITICS
by Adam M. Garfinkle

Bargaining for National Security: The Postwar Disarmament Negotiations. By Lloyd Jensen. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988. 311 pp. $24.95.

If you like collections of previously published essays, thinkers educated by daily journalism, and writing that wavers between addressing experts and addressing students, *Bargaining for National Security* could be for you. Its contents break down into three parts. The first, on the setting of negotiations and on concessionary behavior, might be marginally useful for students, although it is marred by a bean-counting approach to concessions and a sprinkling of meaningless correlations. Part two is a review of U.S.-Soviet arms control efforts, 1963-1979. It provides no new research, but repackages common knowledge with half-truths that match actual truths in a ratio of approximately one to one.

The final section, which offers a discussion of the Reagan tenure and a concluding sermon, defies even student use. Jensen manages to argue, simultaneously, that arms control has not produced great benefits for national security, but that it must do so in the future. Therefore, new weapons should be designed with arms control considerations in mind. Again simultaneously, Jensen holds that the Reagan administration has been irresponsible on arms control, and that more progress has been made during this administration than before it. But it is perhaps too much to expect better from a man with no hands-on experience in these matters, who relies almost entirely (judging by the notes to chapters seven and eight) on the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* for his data.

Claiming the Heavens: The New York Times Complete Guide to the Star Wars Debate. By Philip M. Boffey, William J. Broad, Leslie H. Gelb, Charles Mohr, and Holcomb B. Noble. New York: Times Books, 1988. 299 pp. $17.95.

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A Pulitzer Prize-winning team from the *New York Times* has expanded and refined their articles from the past five years to turn out a readable and almost fair volume on the Star Wars debate. For the confused or curious layman, *Claiming the Heavens* is probably the most efficient way to understand the controversy. The best thing about the book is its ability to communicate complex scientific and technical ideas in a lucid way. But not to be slighted is its willingness to confront the broader issues involved. The authors acknowledge that the effects of the largest research effort in history will not be just on military strategy and technology, but also on technology as a whole and on a vast array of institutions, including industry and academe. They are cautiously futuristic, seeing that the days of large, cumbersome ballistic missiles will one day be over, and that space will inevitably be (in fact already is) a military theater. Finally, the book is sober in its recapitulation of the debate, hewing to the ambiguous center. This allows the authors to conclude, quite rightly, that President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative is simultaneously impossible and inevitable, that it will never achieve military decisiveness, but that its technical development is inherent in our future.

Yet somehow when the review of the debate is over and done, the skeptics of SDI retain an upper hand, even though the technical evaluation points in the other direction. Perhaps this was to be expected from a committee effort in which Gelb and especially Mohr are involved. Nevertheless, it is a competent and valuable tool for general education and even for classroom use.

Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered. By David P. Forsythe. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988. 224 pp. $24.00.

The Carter administration's approach to human rights spurred the writing of many retrospective books on the subject. Most tend to be partisan or polemical; Forsythe's book fits this profile but gains from its focus on one specific decision-making aspect of human rights policy: how Congress functions as a factor in executive branch calculations and policies on this subject. Understanding that politics drives law, Forsythe identifies six major categories of law and a number of legal instruments as a means of measuring congressional influence.

Despite a promising start, the narrative sputters. The introduction turns tediously taxonomical and initial chapters are devoted in the maddening manner of political scientists to the "proof," complete with data and charts, of things we already know, such as the fact that liberal and conservative voting records on human rights tend to parallel voting on national defense. But the most serious problem is the neglect of Congress's role as a transmitter of non-governmental

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interests and impulses into the policy process. The variously hued human rights lobbies that circle Capitol Hill, pushing and prodding the Congress, are never investigated here, even though the author frequently cites materials from them. A good book on the congressional role in human rights policy remains to be written.

Iron Destinies, Lost Opportunities: The Arms Race between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., 1945-1987. By Charles R. Morris. New York: Harper & Row, 1988. 544 pp. $22.95.

A new 500-page book on a topic that has already been written about too much is presumptively an occasion to roll back one's eyes and move on to the next book. But not when the author is Charles R. Morris, an investment banker who writes books — this is his third — for a hobby. His first two, *The Cost of Good Intentions* and *A Time of Passion*, were refreshingly well-written and of fairly high intellectual calibre, although somewhat personal and impressionistic. So is *Iron Destinies, Lost Opportunities*. This is probably the most informative, stimulating, and entertaining book on the arms race meant for non-experts. Although Morris provides no revelations, his knack for juxtaposing the personal, political, technical, and perceptual yields more than an occasional insight, even for the expert.

The special merit of Morris's approach, and probably the reason that it fills so many pages, is that he places the struggle over strategic military questions in the context of international and domestic politics. The poverty of narrowly conceived "strategic studies" reviews becomes immediately apparent in light of this broader approach. Throughout, Morris's tone is sober and conservative, not in its politics but in its sense of what one can reasonably expect from human beings and their institutions. He is neither complacent nor frantic, neither apologetic nor apoplectic. And that seems just about right.

The Key to Failure: Laos and the Vietnam War. By Norman B. Hannah. Lanham, Md.: Madison Books, 1987. 335 pp. $19.95.

Hannah argues the war in Vietnam was lost when the United States failed to respond properly to gross violations of the Laotian neutralization accord of 1962. More to the point, Hannah said so at that time, when he was a Foreign Service Officer. Now he tells the tale of his efforts to persuade his seniors to recognize North Vietnam's twin strategy of infiltration and insurgency, only to be turned aside. Hannah's suggestions — of drawing a military line in southern Laos and conventionalizing the war of infiltration, while simultaneously fighting the small insurgency in South Vietnam — were rejected on two grounds: the large troop commitment they required, and the likelihood that Hanoi would rebuild the Ho Chi Minh Trail farther west, in Thailand, and so would involve SEATO. As Hannah's well-

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documented narrative shows, he rejoined that the cost of sealing off the trail — three divisions — would be much less than the cost to be paid later in South Vietnam if it were not sealed, and that forcing the infiltration route westward made sense logistically and politically.

In retrospect, Hannah was mainly in the right, as his acerbic, blunt, and personal retrospective insists. He also provides a rich trove of anecdotes about the hubris of the Kennedy administration, the power of its game-theory incrementalists, and the sheer stupidity of the military. Yet, unwittingly, Hannah also reveals why he failed, for *The Key to Failure* betrays an honest innocence that facilitates his clear-mindedness as it foreordains his inability to move the bureaucracy. Unfortunately, even as he describes the events a quarter century later, it is not clear whether Hannah knows what happened to him.

Long Cycles in World Politics. By George Modelski. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987. 254 pp. $30.00.
Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age. By Joshua S. Goldstein. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988. 433 pp. $40.00 ($19.95, paper).

Nietzsche once remarked that were it not for the constant counterfeiting of the world by means of numbers, men could not live. Others have noted how difficult it is for meaning-making homo sapiens to accept anything about the world as random. These two books by political scientists on long cycles demonstrate how accurate such observations are, for both impose ornate patterns on the very flow of history and overreach themselves badly.

Modelski is the more circumspect, admitting that long cycles "are patterns that provide a memory and an operating myth for organising knowledge about past world politics." Although his present volume is but one of three, with documentation and case studies yet to come, the pattern of his thinking is clear. Modelski argues that war, global leadership, and the rise of modernity are all integrally related and that long cycles in these phenomena represent a progressive learning function. Thus, he believes, there is a "linkage between long cycles of world leadership, the evolution of the global system, and some fundamental concepts and preoccupations of contemporary social science." For this reason, world politics at the global level works in "an unexpectedly orderly and possibly even predictable fashion."

In contrast to Modelski, Goldstein is not circumspect at all. Long cycles have been dismissed as mysticism, he tell us, because the academy has failed to make "the paradigm shift" necessary to take them seriously and, incidentally, to save the world. What shift? Well, that Goldstein is a Marxist, or at least a Marxoid, gives a hint. Goldstein posits an economic theory of history in which well-functioning econ-

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omies wage hegemonic wars, then decline, opening the way for rival power centers to emerge. All of this is quite regular, says Goldstein, and he tries to demonstrate his case by drawing on a cornucopia of arcane statistical methods and correlations. After insisting that the future is indeterminate, and that he is not making predictions, Goldstein then proceeds to make predictions and to sound the alarm: unless the world refashions itself in a single generation — Jonathan Schell-like — we are all doomed to cataclysmic nuclear war by the middle of the next century.

Virtually all macro-analytic approaches to international relations are afflicted by the same diseases: reified models that "work" because they bear no relation to reality; correlations posing as causation; and premises pre-stuffed with their conclusions. Such approaches also tend to overlook human volition and fall prey to determinisms of various sorts. This is not to say the search for historical patterns is entirely fruitless; in the hands of a Paul Kennedy or an Evan Luard something more ambiguous but also more interesting can result. But in the hands of most political scientists, the insistence on seeing tight patterns — especially if it is combined with a behaviorist-positivist-structuralist approach already discredited in the more mature social sciences — results in embarrassing hubris. If one then adds alternating layers of Marxism and alchemic quantitative analysis, the result is laughable.

Moral Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence. By Gregory S. Kavka. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. 243 pp. $34.50 ($12.95, paper).

Dozens of tomes on the morality of nuclear deterrence have been published by philosophers since 1981, and Kavka knows why: because philosophers "were alarmed by the escalating superpower arms race and the hawkish rhetoric and military procurement policies of the new U.S. administration." Though sympathetic to this impulse, Kavka goes beyond the usual procrustean categories, illusions of significance, and slipshod thinking to achieve a more serious assessment of the morality of nuclear deterrence.

Kavka's merit lies in recognizing the yawning gulf between the "utilitarian costs and benefits of making deterrent nuclear threats" and the costs and benefits of carrying them out. He also understands that alternatives to nuclear deterrence would also have moral costs, and so moral judgments about it cannot be separated from the broader political context in which deterrence rests. For these reasons, he concludes, "a utilitarian defense of nuclear deterrence is possible."

Further distinguishing himself from his colleagues, Kavka doubts that philosophers much influence policy makers. By example, he gives us reason to be grateful this is so, for he appears to have less of a grounding in history and technics than is needed. He underestimates

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the number and kinds of paradoxes of nuclear deterrence; worse, he ignores the moral implications of facing a state, the USSR, driven by a very different moral paradigm. Thus, though an improvement over the usual "morality of deterrence" literature, Kavka's book reaffirms the solipsism of contemporary Western ethical speculation.

Nuclear War and Nuclear Strategy: Unfinished Business. By Stephen J. Cimbala. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1987. 276 pp. $39.95.

Nuclear War and Nuclear Strategy is an assessment of the contemporary strategic military predicament, and U.S. policy as a part of that predicament, that lies smack in the middle of the academic literature. This is both fortunate and unfortunate. It is fortunate because Cimbala makes no cavalier judgments: his conservativism is grounded in a close familiarity with the literature and his judgments rarely travel far from the realist consensus. It is an "inside" book, and it rises or falls in accord with its utility as refinement for the inner discourse of strategic analysts. In familiar Kuhnian terms, this is normal science, not paradigm shaking.

It is unfortunate because the book exhibits all the flaws of the class of literature to which it is a recent addition. To most readers, it is hopelessly arcane and convoluted. It is maddeningly careful and equivocal in its judgment. It is not written with grace. It is acronymic to the point of distraction. It is nearly devoid of any consideration of political context, either international or domestic, giving it as well as most kindred work the feel of an endless and inbred glass bead game. In short, *Nuclear War and Nuclear Strategy* has an audience problem. To outsiders, it is impenetrable. To insiders, it is of value on the margins of the discourse, not on its center. But value is value and given the stakes involved in getting such matters straight, no doubt the world is marginally better off for Cimbala's effort.

A Peace Reader: Essential Readings on War, Justice, Non-Violence and World Order. Edited by Joseph Fahey and Richard Armstrong. New York: Paulist Press, 1987. 477 pp. $14.95 (paper).

College and high school courses on "peace science" and "peace history" have proliferated since the Vietnam War period. Whether such efforts deserve the status of a discipline is hotly debated. But what is beyond dispute is the existence of a large market for textbooks to be used in such courses. *A Peace Reader*, from the Paulist Press, is clearly designed to fill this niche.

The *Reader* contains fifty-two selections, divided into sections on "War and the Arms Race," "Justice for All," "Non-Violence: Philosophy and Strategy," "Other Forms of Conflict Resolution," and "World Order." As one might expect, the tilt is strongly toward an idealistic and very dovish perspective. But the book is not entirely

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one-sided: balancing Sidney Lens, Gene Sharp, Robert J. Lifton, Richard Falk, and dozens of others are four right-of-center selections from Donald Kagan, James Finn, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Warren Burger. Given the intellectual context in which such a book is likely to be assigned, things could be worse.

What is most annoying about this text is not the selection of articles but that each essay is preceded by a brief summary. This book contains its own *Cliff's Notes*!

The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage. By Todd Gitlin. New York: Bantam, 1987. 513 pp. $24.95.

Gitlin's contribution to the torrent of outpourings about the 1960s, like most others, is as much an object of analysis as it is analysis itself. Like most others, too, it is just contrite enough about the excesses and mistakes of youth to be self-hagiographic in essence. But unlike most others, Gitlin offers a much more impressive, and powerfully written, cultural and personal panorama of the New Left and its times. For those who did not live through it, this is the best account yet to get the flavor of the times.

When it comes to ideas, however, Gitlin is as confused as — well, as he was in the sixties, perhaps even more so. Without the "divine delirium" of the decade, he believes, "America's political and cultural space would not have opened up as much as it did." This opening "averted some of the worst abuses of power, and made life more decent for millions of people. The movement in its best moments and broadest definition made philosophical breakthroughs which are still working themselves out." But when Gitlin turns to list these breakthroughs, they are either hopelessly vague or thoroughly liberal in origin — strangely weak remarks for a former radical who still loathes bourgeois liberals. Nevertheless, Gitlin is engaging. However confused, he is as bright, as witty, and as personable as ever. That is why *The Sixties*, for all its flaws, is a good read.

Wild Blue Yonder: Money, Politics and the B-1 Bomber. By Nick Kotz. New York: Pantheon, 1988. 313 pp. $19.95.

Using the B-1 bomber program as a case study, Kotz tries to show how politicized the defense procurement process is and, specifically, how "special interests have grossly distorted defense priorities and needlessly exacerbated the arms race."

Kotz claims that the B-1 was saved in the Nixon administration because Nixon's re-election drive dictated the creation of defense-related jobs to insure California would vote Republican. He believes the B-1B survived in the Reagan administration because the defense industry lobbied senators to lobby the president, thus frustrating Secretary of Defense Weinberger who thought Stealth a better in-

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vestment. Notz makes rather severe accusations about former senators John Tower and Howard Baker. Even if this is true, Notz has neglected almost entirely the other side of the story: the persistent efforts made inside and outside the Congress to kill each and every weapons system that comes along, quite on principle. Generals and defense industrialists are not the only ones playing hardball. In the few pages Notz devotes to the efforts made to kill the B-1 in the 1970s, the players are referred to benignly as "peace activists." Notz's description of the "grassroots" campaign to nail down candidate Jimmy Carter in 1976 against the B-1 is actually the most fascinating part of the book.

Of course the B-1 program has been a mess, and the procurement process is not unfairly described as "out of control." But part of the B-1's problem has been the off-again, on-again character of the program, and the politics surrounding it have been animated on both sides of the political spectrum. Assuming that Notz has his account straight, it is still only half the story, and the book only a half-truth.

The Year of the Barricades: A Journey Through 1968. By David Caute. New York: Harper & Row, 1988. 514 pp. $24.95.

For most Americans, "the sixties" refers to events that occurred in the United States. *The Year of the Barricades* is interesting because it also looks at the tumult in Western and Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, Caute brings only a facade of comparability; mere juxtaposition is not analysis. More unfortunately still, Caute is a British socialist who puts such a leftward spin on everything that he manages to confuse some very basic points. On the American scene, for example, he tells us that "the innovative ideas of the New Left — frequently . . . expressed with clarity and sophistication — constitute a treasury whose present dilapidation impoverishes us." Few former New Leftists would dare say as much. Caute even claims to have seen a sober face to the New Left, "a sense of social responsibility" founded in its "anchorage in the heart of the socialist tradition." This is sheer nonsense, proving at the very least that Caute was thousands of miles away when the events he describes took place. More likely, Caute's remaking of the New Left into an old left, keeping the exuberant, fresh image while dismissing the weightier maladies, is a bit of quackery designed for today's young and would-be "progressive." At least as far as the American side of his subject is concerned, what Caute perpetrates here is not interpretation, but theft.

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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
by Patrick Clawson

Buying into America. By Martin and Susan Tolchin. New York: Times Books, 1988. 387 pp. $19.95.

Using anecdote, not analysis, the Tolchins tackle problems arising from the growth of foreign investment in the United States. To inquire whether foreign firms are being given unfair advantages, for example, they devote a chapter to Komatsu, a Japanese construction equipment firm that was offered city and state incentives to build a factory in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Similar feature-story treatment is given to the question of how foreign-owned firms influence U.S. politics; how they approach unions; and how Soviet-bloc investments gain the USSR information denied it on national security grounds.

The Tolchins seem to believe that showing foreign investment's disadvantages is sufficient to condemn it. But it is not; sometimes the alternative to bad is worse. A more analytic approach would have discussed the quandary the United States faces because of its huge trade deficit. Financing that deficit can be done only in three ways: selling stocks and bonds to foreigners, borrowing from foreigners, or accepting investment by foreigners. Of these three, foreign investment offers the most advantages, for it is least volatile and therefore least likely to provoke a crisis. It often brings technology or an expansion of output that increases America's ability to repay its deficit. And it rewards foreigners only if they do well.

To their credit, the Tolchins have avoided Japan bashing — but by spreading their criticism around. They should have pointed out that today's worries about the Japanese buying up America are no more sensible than the last wave of worries, when the fear was that oil-rich Arabs would take control.

Gorbachev's Economic Plans. Volumes 1 and 2. Edited by John Hardt and Richard Kaufman. Papers submitted to the U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1987. Volume 1, 575 pp.; Volume 2, 557 pp. $16.00.

How much of Gorbachev's economic restructuring is system improvement, how much truly system reform? That illuminating distinction, drawn by Hardt and Kaufman, is just one of many insights that make these volumes from the Joint Economic Committee a basic reference work on Gorbachev's *perestroika*. Reflecting the diversity of the authors' views and backgrounds (several academic disciplines and government agencies), the articles are not consistent in their interpretation of data or in their analysis of the prospects for reforms. Nevertheless, in fifty essays of singularly high quality, the experts

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take apart Soviet statistics and reassemble them more meaningfully, and the result is the best statistical picture we have of the Soviet economy, as well as some understanding of Gorbachev's proposals and problems. Discussions of specific sectors of the economy are particularly valuable; essays on the overall economy are somewhat less so, as they resemble the treatments found in a variety of recent books and magazine articles.

One notable shortcoming of the volumes is a scarcity of comparisons to the West. An article by Ann Lane, Ruth Marsten, and Susan Welsh — contrasting U.S. and Soviet diets — makes the distance between the two societies more palpable. Also, in looking at the poor economic performance of the USSR since the mid-1970s, the authors might well have recalled that the West's performance in those years was nothing to brag about.

Japan: Facing Economic Maturity. By Lincoln Stevens. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988. 298 pp. $31.95 ($11.95, paper).

Despite the interest in Japan's management techniques and trading practices, little has been written in English analyzing Japan's economic record since 1973. In this important book, Stevens corrects the misperception that Japan remains a juggernaut of growth. Instead, he argues, Japan shifted fundamentally, in about 1973, from a high-growth economy to a more mature economy. To sustain his thesis, Stevens points to the average annual growth rate in Japan's Gross Domestic Product: 10.7 percent in 1960-1973; 3.2 percent in 1974-1985. This slowdown occurred, he writes, primarily because Japan had closed its technological gap with the West; productivity gains from imported technology were no longer as rapid. The shocks of the early 1970s — the 1971 devaluation of the yen, Nixon's soybean embargo, the oil price rises — merely acted as precipitating factors for the decline.

As for the future, Stevens analyzes economic imbalances now arising in Japan's mature economy. The famous savings of the Japanese are no longer needed to finance an ever-larger industrial investment. At first, in 1974-79, the Japanese government tapped these savings to finance a deficit. After 1980, however, the huge financial surpluses began to go overseas. And it is the export of these savings surpluses, Stevens believes, that is fueling Japan's trade surpluses. Any excess of exports over imports necessarily means an increase in foreign assets. Most people think the former causes the latter; Stevens says the the latter causes the former for Japan. From this perspective, Japan's trade imbalances will not disappear until savings are reduced by steps of the sort that Stevens describes in his final chapter.

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The Microelectronics Race. Thomas Howell, William Noellert, Janet MacLaughlin, and Alan Wolff. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988. 269 pp. $25.00.

The Semiconductor Industry Association sponsored this informative account of Japanese gains and U.S. losses in semiconductor technology and marketing. Unfortunately, the authors remain silent on some key issues about the performance of U.S. companies — sensitive issues for the study's sponsors. For instance, they ascribe Japanese success in the semiconductor market to intensive capital investment, control of the domestic market, dominance of the production of materials for semiconductors, manufacturing skill, and dominance of the world consumer electronics market. These factors are all well analyzed and make the whole book worth reading. The authors then deal with "the U.S. policy responses," by which they mean the U.S. government's response to the success of Japanese firms. But dwelling on this conceals the main issue: how have U.S. *firms* responded to the challenge of the Japanese?

If U.S. firms rely on government to solve their problems, the future for U.S. manufacturing will not be bright. Although the authors note shortcomings in each of the proposals for a greater U.S. government role, they give little reason to think their own proposal — government-funded research and development conducted by an industry-wide consortium — could be a significant factor in reversing the decline in U.S. competitiveness. More generally, the authors run together private and government roles in a disturbing way. Their comparison of the "microelectronics challenge" to "the challenges in space, defense, and aviation" self-servingly implies that increasing the market share of U.S. semiconductor companies is on a par with national security.

The Pacific Rim and the Western World. Edited by Philip West and Frans A.M.A. von Geusau. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. 323 pp. $29.00 (paper).

The origins of this collection in an Eindhoven (Netherlands) Colloquium adds a rarely heard European perspective on the Pacific Rim. For example, the editors argue that "in economic size, the Asia Pacific is still quite small compared to the liberal West" — definitely a European attitude, and badly outdated: trans-Pacific trade exceeds trans-Atlantic. West and von Geusau have avoided the usual pitfalls of conference proceedings — hit-or-miss coverage of important issues and uneven quality. While not path-breaking, the articles present a balanced and comprehensive look at relations between the Pacific Rim and the West (in which they include Australia and New Zealand).

One section takes up security interests, strategy, and the military role of the major Pacific Rim powers; another section examines Jap-

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anese trade relations with the West. A third section examines the record of economic development in East Asia. The essays on East Asia are solid and workmanlike, reviewing the record of growth and the main arguments about its causes, especially the role of foreign aid and an outward orientation. One shortcoming is the relative lack of discussion about the role of markets and the government.

In the most provocative essay in the collection, Lawrence Klein defends the idea that China in 1980 stood in nearly the same position relative to the United States as Japan in 1950, and hints that China may grow as fast from 1980 to 2010 as Japan did from 1950 to 1980.

Threats to International Financial Stability. Edited by Richard Portes and Alexander Swoboda. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 302 pp. $42.50.

The American banking industry has had problems recently: multi-billion dollar write-offs of Third World debt, turbulence following the October 1987 stock market crash, and the continuing hemorrhage at Texas financial institutions. Such traumas require a damage-control effort, and the Portes and Swoboda collection — drawn from a conference of international bankers, academics, and regulators — would seem to be the definitive discussion about the causes and containment of international financial instability. All the important topics are here: comparing the 1930s and 1980s; asking whether a crisis could spread through the inter-bank markets; analyzing how a central bank should respond to a run; contrasting the practice of regulators to the theory of finance; and looking at the dangers posed by differences among countries with regard to regulatory practices. Unfortunately, the articles are generally out of touch with reality. Many of the authors ignore the influence that political pressure exerts on regulators, although that is the main factor prolonging the agony of dozens of Texas financial institutions. Some authors seem surprisingly unaware of recent developments. Most egregious, when Edward Kane discusses the potential risks from regulatory differences among industrial countries, he does not mention the increasing coordination among bank regulators during the last decade — including the Basle Concordats of 1975 and 1983, the joint position of the major central banks harmonizing capital requirements, and the European Community's moves to standardize regulatory practice before 1992 (when it hopes to drop all barriers to intra-community banking operations). In short, after promising much, the book disappoints.

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WAR STUDIES
by John H. Maurer

The Geopolitics of Super Power. By Colin S. Gray. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1988. 274 pp. $26.00.

Drawing upon the classic geopolitical writings of Mahan, Mackinder, and Spykman for inspiration, Gray paints on a broad canvas today's great power rivalries and shifting balances of world power. He depicts the competition between the superpowers as a geopolitical contest for the control of the Eurasian land mass and the world's strategic oceanic highways. "The Soviet-American rivalry is but the latest manifestation of the landpower-seapower antagonism of which Halford Mackinder wrote so eloquently more than eighty years ago." The United States, he argues, should continue to lead a coalition of powers in order to thwart Soviet Russia's imperial ambition.

Gray's analysis in turn brings policy recommendations about the allocation of U.S. defense expenditures and contributes to the current debate over matching resources against commitments. Contrary to those who focus on the balance of forces along the Central Front in Germany, Gray's strategic world view is decidedly maritime and looks to naval power, in conjunction with strategic forces, as the foundation for the U.S. position in world politics. The defense of Western Europe, he believes, must rest primarily on the shoulders of the European great powers. Just as controversial is Gray's recommendation that the United States reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons for the purpose of extended deterrence and, instead, increase its ability to fight along with allies a protracted global war. These provocative conclusions, from one of this country's most brilliant commentators on strategic affairs, provide valuable guideposts for a long-term defense program by the United States.

How Haig Saved Lenin. By Brian Pearce. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987. 150 pp. $29.95.

Pearce debunks Soviet views about the Bolshevik regime's role in defeating Germany during the First World War. Pearce convincingly argues that the infant Soviet state had no major part in the collapse of Wilhelmine Germany after signing the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty in March 1918. Contrary to the assertions of Soviet historians, Bolshevik propaganda did not demoralize the German army on the Western Front during the crucial opening battles of the spring and early summer of 1918. Nor did the Brest-Litovsk Treaty prevent Germany from shifting a million or more soldiers to the west for offensives against the armies of Britain and France. Indeed, had it not been for allied victories in the west — spearheaded by the

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armies of the British Empire commanded by Field Marshal Douglas Haig — Germany's leaders might soon have put an end to the Bolshevik regime. To magnify Russia's role in Germany's collapse in the fall of 1918, as is the wont of Soviet historians, is to distort the facts.

Of course, these points are not new to Western historians, but it is useful that Pearce has explicitly taken on the Soviet propagandists. That he need demonstrate his thesis at all proves the lamentable spread of ideologically inspired history, which is not history at all but a catalog of self-serving distortions of the past.

The Last Gaiter Button: A Study of the Mobilization and Concentration of the French Army in the War of 1870. By Thomas J. Adriance. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1987. 192 pp. $32.95.

When asked if his country was ready for war with Prussia in the summer of 1870, French war minister General Edmond Leboeuf responded: "We are ready, very ready! Down to the last gaiter button." Of course, as the ensuing debacle demonstrated, France was far from ready: two French armies were encircled and destroyed by the invading Germans, the regime of Napoleon III was toppled, and the emperor himself was captured along with an army at Sedan.

What caused the rapid downfall of French military power in 1870? The relatively slow mobilization of its military resources along the critical northeastern frontier was a principal cause, for this allowed Germany's forces to seize the initiative and outmaneuver the French army during the initial battles. In this excellent analysis of French war plans, Adriance locates the root cause of France's defeat in the sloppy staff planning of the military high command, which did not understand the critical role played by detailed deployment plans in guiding the railway movements of hundreds of thousands of soldiers and horses toward the frontier.

Today's analysts of the Central Front military balance will appreciate this volume for highlighting the dangers of falling behind in a race to deploy forces under crisis conditions. The study also offers a useful reply to scholars who have examined the July Crisis of 1914 and who argue that the general staffs of the great powers placed too much emphasis on rapid military deployments, thereby foreclosing diplomatic solutions that might have averted the outbreak of war. As Adriance shows, mistakes in deployment could lead to defeat — a lesson taken very much to heart by military men before 1914.

Military Effectiveness. 3 volumes. Edited by Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988. $150.00.

Why do some armies fight better than others? To find answers to this question, an ambitious project on military effectiveness was brought together by the Mershon Center of Ohio State University.

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They have compared seven major armies in three periods (World War I, the inter-war years, and World War II) and assigned each of these case studies to a prominent historian. Each topic is organized around a common set of questions that emphasizes the role of intangibles, such as military education and doctrine — factors frequently ignored in strategic analyses of combat performance.

Not surprisingly, perhaps, the German army gets high marks at the operational and tactical levels for its willingness to learn from combat experience. In contrast, the British armed forces quickly forgot the lessons of combat experience gained during the First World War and subsequently returned to prewar conceptions. Thus, in the Second World War, British forces had to relearn at great cost the importance of the convoy in defeating submarine attacks; similarly, they had painfully to relearn the value of integrating tanks, artillery, infantry, and tactical aircraft to carry out combined-arms operations.

These volumes are very useful because they provide a needed comparative perspective on the topic of military performance. In an insightful concluding essay, Russell Weigley points out that military effectiveness rests on more than an understanding of tactics and operations; it rests on an appreciation of the interrelationship between armed forces and political objectives. Much wisdom resides in Weigley's sober assessment: "The key to making armed forces effective is to tailor their responsibilities and goals to the limits of tactical, operational, strategic, and policy-making practicability."

The U.S. Maritime Strategy. By Norman Friedman. London: Jane's, 1988. 256 pp. $45.00.

Led by a dynamic secretary of the navy, John Lehman, and guided by a blueprint known as the maritime strategy, the U.S. Navy has benefited more from the Reagan defense buildup than any of the other services. But critics — including Gary Hart, Robert Komer, Edward Luttwak, and William Kaufmann — have opposed this expansion, charging that the maritime strategy misallocates resources and would promote an escalation to nuclear weapons in a war with the Soviet Union.

Friedman offers a forceful rejoinder to those who would ax the navy's fleet strength, because he is an ardent proponent of the 600-ship navy and the maritime strategy. Indeed, he views this as the minimum naval requirement, and argues that only the maritime strategy provides the United States with the naval power to respond flexibly to international crises and to the strategic task of protecting sea-lanes in wartime. Chapters on "The Strategy of Sea Power" and "The Maritime Strategy in Action" provide particularly valuable insights into the strengths and limits of naval power in a U.S.-Soviet conflict.

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Friedman contends that a 600-ship fleet is the largest force the United States will likely maintain over the long haul. He arrives at this by estimating that the navy can expect to obtain, at most, twenty new ships each year; and that the life span of a modern warship is thirty years. Accepting this limit, Friedman agrees with the navy leadership's call for a fleet built around fifteen carrier battle groups and 100 attack submarines. This is a valuable rejoinder to the opponents of the maritime strategy, and Friedman makes a compelling case for not scuttling the 600-ship fleet in the coming era of tight fiscal constraints on defense spending.

THE MIDDLE EAST
by Daniel Pipes

The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949. By Benny Morris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 380 pp. $39.50.

Drawing on recently declassified state papers in Israel, Great Britain, and the United States, as well as on Israeli private papers, Morris has written the first scholarly account of this most contentious issue, the Arab exodus from Palestine. Until now, two irreconcilable viewpoints have dominated the debate: the pro-Arab, which contends that the Arabs were expelled; and the pro-Israeli, which holds that the Arabs left of their own accord, under instructions from their leaders.

Morris endorses neither of these simple positions. Instead, he analyzes in minute detail the varied circumstances in which about 700,000 Arabs left nearly 400 settlements over a period of 700 days. What he finds is that the events were "so complex and varied, the situation radically changing from date to date and place to place, that a single-cause explanation of the exodus from most sites is impossible." If one looks hard enough, the standard pro-Arab and pro-Israeli positions can both be supported, but neither predominates.

Morris's research provides the factual basis for future discussions of this vexing problem; and his even-handed, scrupulous investigation assures that many of his own conclusions will achieve wide acceptance.

Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question. Edited by Edward Said and Christopher Hitchins. New York: Verso, 1988. 296 pp. $39.95 ($13.95, paper).

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Said and Hitchens — two highly literate and accomplished writers — know their audience. Although Verso proclaims itself the "imprint of New Left Books," there is barely a whisper of Marxism in *Blaming the Victims*, much less an apologia for the Soviet Union or terrorism. Rather, the editors have carefully limited the essays included here (more than half of which have been previously published) to attacks on Israel and the United States.

The result has to be deemed impressive for, no matter how tendentious, the essays are judicious in tone, factual, and amply documented. Indeed, this combination suggests that anti-Israel scholarship has finally shed its extremist, irrational past and come of age. Noam Chomsky here still calls Ronald Reagan and Shimon Peres "two of the world's leading terrorist commanders," and he reaches a hysterical pitch when accusing Israeli forces of attacking hospitals, but his chapter is an exception. Other essays, especially the six written by the editors, are mellifluous, engaging, and even slightly humorous.

But after trudging through nearly 300 pages of lovingly minute analysis of Israeli and American sins, one has to wonder why the authors bother, what inspires them to churn out this carefully crafted nonsense, and what purpose their effort serves. In the end, one cannot avoid coming back to two standard explanations: a large dose of anti-Americanism, with a sprinkling of anti-Semitism, underlies virtually every word in this book.

Deterrence without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy. By Avner Yaniv. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1987. 324 pp. $35.00.

Yaniv gives a chronological approach to Israel's strategy of deterrence up through the dénouement of the Lebanese War. Although many treatises on Israeli strategy exist in Hebrew, rather little of broad scope has been available in English. This lack alone makes *Deterrence without the Bomb* noteworthy. But it has merit beyond that.

Yaniv establishes his frame of analysis by noting that deterrence is a very American concept based on American experience. The classic formulation assumes a war of nerves and intelligence; a confrontation between small groups of decision makers rather than between nations; brief, spasmodic crises; a rough symmetry in power; and the acceptance of an either/or strategy. None of these premises, Yaniv argues, fit Israel's circumstances and authors struggle to refashion the concept into one that is protracted, socially wide, asymmetrical, and differential.

The detailed narrative of Yaniv's book occasionally loses its theme, and sometimes stutters over emotional issues and evocative personalities. Nevertheless, it is on balance clear and persuasive. Yaniv realizes Israel cannot create a war-winning military potential

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capable of dictating a peace, such as the peace that followed World War II. But he is clearly annoyed that the tactical aspects of deterrence have been disconnected from the broader social and political ones. He closes by projecting the Israeli security dilemma into the future and asks if an admission that Israel has nuclear weapons is a likely answer. The question is parried, but parried expertly, and the future left to provide the answer. A.M.G.

The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations. By James A. Bill. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988. 520 pp. $25.00.

Bill reviews the history of relations between America and Iran, then analyzes the reasons for their turning out so badly. Though the effort put into this volume represents nearly three decades of work, it is work vitiated by flaws deep and numerous. Deepest of all is the complete one-sidedness of Bill's approach, always blaming Americans and never Iranians for mistakes. The terrible state of relations since 1979, for example, results only from U.S. "malevolence," and not from Iranian hatreds. The author's one-sided, blame-America treatment distorts the dynamics of a complex tie and renders his book far too unbalanced to be trusted.

In his most unpleasant chapter ("Pahlavism in America"), Bill transparently sets out to settle old scores with those Americans who crossed his path. The resulting mix of gossip and envy has no place in a scholarly study. Bill's impatience with U.S. policy at the time of the Iranian Revolution is particularly vexing, given that his own analysis on the eve of the shah's fall unambiguously predicted that the religious leaders "would never participate in the formal government structure." Worse, he thought they sought the restoration of a liberal order and that the "professional middle classes" dominated the opposition to the shah.

Although Bill is a specialist on Iran, he understands exceedingly little about that country; indeed, he does not seem interested in it. Instead, he falls into the trap of seeing the world only in terms of U.S. foreign policy. The result is a thin, unsatisfactory analysis. Barry Rubin's *Paved With Good Intentions,* although now eight years old, remains the standard account of U.S.-Iran relations. Skip this one.

Egypt Revealed: Scenes from Napoleon's *Description de l'Egypte.* Edited by Robert Anderson and Ibrahim Fawzy. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1987. (Distributed by Columbia University Press.) 196 pp. $49.95.

In anticipation of his invasion of Egypt in 1798, Napoleon formed a Commission of Arts and Science, made up of 165 French scholars in many fields of learning. The result of their efforts was the mon-

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umental *Description de l'Egypte*, a massive attempt to record all aspects of life in early nineteenth-century Egypt. This undertaking took more than thirty years to complete and yielded twenty-six volumes of text plus eleven elephant folio volumes of plates produced by 400 engravers and 1,600 other artisans. But the very sumptuousness of the book has always kept it virtually out of sight. Anderson and Fawzi have taken the obvious, long overdue step of excerpting the *Description*'s plates, and making a selection of 196 splendid engravings available to a wider audience. With the help of five other contributors, they have attached brief but useful explanations to each picture. Full color reproductions would have made this book prohibitively expensive, one knows, but it is still a shame that all the reproductions are in black and white. Now, the editors should take the next step and produce an equally useful volume of texts excerpted from the *Description*.

Eighteenth-Century Renewal and Reform in Islam. Edited by Nehemia Levtzion and John O. Voll. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1987. 200 pp. $24.95.

Conventional chronology holds that the Muslim world fell from the splendors of the medieval period starting about the fourteenth century, and that it continued to decline until reaching rock bottom in the 1700s. Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 marked the beginning of the modern age, defined as a time of intense interaction with the West.

Recent research has been punching holes in this simple outline, especially the part concerning the eighteenth century. The present volume — an excellent and highly original undertaking — will speed the process along. The editors contend that as historical research moves away from the confines of military and political subjects, and takes up social and religious developments, it becomes clear that what once appeared to be an era of unblemished decline was in fact far more complex. Yes, the empires of the Middle East were weakened and impoverishment was widespread, but intellectual ferment and religious expansion of great importance were taking place. To note just one example, the fundamentalist cast of the eighteenth-century reform movements has probably had much to do with the rigorist and puritanical tenor of so many reform movements in the modern age. Accordingly, the editors rightly plead that the era between the old grandeur and the modern experience "be examined as something more than simply an epilogue or a preface to the study of some other subject."

The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, 1950-1985. By Abdullah Omran Taryam. London: Croom Helm, 1987. 290 pp. $65.00.

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Though presented as an academic review, Taryam's history is most valuable as an insider's account of the delicate and intricate talks that led to the establishment of the United Arab Emirates in 1971. Having been a delegate to the talks from the emirate of Sharjah (and a federal minister of the seven-member UAE from 1971 to 1979), Taryam has new information on his subject. Unfortunately, he has not managed to make it accessible to a general audience. Only someone well versed in the subject will be able to find the novel elements here and know where they fit into the larger picture. For non-specialists, Taryam's account offers little more than a partial and often biased (anti-British and anti-Iranian) account.

The Geopolitics of Israel's Border Question. By Saul Cohen. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986. 124 pp. $18.00.

Cohen, a political geographer, offers a useful, tightly argued proposal to update the Allon Plan. With an eye toward the territorial compromises Israel might make, he surveys all four regions won by Israel in 1967 and still under its control (the Golan Heights, the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip). Cohen seeks a way for Israel to retain the strategic benefits of the territory without having to rule a large Arab population. At a moment when the Likud and Labor parties' approaches have been discredited, such fresh thinking has special usefulness.

Cohen argues that Israel should retain 48 percent of the Golan Heights, 20 percent of the West Bank, and 19 percent of the Gaza Strip. In addition, he advocates the establishment of five corridors (two in the West Bank, two in Israel, one in Gaza) and a leased security zone for Israel's benefit in the West Bank. These ideas are hardly neat or simple, but their virtue lies in a precision of detail and a careful attention to local circumstance. Indeed, the very complexity of the scheme might help defuse the intense controversy that would inevitably surround it.

But Cohen's proposals raise a question: why stop with territorial adjustments that increase Israel's size? If some heavily Arab portions of Israel proper were also put on the bargaining table, this would stimulate Arab interest while diminishing the Arab population of Israel.

King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan. By Mary C. Wilson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 289 pp. $42.50.

Wilson offers the first full-length and scholarly study of 'Abdullah, who was the ruler of Jordan from 1921 to 1951 and one of the major political figures of the twentieth-century Middle East. Drawing upon considerable literary skills and a wealth of research, she succeeds in tracing 'Abdullah's life from his pleasant childhood on the shores of

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the Bosporus in the 1890s to his efforts to control the West Bank in the 1950s. As a biography of a Middle Eastern figure that is also a pleasure to read, this book is a great rarity.

Its faults lie mainly in the realm of politics. First, Wilson is both ignorant of Israel and biased against it, so that many of her comments about the state are inaccurate. Second, she is surprisingly unaware of the important role Pan-Syrian nationalism played in motivating 'Abdullah. Instead, she ascribes his irredentism only to the weakness of his base in Jordan. It was weak, to be sure, but even had it not been, 'Abdullah's long commitment to Greater Syria would have caused him to seek to expand. Wilson also makes the unfortunate mistake of seeing Palestine as an alternate to the "Syrian hobby-horse." In fact, 'Abdullah always considered Palestine a part of Syria. But these are minor problems in an otherwise excellent study.

Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume IX, 1984-85. Edited by Itamar Rabinovich and Haim Shaked. Tel Aviv: Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1987. (Distributed by Westview Press.) 735 pp. $85.00.

The contributors largely agree that 1985 was a year in which basic changes did not take place in the Middle East. Gabriel Ben-Dor notes that "there was 'lots of motion but very little movement.' There were no major breakthroughs, and no stalemates were broken. . . . No major problems were resolved, and no new horizons were opened." Barry Rubin holds that "there was no regional crisis . . . nor internal upheavals, nor threats to Gulf security." Writers on inter-Arab relations, Islamic affairs, the Iraq-Iran war, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israel, and Turkey all confirm these generalizations.

As ever, the Dayan Center has pulled together the events of a year with precision and great clarity. The planned change to calendar-year coverage in 1986 will bring the *Survey* into line with other reference books and make it easier to use. Rightly, the editors devote nearly half the annual to regional affairs and the rest to a country-by-country survey. The one serious complaint has to do with timeliness. Although articles for this volume were written in early 1986, it took two years for the book to appear in print. If only the editors could shave one year off this process, their efforts would gain even greater utility.

Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. By Charles D. Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988. 308 pp. $35.00.

Smith tells us that he wrote this work as a college text for lack of an alternative but his narrative is so complicated, so detailed, and so taken up with controversy that it would drive most undergraduates

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to distraction. Nor does it have much to offer scholars, for the compression and interpretation contain nothing especially new. It would seem that either Smith overdid it for a text or underdid it for a scholarly work, probably the former.

Smith has a voracious appetite for detail and has evidently consulted a myriad of sources. Unfortunately, he seems to have taken these sources at face value, without sensitivity to the emotions and politicization of historical truth. While the narrative as a whole demonstrates no obvious bias, and apparently means to be fair, little episodes of hyperbole and illogic as well as plain error creep in. For example, Smith reports that Ben-Gurion was so jealous of Israeli freedom of action in the 1950s — Smith does not say exactly when — that he refused American suggestions of a security pact. But the evidence suggests otherwise.

Nor has Smith avoided the temptation to bring the narrative as close to the moment of publication as possible, and this has created other difficulties. A number of judgments made about very recent events are not likely to stand the test of time, and a half dozen pages of the final chapter have already perished. On balance, this is a worthy, if somewhat innocently researched, effort in search of an appropriate readership. A.M.G.

Past Trials and Present Tribulations: A Muslim Fundamentalist's View of the Jews. By Ronald L. Nettler. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987. 92 pp. $20.95.

Bernard Lewis has argued, in *Semites and Anti-Semites* (1986), that the Muslim attitude toward Jews underwent a major change as it came under Western influence in the nineteenth century. By contrast, Nettler stresses the continuity in attitude from the origins of Islam to the present. He traces the recent outpouring of anti-Semitism in the Middle East to a combination of long-standing Islamic dogmas and current exigency. The result is a "fine edge of unprecedented hatred" which deepens, transcends, and informs the conflict with Israel.

Nettler considers the Egyptian thinker Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) the key to the fusion of archaic and modern; thus, in addition to analyzing Qutb's writings, *Past Trials* includes a translation of his essay, "Our Struggle With the Jews." The wealth of knowledge and insight Nettler packs into this brief study ensures its lasting importance in the discussion of Muslim-Jewish relations.

Religious Resurgence: Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Edited by Richard T. Antoun and Mary Elaine Hegland. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press. 269 pp. $27.50.

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Antoun and Hegland have published a grab bag of essays, covering a variety of disciplines and subjects; some of the essays are useful, others not. Starting from the premise that "the thoughtful observer of current events and trends can find ample evidence to suspect a fresh resurgence" of the three major monotheisms, the editors look for the common factors. The resulting essays include some fine insights (for example, on the decline of Muslim piety in Iran since Khomeini took power); one or two excellent efforts (especially John O. Voll's essay on the Muslim perception of the "failure of the West"); some egregious theorizing (especially Eric Davis's doctrinaire Marxist analysis of Egypt and Israel); and an awful lot of standard social science patter. Despite many authors' efforts to draw parallels between the monotheisms, one comes away from the volume with no sense that common causes exist, only a few shared manifestations.

Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era: Regime and Elites; Conflict and Resolution. By Mordechai Abir. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988. 247 pp. $38.50.

Though never stated explicitly, Abir's purpose is to explain why massive changes in Saudi Arabia during the past thirty-five years have not led to upheaval and revolution. As the subtitle suggests, he sees elites as critical to the state's continued stability. He argues that the country's several elites — royal, religious, technical, and (recently) military — have stayed loyal to the regime because they have been satisfied. "Far from being an absolute monarchy, or a desert democracy, the Saudi regime is an oligarchy, whose cornerstone is the principle of consultation and consensus." Looking to the future, however, the author sees an economic downturn leading to increased opposition.

Abir establishes this less-than-earth-shaking thesis through a painstaking analysis of the standard sources, plus 120 M.A. and Ph.D. dissertations on Saudi public life, mostly by Saudi nationals. Though not impressed by their quality, he does note that several were essential to his understanding of opposition forces and the disenfranchised middle-class elite. Unfortunately, Abir himself writes a prose so lusterless that only devoted students of Saudi affairs or the sociology of elites are likely to make their way through the entire text.

The Third Reich and the Palestine Question. By Francis R. Nicosia. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985. 319 pp. $35.00.

Looking at Nazi policy in the prewar years, 1933-1940, Nicosia comes up with some surprises. Using a great number of archival sources in Germany, France, England, the United States, and Israel, plus first-hand information from Third Reich officials, he makes a

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convincing case that prewar German policy in the Middle East was conservative and cautious. "Between 1933 and 1940, German policy encouraged and actively promoted Jewish emigration to Palestine, recognized and respected Britain's imperial interests throughout the Middle East and remained largely indifferent to the ideals and aims of Arab nationalism."

German officials approved of Zionist emigration to Palestine because they saw this as a way to remove Jews from Europe. But their enthusiasm dimmed in 1937 when the Peel Partition plan raised the specter of an independent Jewish state (a very fearful prospect for convinced Nazis). Hoping to maintain cordial relations with Great Britain, they avoided any step that would seriously challenge British predominance in the Middle East. All of this left little scope for pro-Arab policies, but self-determination for Arabs hardly fit the Nazi world order anyway.

Wartime conditions changed all three of these policies but, Nicosia is correct to point out, it is important not to extrapolate backwards from Hitler's policies of the 1940s to the very different approach of the 1930s.

The U.S. Press and Iran: Foreign Policy and the Journalism of Deference. By William A. Dorman and Mansour Farhang. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. 272 pp. $30.00.

Dorman (a professor of journalism) and Farhang (Khomeini's first ambassador to the United Nations) cannot get over the fact that the U.S. press broadly accepts the basic premises of the American government's foreign policy. Blaming this unhappy coincidence on the persistence of "a cold-war mentality," they suggest that it led to a "generally uninformed and often highly ethnocentric" coverage of Iran during the period of their study, 1951-1978. Arguing against what they call the "conventional left" (and where that leaves the authors is an interesting question), they deny the central importance of commercial considerations in setting journalism's agenda. The real key, as the authors see it, is the journalist's foolhardy devotion to objectivity and allergy to ideology. "The greatest hurdle American journalists have to overcome before coverage of foreign affairs will improve is their belief that they are nonideological." In short, Dorman and Farhang want to transform the *New York Times* into a daily version of *The Nation*.

Unfortunately for them, this will never happen, for the audience in a liberal democracy confronted with the Soviet threat is not about to agree to so fundamental a rejection of the policies it has supported for over forty years. And if, by chance, the *Times* did make the changes Dorman and Farhang seek, it would rapidly lose its place as

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a powerful molder of opinion. This book's objectives are as hopeless as they are pernicious.

The Yellow Wind. By David Grossman. Translated from the Hebrew by Haim Watzman. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1988. 216 pp. $17.95.

Grossman, a well-known Israeli novelist, has penned a captivating personal odyssey through the occupied territories amid occupied Arabs and preoccupied Jews, that feels like Camus at his existentialist best. But the "struggle to stay human" amid the violence and political coercion is a struggle that resonates with educated publics in Israel and in the West — but not with many Middle Easterners. Indeed, *The Yellow Wind* is, like certain earlier works (Amos Oz's *In the Land of Israel*, for example), so philosophically and literarily Western that it will surely have a larger readership in New York City alone than in Israel, certainly larger than it will have among Arabs. For all its literary merit, therefore, *The Yellow Wind* is from but not of the Middle East, from but not of the Middle East conflict.

In a way, this epitomizes the Israeli dilemma: however sweet the dreams and noble the experience of Israel forty years passing, Israel as a living society has been dragged down to the level of the region by those on both sides, but mainly the Arab side, who care little for peace. Although most Israelis have yielded to reality, Grossman resists it kicking and screaming. *The Yellow Wind* may sadden some and confirm others in their realism but, either way, essentially and movingly, it is mostly irrelevant to Middle Eastern realities.

A.M.G.

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
by Arthur Waldron

Arming the Dragon: U.S. Security Ties with the People's Republic of China. By A. James Gregor. Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1987. 139 pp. $19.75 ($7.95, paper).

Gregor's troubling little book surveys the U.S. security relationship with the People's Republic of China, stressing the confusions, inconsistencies, and risks. The author reviews the origins of the connection in Kissinger's "triangular diplomacy" and recalls the ambitious scenarios then current in Washington, including (as one planning paper put it) "a far-reaching military relationship with China."

Wildly unrealistic as such ideas were, at least they had a coherent rationale. The problem with the relationship today, according to

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Gregor, is that although the original rationale is discredited, no new set of guiding principles has replaced it. The U.S.-PRC military relationship no longer has a clear purpose, yet it continues, and the measures undertaken to implement it only increase the confusion. Thus, much of the technology transferred to China over the last few years has not gone to the army, which faces the USSR and needs modernization. It has gone, rather, to the air force and navy, which are too weak to figure against the USSR but could remove the current margins of safety that help keep such U.S. friends as the ASEAN countries and Taiwan reasonably secure. Gregor argues persuasively that to continue the present confused approach will create real dangers, and urges that the whole relationship be carefully re-examined and redefined.

China's Continuous Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch, 1949-1981. By Lowell Dittmer. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. 335 pp. $35.00.

Maoism is distinguished by a belief that revolution is an ongoing process, ever repeated and renewed. This rigorous study examines how that conviction affected post-1949 China almost down to the present, when the whole idea has been implicitly abandoned. In this first-rate work of political analysis, Dittmer builds a narration on an exhaustive study of the written sources. He shuns easy generalizations, stressing instead the particular configuration of causes that led to each twist and turn of the story. His general framework, that of "continuous revolution," works well too, so long as he confines himself to using Maoist theory to explain Chinese politics. But anyone who reads the book is bound to wonder whether "revolution" really has a general meaning any more, and whether political scientists might do best simply to discard it as an analytical category. Certainly it is either conceptually superfluous in Dittmer's account, or belied by the facts.

The Dragon and the Wild Goose: China and India. By Jay Taylor. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1987. 306 pp. $37.50.

Competition between China and India — the earth's first and second largest countries — promises to become an increasingly important theme in international relations of the years ahead. Leaders in both countries see themselves as natural leaders of Asia, and their common border remains tense. Yet very little serious scholarly effort has gone into comparing the two countries' pasts or considering their futures. This book offers a fine beginning. Taylor looks at history, culture, politics, science, the arts, even sex, but he is perhaps most helpful when he compares the economies, and (particularly in the Indian case) summarizes complex political developments. No partic-

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ularly riveting insights emerge from the pages, but Taylor is a judicious summarizer and appraiser. He sifts through the comparative economic evidence carefully and critically (though he perhaps underestimates India's future performance) and is refreshingly positive about India's democracy. One wishes that he had spent more time on the military.

The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism. Edited by Frederic C. Deyo. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987. 252 pp. $29.95 ($12.95, paper).

For economists accustomed to analyzing development through theories of dependency, the postwar experience of East Asia poses many challenges. The essays collected by Deyo address some of these challenges from the "political economy" perspective that seeks to displace both free market and neo-Marxist analyses. The essays are all useful and, taken together, provide as good a review of the evidence and the literature as can be found. But it is not clear exactly where they lead. They stress the emergence in Asia of "developmental states," and lay great stress on the governmental role in facilitating and guiding development. Such states, however, can be successful only if they set national sails to economic winds; that is, they must create incentive structures that are congruent with market demands. Yet several of the authors seem far more comfortable with states than with markets as primary actors. Clearly general theories of growth — most of which explain why it cannot occur outside Europe and America — are still digesting the Asian experience.

Who's Who in the People's Republic of China. 2nd Edition. By Wolfgang Bartke. Munich: K.G. Saur, 1987. 795 pp. $150.00.

Bartke still practices China-watching the old-fashioned way. Since 1958 he has been systematically combing the sources (above all radio broadcasts and the press) for clues about the backgrounds and careers of important figures in China — an eminently sensible approach to a country where rule is by individuals, and not by institutions, laws, or ideology. By now Bartke has files on approximately 60,000 individuals and of these, 2,026 were included in the first edition of this invaluable reference work, while the much improved second edition treats 3,700, with an overlap of only 917 names. In addition to the brief biographies, many with photographs, thorough charts of the personnel in the Chinese government are provided, as are indexes by occupation. This book is a must for anyone who is serious about China.

Who's Who implicitly corrects two harmful tendencies in China-watching. The first, a particular temptation with the opening of the recent years, is to substitute personal contacts and Peking gossip for

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rigorous research. The second is to view Chinese politics in terms of vague generalities — such as "reformers" and "hard-liners." To browse in Bartke's work is to be reminded that Chinese politics remains personal and highly complex: common provincial origins, marriage or adoption, shared service in an army or a ministry are among the most useful threads to trace.

THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
by Vladimir Tismaneanu

Eastern Europe and Communist Rule. By J. F. Brown. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1988. 562 pp. $48.50 ($15.95, paper).

Brown, a veteran student of communist affairs, examines structural similarities and national idiosyncracies in all the East European communist regimes, meaning not just the Warsaw Pact but also Albania and Yugoslavia. Particularly interesting is the chapter on social problems: the demographic and urbanization issues, the alienated youth, the alternative subcultures, the pervasive corruption, the social stratification, and the degraded physical environment. He also gives proper emphasis to the continuing issue of nationality; official claims to the contrary, disputes over national identity remain a major source of domestic friction in Eastern Europe and a major source of friction between communist allies. Brown contends that, in combination, the social issues and the minority questions are leading to social turmoil and political unrest in Eastern Europe. Looking to the future, he argues that Soviet interests and East European aspirations will remain incompatible, and that this tension will more often than not remain, even in the Gorbachev era.

Lenin and the Mensheviks: The Persecution of Socialists under Bolshevism. By Vera Broido. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. 216 pp. $32.00.

Writing loosely, authors tend to use the terms "Marxist" and "Bolshevik" as though the two were identical. But that is far from the case, for there were important groups of non-Bolshevik Marxists before 1917, especially the Mensheviks. Broido — both of whose parents were leading Mensheviks and whose mother disappeared into the Gulag during the 1930s — tells the story of Russia's "other Marxists," some of whom had revolutionary credentials that rivaled Lenin's.

Skillfully documenting her impassioned tale with the memoirs and archives of the principal Menshevik leaders, Broido draws a

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portrait of Lenin and his supporters that challenges the myth of a democratically minded Bolshevik elite ready to cooperate with other socialist groups. She shows how costly was the Mensheviks' illusion in 1917 that the major threat to the revolution came from the right. When the opposition finally awoke, after the Bolsheviks had established a one-party system, it was too late for them. As the Menshevik leader Martov wrote in 1919, "Illegal agitation is infinitely more difficult under a regime like the Bolshevik . . . than under tsarism."

The Bolsheviks systematically harassed and eventually vanquished other leftist groups too, including the Social Revolutionaries (both right and left), Maximalists, Populist Socialists, Anarchists, the Jewish *Bund*, and the Zionist Labour party, *Poalei Tsion*. Broido chronicles the prolonged ordeal of the members of these anti-Bolshevik organizations through prisons, labor camps, and into exile. The result enriches our understanding of terror and resistance in Lenin's times.

Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide. By Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986. 294 pp. $29.95.

Though their book is similar in coverage to Shirin Akiner's *Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union: A Historical and Statistical Handbook* (reviewed in ORBIS, Fall 1987), Bennigsen and Wimbush cover fewer ethnic groups and devote less space to them. They devote more attention than Akiner to demographic trends and to the role of Islam, making the two volumes complementary and both very useful to the student of Soviet Islam. Indeed, the appearance of these two works helps codify the subject of Soviet Muslims, and the growing availability of such good information on these people suggests this still obscure topic is beginning to attract the attention it deserves. The future of the USSR will be profoundly influenced by the political awakening of the Muslims, and the West needs to be prepared.

D.P.

Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia: From Lenin to Gorbachev. By Robert C. Tucker. New York: Norton, 1987. 214 pp. $22.50.

According to Tucker, a very respected Soviet expert, Lenin's Bolshevism was "a revolutionary culture that grew by accretion from its early beginnings around the turn of the century to Lenin's last period of activity under the NEP." Stalinism, in his view, was not a continuation of Leninism, but the result of a breakdown in the revolutionary culture. It is this breakdown that Gorbachev deplores and has tried to eradicate in his campaign of de-Stalinization. Stalinism is his foremost obstacle to the reinvention of the Bolshevik ethos.

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Thus, Tucker writes, an ideological malaise — "the widespread failure of belief" — is at the very heart of the present predicament of Soviet society.

Tucker believes that Gorbachev's abolishment of the Stalinist system will transform Russia, nothing less: "Although professing some form of Marxist and Leninist ideas, it will be a Russia that has learned to live at home with a mixed economy, a non-repressive polity, and an unregimented cultural life. It will be a Russia tolerant of diversity in its neighbouring sphere of influence and one whose international efforts are directed to working with willing governments and other constructive political forces abroad to check the present global drift to environmental disaster, contain the threat of war, and sustain a world fit for the generations yet to come. In other words, a Russia worth believing in." No doubt, this would be the most fortunate dénouement of the current struggle in the Soviet elite. But in order for it to come true, Gorbachev would need to triumph over his less-reformist opponents. What will be the reaction of the Leninist fundamentalists at the moment Lenin's legacy will come under scrutiny? On the other hand, it is not certain that the general secretary himself is ready to embrace the program of an overall pluralization of the Soviet society. One can be a party reformer without being a restorer of the civil society.

Red Horizons: Chronicles of a Communist Chief Spy. By Ion Mihai Pacepa. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1987. 426 pp. $19.95.

Before defecting to the West in 1978, Pacepa was chief adviser on intelligence to the Romanian dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu. He directed not only espionage operations against the West but also intra-party conspiracies and security police repression. His memoirs offer an invaluable glimpse into Ceausescu's methods and intentions and, indeed, into the workings of all communist states.

According to Pacepa, Ceausescu has always been a hardened Stalinist and a fervid enemy of liberal democracies. Despite a reputation for neutrality in the Middle East, Ceausescu has become the PLO's best friend in Eastern Europe, and his support for 'Arafat has been unwavering. "Brother Yassir" visits "comrade Nicolae" more frequently than any other communist leader. According to Pacepa, their talks bear upon all the sensitive issues, including preparations for terrorist attempts. It is not only that 'Arafat indulges in promiscuous orgies in Bucharest — copiously depicted by Pacepa — but also that, with the Romanian tyrant's assistance, the PLO has engineered many of its murderous actions. Ceausescu's anti-Soviet stances in foreign affairs were posturings to gain a privileged status in the West and thereby obtain important economic and technological assets. Far from rejecting Soviet tutelage, Romanian secret services cooperate

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closely with their sister organizations in the Warsaw Pact. Ceausescu himself orders and supervises terrorist operations against exiled critics of the regime. Disinformation is one of his favorite weapons against the West. We owe to Pacepa precious details about the extraordinary Romanian infiltrations in Western media, economic, and religious communities. We also learn about the active involvement of Romanian diplomats in intelligence activities usually described as espionage. Ceausescu himself conceived of the *Red Horizons* scenario in 1972 and Romanian secret services have furthered its success ever since. According to Pacepa, this grandiose deceptive plan aimed to convince the West of Romania's independence. To achieve this objective, all methods, no matter how abject, have been remorselessly employed: blackmailing foreign diplomats, forging documents to compromise "unfriendly" political personalities in the West, munificently rewarding rapacious journalists for celebrating "achievements," and using intelligence officers as Casanovas or femmes fatales. Pacepa's book reads like an anthology of unchecked infamy. It is not that espionage, or covert operations, are usually clean. But the level of Ceausescu's cynicism, as revealed by his former underling, outreaches one's wildest suspicions.

Domestically, the rise of Ceausescu's family in party and state affairs, especially his wife Elena, has found in Pacepa a knowledgeable chronicler. His chapters dealing with the mechanisms of power in contemporary Romania thrill even as they appall. Both Ceausescus, he shows, frantically enjoy luxury and unashamed opulence even while preaching to their subjects the virtues of asceticism. Elena's collection of jewels and furs would make envious the nabobs of this world. Nicolae owns dozens of mansions with hunting parks. Thinking of the future, they have deposited huge amounts of hard currency in Swiss banks. Their son Nicu, whom they are grooming for succession, appears as an alcoholic and a morbid womanizer. As for the camarilla, Ceausescu's lieutenants seem to have lost any sense of dignity. But one notices that some of the Politburo members privately confess their frustration with the presidential couple's behavior. Pacepa's book deals with events of the 1970s. Since then, the situation in Romania has gone from bad to worse, and the grotesque features of dynastic socialism are no longer a secret. No sociological study, this is the memoir of a witness who has seen some of the most depressing — sometimes nauseating — episodes of Ceausescu's despotic rule.

Socialist Authority: The Hungarian Experience. By Peter A. Toma. New York: Praeger, 1988. 288 pp. $49.95.

Hungary has become the showcase of less repressive Soviet-style rule during the thirty-plus years of Janos Kadar's rule. But, as recent

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signals from Budapest suggest, "goulash socialism" engenders its own tensions. While the most intelligent of Hungary's rulers are convinced that only markets can solve the country's economic predicament, they resist the creation of independent, self-governing organizations. Toma highlights the regime's oscillating economic reforms and the corresponding effects those have on the suppression of active political life. To illustrate these tensions, Toma details a series of case studies which show the ways individuals deal with the regime's political controls.

The author is particularly interested in the ideological underpinnings of the Hungarian model. He emphasizes the limits to liberalization dictated by the regime's subordination to Moscow. Most notable among these limits is the impossiblity of expanding economic reforms into a broader framework of political democratization. The communist elite takes credit for its toleration of criticism, but the two major constraints — the leading role of the party and the ultimate power of the USSR — are still sacrosanct. As a result, all the promises and even all the realities of Hungarian liberalization seem to lead nowhere. The vanguard troops of goulash communism march up the hill, only to march down again.

"Them": Stalin's Polish Puppets. By Teresa Toranska. New York: Harper & Row, 1987. 384 pp. $22.95.

Toranska, a journalist closely associated with Solidarity, has interviewed five of the people who helped establish Poland's post-World War II Stalinist regime. Her achievement as an inteviewer and a debater is superb. By simply persuading these former potentates to speak, Toranska has made history. In addition, her well-directed questions and sardonic interventions help to reconstruct long-forgotten moments of fanaticism, intrigue, betrayal, and debasement.

It appears from these interviews that Polish Stalinists were concerned only with holding on to their own power; this they achieved by faithfully serving their Soviet masters. To achieve total control over a traditionally rebellious civil society, they imported a political model from the Soviet Union based on terror and ideological orthodoxy.

Beyond the historical detail they provide, these conversations offer students of communist affairs an opportunity to fathom the psychology of the Stalinist mind. How has Edward Ochab, a former chief of state, retained his quasi-religious belief that the Stalinist epoch in Poland (1944-1955) will remain "throughout the centuries the foundation of a new era, a people's era, in the march toward a classless society"? How could Jakub Berman, the most sophisticated of Toranska's interviewees, remain convinced that Poland must stay in the

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Soviet camp lest it disappear? And how has Stefan Staszewski, a former party boss in Warsaw, come to dramatically renounce communism as "the rule of the minority over the majority"? Deceivers as they certainly were, maybe the Stalinists were also deceived by a mechanism they refused to understand but which they faithfully served.

LATIN AMERICA
by Michael Radu

Close Neighbors, Distant Friends: United States-Central American Relations. By John E. Findling. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1987. 240 pp. $35.00.

There is little here that has not been said before and better. The author is oblivious to anything that would damage his image of Central America as the victim of an indifferent and arrogant Washington. In every instance Findling toes the liberal line on major events in the history of U.S.-Central American relations. When discussing the fall of the Arbenz regime, for example, the controlling influence of local and foreign Communists is neither mentioned nor denied — just neglected, and America's motivation becomes "Cold War paranoia" and United Fruit's greed.

Nor are more recent developments in the region seriously analyzed. The nature of the Nicaraguan regime is either ignored or misleadingly presented. For example, Findling simply refuses to confront Sandinista support for insurgent groups throughout the region. And he repeats the nonsensical claim that 60 percent of the economy is in private hands, when all credit, export and import policies and institutions, wage and price levels, and employment practices are under state control. On the other side, he has not the vaguest familiarity with the Contras, repeating assertions the Sandinistas themselves have dropped.

The author is apparently unaware of the most significant scholarly volumes on his topic, including those by Robert Leiken and Mark Falcoff, nor does he even seem to know of older, recognized works. Finally, he is apparently uninterested in the two major developments throughout the region — nationalism on the right and Marxism-Leninism on the left. That is the only plausible explanation for the absence of any analysis of primary sources from the military and conservative parties or, conversely, from the FMLN in El Salvador or the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

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Forging Peace: The Challenge of Central America. By Richard Fagen. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987. 161 pp. $7.95 (paper).

A foreword by George McGovern quickly signals this volume's thrust: "Come Home, America." Fagen, a former member of the "Venceremos Brigades," believes that the United States has no legitimate strategic interests in Latin America, nor has it any "right" to such interests. He states that "United States policy toward Central America has been a disaster for the citizens of that war-torn region, and for the United States as well." It is a fitting start, inasmuch as this is also the content and the conclusion of the book.

Fagen sees U.S. options as clear: Washington's choice is between "a policy of containment and roll-back or one of diplomacy and demilitarization." Containment of communism, let alone its roll-back, is bad — although, mysteriously, the author also denies that the Sandinistas are Communists. If they are not, what is the point of talking about containment or roll-back? Diplomacy, in the author's opinion, means dealing with your enemy by making concessions to him. What other option is there, since the use of American force is bad? And that brings up demilitarization. Demilitarization does not apply to Nicaragua — just because it has militarized forces greater than those of the rest of Central America combined. No, demilitarization applies to the dozens of U.S. military personnel in El Salvador and Guatemala, or to the larger number of those passing through Honduras. Fagen uses the "scholarly approach," perhaps to impress unwary readers, but his most likely victims are activists in search of "academic" excuses.

Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution. By Donald C. Hodges. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987. 378 pp. $11.50 (paper).

For two decades, Hodges has proved that being a Marxist did not mean applauding the crimes of the Tupamaros, Montoneros, and assorted Latin American leftist insurgents, terrorists, and fanatics. He has been one of the few Marxist scholars dealing with Latin America who have made massive, often invaluable contributions to the understanding of the Latin American left. Unfortunately, his latest volume is a departure from his previous scholarly standards and from his usual ideological restraint.

In this volume Hodges has two ideological aims: to make "Sandinismo" a coherent ideology (or at least a stream of mutually compatible ideas), and to tell the ruling Sandinistas what to avoid — i.e., Soviet-style communism. He has failed in scholarship, as well as in his recipes, producing the longest, most forgettable book of his career.

Hodges is squaring the circle when he attempts to demonstrate that Augusto César Sandino was the founder of an original Central

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American version of "socialism." Sandino was, in fact, the bastard son of a prominent Liberal father, intellectually (and formally) a semi-literate, and a believer in his own half-baked mixture of Christianity, theosophy, Free Masonry, Zoroastrian myths, unionism, socialism, communism, and everything else. He also liked to torture people, and he disliked Communists — namely, the Comintern agents who tried to boss him around, as the pestering Salvadoran, Farabundo Marti, did. It is sad to see Hodges straining to make a thinker of this semi-bandit. But sadder still is that Hodges, at the end of his career, still believes a truly "socialist" interpretation of communism in the Third World is possible. Tomás Borge knows better — one cannot be anti-Soviet and stay in power as a "progressive."

Miguel Marmol. By Roque Dalton. Translated by Kathleen Ross and Richard Schaaf. Willimantic, Conn.: Curbstone Press, 1987. 503 pp. $19.95.

Thanks to the National Endowment for the Arts, the Connecticut Commission on Arts, and the New York State Council on the Arts, we now have a splendidly presented biography of the foremost Central American Stalinist, written by El Salvador's favorite communist "martyr." (Dalton was shot in 1975 by Joaquin Villalobos, chief of the Marxist-Leninist FMLN guerrilla umbrella organization in El Salvador, who accused him of being a "CIA and Cuban" agent.) Esthetically, the taxpayers got their money's worth — intellectually, they have got some disturbing echoes from the worst years of Stalinism.

In brief, Marmol was born in Ilopango, El Salvador, in 1905, and became one of the founders of the Salvadoran Communist party in the early 1920s. Captured during the 1932 communist insurrection, he was shot and left for dead. Surviving, he escaped, spent most of his life in exile — often in Mexico, at some point in Guatemala or Cuba but far more often in the Soviet Union — and in the early 1980s he was still active in the cause, as the Salvadoran Communists' representative in Moscow.

Like most Stalinists who write an autobiography — Dalton's role is largely that of a clerk taking notes — Marmol is perfectly honest, making this an important book for anyone seriously interested in Central American modern history, political myths (Marmol and Dalton are prominent ones), and the ideological background of the present Salvadoran insurgency.

National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America. By Lars Schoultz. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987. 377 pp. $12.95 (paper).

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Although Schoultz's analysis rests on an understanding of Latin America that ranges from incomplete to incoherent, and although his "facts" are mostly not facts or misconstrued, this book is important. It reflects and articulates the beliefs about Latin America, and about appropriate U.S. policy toward Latin America, that prevail among a significant segment of the U.S. policy-making community, not least, the Democratic party's leadership.

No expert in the region of his concern, Schoultz focuses instead on the beliefs of U.S. policy makers. Thus, when the Reagan administration expressed concern about the length of the runway Grenada wanted to build (with Cuban help), Schoultz is chiefly concerned with the "assumptions" made by Washington politicos on the probable use of such an airfield. Whether such an airfield in fact threatens U.S. security is not as interesting as positing the ideological assumption of Reaganites. That is a dangerous approach for someone who implicitly admits, and abundantly proves, that he is ignorant of most Latin American realities.

Schoultz's most timely argument, with a large constituency in the U.S. Congress, is that the United States has an absolute right and duty to protect its strategic interests in Latin America — but fortunately it does not have any such strategic interests to protect, short of (say) Soviet missiles along the Rio Grande. Even a proliferation of Soviet-influenced and armed regimes like Nicaragua is no real problem. They would likely become Yugoslavias. Such analysis serves as a rationalization for the isolationist, xenophobic, and moralizing politicians who are prepared to drop any active U.S. military and strategic role in Latin America.

NicaNotes: A Collection of Newsletters from a Peace Activist's Stay in Nicaragua. By Bob Barns. Nevada City, Calif.: Friendship Press, 1987. 188 pp. $9.95 (paper).

Barns's true beliefs suffuse every page of this book, but those beliefs have nothing to do with peace, at least in the accepted meaning of the term. Barns is a member of Witnesses for Peace, one of the most active branches of the pro-Sandinista support network in the United States. As he states, the group's "goal is to change United States' foreign policy from backing aggression, violence and terrorism to one which fosters justice, peace and friendship." Barns argues that the Sandinistas truly represent those latter three ideals.

This premise always in mind, Barns tells us that "In Guatemala there were many police and soldiers. Here (in Nicaragua) — in a country at war — there are soldiers visible, but not as many in proportion to the population or the area of Guatemala." This is false even as an impression, as anyone who travels to those two countries can witness. More important, as the Sandinista defense minister him-

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self admits, and everyone else under the sun knows, Nicaragua has a far larger military than Guatemala, despite having one-third its population. Yet Barns does not "feel" it, or, more precisely, "feels" the opposite.

On its own merits, this volume deserves obscurity. But what makes it useful, even interesting, is its archetypical character. It exemplifies the mentality of the ignorant, "committed" ideological drifter in today's America, prepared to believe in and fight ("peacefully") on behalf of any society suitably "progressive" and anti-democratic.

Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. By Alfred Stepan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988. 167 pp. $9.95 (paper).

Stepan offers the most comprehensive analysis of the Brazilian military yet published in English. Unlike his few predecessors, he does not display the hostile bias academics generally exhibit when dealing with this subject. But the subtitle is slightly misleading, for Stepan hardly deals with the military establishments of Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile.

In trying to define the nature of the military regime that ruled Brazil between 1964 and 1985, Stepan focuses primarily on the Serviço Nacional de Informaçoes (SNI-National Information Service). Originally a creature of the military, SNI had by the mid-1970s acquired a life apart from and almost hostile to the thinking of many senior officers, articulating maximalist military demands upon society, both during and since the dictatorship. There is considerable doubt, however, that the SNI ever reached the importance and degree of autonomy of a KGB, let alone that it was more powerful than the KGB, as Stepan claims in one of the few obvious and important errors in his analysis.

Stepan describes the attitudes embodied in the SNI as the "new professionalism," a welcome coinage. It emphasizes that these attitudes form a conception of military professionalism different from the American and European conceptions, though not for that reason inferior to them, as most other descriptions imply. This "new professionalism" involves military leaders in the acquisition, rather than the shunning, of political skills, and it is a tribute to Stepan's objectivity that he realizes, his own democratic preferences aside, that the military in Brazil has an important and legitimate political role to play.

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AFRICA
by Michael Radu

The Geopolitics of Southern Africa: South Africa as Regional Superpower. By Kent Hughes Butts and Paul R. Thomas. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. 193 pp. $22.50 (paper).

It is rare and refreshing to find an informed study of South Africa, but this volume provides one of those rare occasions. It is structured around South Africa's dominant position in its region, a position due to superior technology, economic resources, location, and military power. The authors demonstrate that there is simply no alternative to this hegemony, now or in the future, regardless of the nature of the government in Pretoria.

One pillar of Pretoria's regional supremacy is economic leverage. For practical purposes there is no "South African" economy, only a regional one, with Pretoria calling the shots. From Zaire to the Cape the transportation network, trade, technology, and food all run through and from South Africa. Using this insight, Butts and Thomas offer one of the best recent analyses of the impact and effectiveness of sanctions against South Africa. In a very well-documented and balanced manner, every argument for sanctions is examined and dismantled. For this alone, the volume should be required reading for all involved in the debate over U.S. policy on Southern Africa.

On military matters, the authors do less well. Their use of the term "destabilization" to describe South Africa's support for anti-communist insurgencies in Angola and Mozambique assumes that "stability" already exists in Angola or Mozambique. It also assumes that Pretoria has an interest in regional chaos. In fact, Pretoria's regional policy is predicated upon the removal of what it perceives as threats to its own and the region's peace: Soviet-bloc influence and its local revolutionary allies. Whether that perception is correct or not, it is the basis of a sophisticated and rational policy, which the authors describe as consistent and successful.

The Likelihood of Coups. By Rosemary H. T. O'Kane. Aldershot, England: Avebury, 1987. 162 pp. $39.95.

The study of coups has a relatively long history, and any new work risks repetition. The dangers are particularly clear in the case of this volume. Its typology of coups, while extensive, is not original; and an attempt to find general roots for coups is unconvincing.

The author believes that the Third World's vulnerability to fluctuations in commodity prices, and its dependence upon a few major export items, are what "underlie coups." Thus, a collapse in the price of coffee, cocoa, or bananas puts stress on the regime's ability to

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distribute declining resources; that in turn increases or creates dissatisfaction, and thus brings about a violent change of government. The problem with this argument is that it does not match reality. A number of countries in Africa (Ivory Coast), Latin America (Costa Rica), and Asia or the Pacific are highly dependent on a single or few export commodities, but have not experienced coups. Indeed, even the two case studies offered as evidence for the author's thesis — Ghana in 1966 and Brazil in 1964 — do not sustain it. In both instances it was the perceived threat to the corporate interests of the army, and particularly to its continuing monopoly of the means of violence, that moved the military against the government.

It is clear that the author's attempt to find economic determinants for coups is bound to fail, for one simple reason: coups are not economic actions, but primarily political and institutional actions. As a result, ideology, or group interests, or diverging perceptions of national interests are all far more likely to provide a common thread to coups across cultural lines than is economics.

Mozambique: A Dream Undone, The Political Economy of Democracy, 1975-1984. By Bertil Egerö. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1987. 230 pp. No price given.

Sweden has long been a staunch supporter of failed "socialist experiments" in Africa, particularly in Tanzania and Mozambique, and here we have an implicit and painful admission of failure on the part of a leading Swedish neo-Marxist expert on the Third World. In a way, Egerö only states the obvious — that Mozambique is a basket case of Marxism-Leninism — and he states it in tedious neo-Marxist lingo. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see how a believer in the virtues of socialism explains the failure that his country has massively invested in and still supports. And, along the way, Egerö does provides a wealth of information that can be used by others to understand why and how Mozambique and its "revolution" collapsed.

The primary reasons for Mozambique's slide into the present nightmare of famine, anarchy, and social disintegration are the ideology and policies of the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). By 1969, after a few years as an anti-colonial group, FRELIMO became a dogmatic Marxist-Leninist organization. After taking power in 1974, their ideological framework was further reinforced by East German, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Romanian, Soviet, and Cuban advisers, as well as the usual plethora of Western leftists in search of a new Third World country to revolutionize. In short, FRELIMO tried to impose an alien, historically inefficient, and anti-democratic system imported entirely from abroad on an unwilling populace, for whose beliefs, traditions, and welfare it had a complete disregard. Although this is not the volume for acquiring an essential

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understanding of FRELIMO, it is useful because it exposes from the left the process and results of FRELIMO's brutal incompetence.

The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa. Edited by Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988. 357 pp. $32.50.

Rothchild and Chazan have gone far beyond merely providing an accurate diagnosis of Africa's malaise: the weak yet exploitative and intrusive states, with bloated bureaucracies and poorly distributed scarce resources. They have given us one of the best academic interpretations of African politics and political culture.

Most intriguing in their volume is what the editors call "disengagement," by which they mean a growing detachment of civil society from the state. It is a phenomenon that can take one of two forms. The first, rare in Africa but increasingly frequent in Latin America, leads to a "parallel" or "black" economy: the illegal but authentic capitalism of the little guy or tight-knit family, defying the embrace of the state. The other far more disturbing form, likely in African countries, is a process amounting to demodernization: the withdrawal of entire societies or countries from modernity. In Uganda, pre-1979 Equatorial Guinea, and Mozambique, people simply reverted to the primitive politics and economics of self-defense and sheer personal (or family) survival in a de-monetized subsistence economy.

The contributors sense this process, but fail to realize the huge gap now opened between some African states and others. The Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Gabon, Botswana — and perhaps Kenya, Senegal, Zimbabwe, and Swaziland — are safely outside the grip of demodernization. Uganda, most of the Sahel states, Mozambique, Zambia, and perhaps Angola may fall into its grasp. At that not-distant time, it will be as irrelevant to talk about "Africa" as it now is to speak of "Asia."

Southern Africa. An American Enigma. By Sheikh R. Ali. New York: Praeger, 1987. 239 pp. $37.95.

Where has Ali been during the past few years? His description of South Africa's realities are a caricature. We are told that the National party is "Nazi-styled," the government system in South Africa is a "system of genocide," and so on. Nowhere in the volume will a reader learn that the Indians' standard of living is almost equal to the whites'; or that a formal and actual desegregation of universities has taken place; or that the blacks' income is growing far faster than that of the whites, etc. Ali also seems unaware that there is no apartheid in Namibia or that the "pass laws" have been removed in South Africa.

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The author's solutions are no better than his facts. He claims that "Only a unified effort of the OAU [Organization of African Unity] can bring South Africa to submission." But how could such a blatantly ineffective organization, 90 percent of whose members trade with South Africa, ever accomplish that? And if that is the "only" way, why does the author repeat ad nauseam that the fall of the "white-ocracy" is "inevitable," a historical necessity? Strong emotions and weak knowledge have little to contribute to the discussion of South Africa's complex situation — and this particular volume abounds in both.

Superpower Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa. By Samuel M. Makinda. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987. 242 pp. $45.00.

The intricacies of U.S. and Soviet policies in the Horn of Africa receive a thorough analysis here, but one of widely varying quality. For example, the author correctly holds that the superpowers did not create instability in the Horn of Africa during the past decade and a half. They simply found it and jockeyed for position, amid the shifting sands of nationalism, Marxism-Leninism, irredentism, and secessionism, all against a larger background of misery, corruption, and incompetence.

But the author's common sense sometimes fails him. He claims that the initial Cuban refusal to help Ethiopia's Mengistu regime in fighting the Marxist-led Eritrean secessionists indicates the limits of Moscow's ability to use Havana as a surrogate. But turn the facts around — Havana refused to fight its erstwhile protégés in Eritrea, but later did so — and one has demonstrated that Castro cannot long resist Soviet pressure. The book makes some other less-than-convincing cases as well, as when the author tries to explain that the Soviets decided in 1977 to shift their alliance from Somalia to Ethiopia because the latter's case against Somalia was widely supported by African states. Respect for the integrity of international borders is not among Moscow's most consistent foreign-policy characteristics.

In sum, this work provides few new insights or data and only a highly traditional interpretation of events. It is a useful tool for the generalist, but offers far less to the specialist.

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

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

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Savimbi's strategy, as he outlines in POLICY REVIEW, is . . . "to raise the costs of the foreign occupation of Angola until the Cubans and the Soviets can no longer bear the burden." *Norman Podhoretz, Washington Post*

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

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

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Through the wire mesh that covered the cell, the guards would pour over me buckets of urine and excrement that they had collected earlier. . . . That form of torture leaves no physical trace. What does leave traces are the beatings with metal bars or bayonets. My head is covered with still detectable scars and wounds. But what is more harmful to human dignity? Buckets of urine and excrement thrown in one's face or blows from a bayonet?

Armando Valladares
"Torture"

Ties between [America and Iraq] would strengthen the U.S. position in the Persian Gulf, limit the Soviet Union's room for maneuver, and enhance prospects for an Arab-Israeli settlement. The Iranians, left to the cold embrace of the Russian bear, might . . . begin to consider it a very uncomfortable position and wonder if their hysterical, unremitting challenge to Washington had not become a little dangerous. Who knows, the United States might even find that there are some genuine "moderates" in Tehran.

Laurie Mylroie
"The Baghdad Alternative"

South Africa has become the first state possessing nuclear arms, or at least the means to build such arms, that ultimately faces a fundamental internal reorientation of political power — from white minority to black majority rule. Under these circumstances, Western policy makers need to think anew about how Pretoria might use its nuclear arsenal.

Michèle Flournoy and Kurt M. Campbell
"South Africa's Bomb: A Military Option"

What I envision is a partnership between the two wealthiest and most technologically advanced democracies, for the joint exploration of our solar system. Japan and the United States share many common values, not least, a commitment to free inquiry and pluralistic politics. Their joint exploration of Mars would celebrate and advance those shared values. By contrast, the Soviet Union is profoundly opposed to the values on which U.S. liberty is based.

John W. Garver
"Getting to Mars"

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